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ABSTRACT
This study examines the concept o f property rights in relation to fisheries resource 
management in the Maryland oyster fishery. An analysis o f the past and present state o f this 
fishery on the Chesapeake Bay focused on the administrative, biological, social, economic, and 
political influences in fisheries management and their potential consequences. This single 
fishery once provided a quarter o f America's oysters but, if the oyster population decline 
continues, it may soon become a memory. Though Maryland has a dual property rights structure, 
private and public, the public fishery predominates. The reasons why privatization has not been 
a successfully implemented strategy, and whether the Maryland fishery embodies a unique 
situation better served by other management strategies, were addressed, and comm unity-based 
alternatives from other types o f fisheries were evaluated for their efficacy and applicability to 
Maryland. Historical and current information on Chesapeake oyster populations, events 
contributing to population fluctuations, and changes in fisheries management strategies were 
examined for any causal trends and compared and contrasted with other fisheries. The study 
found that culture and job  satisfaction prevents privatization from becoming an accepted property 
rights management strategy in Maryland. This study also illustrates how cooperative fisheries 
management strategies can address nonmonetary benefits, traditional values, and coastal 
community structures, while achieving a sustainable harvest, preserving a traditional way of life, 
and restoring habitat and the oyster’s role in the Bay’s ecology. Any changes in the future will 
likely be directed toward changing the rules o f management and harvest for the public grounds.
If oyster production is to be increased in the Chesapeake Bay, the cooperation, consent, and 
responsibility o f the watermen are needed for any policy to be successfully implemented. The 
future o f  fisheries management will not and cannot be confined to fisheries biology' and 
population counts. It will need to encompass a broad arena o f disciplines working together 
toward a common goal.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Defining the Problem
Population Decline
Oysters are a symbol o f the fabled productivity o f the Chesapeake Bay. which w as 
named by the Native Americans, and means Great Shellfish Bay. But these days the Great 
Shellfish Bay is far from living up to its former reputation. Questions are being raised about the 
future o f the oyster fishery, the role of management in the declining harvest, and whether the 
brood stock is being lost. It is unknown whether oyster population declines occurred prior to 
keeping records o f  the harvest in the 1800s. However, what is known is that oyster harvests in 
the Bay are at historic lows (Jensen & Travelstead, 1992).
The Chesapeake Bay's celebrated oyster population has been ravaged by overfishing, 
disease, and pollution. This single fishery once provided a quarter o f America's oysters but. if 
current trends continue, may soon become a memory, as may the skipjacks (Pollack. 1996: "So 
Do the Oysters." 1993). The decline of the oyster population has had a significant impact on the 
communities surrounding the Bay. It is becoming harder to make a living on the Bay, and young 
people are moving away from the communities that they grew up in. Though it is not unusual for 
fishers to seasonally fish different species, the harvesting pressure on the other species has 
increased to make up for losses in the oyster fishery, and now those other species are becoming 
depleted. Some watermen have even begun to work as guides for recreational parties o f anglers 
when fishing is poor.
The oyster population in the Maryland portion o f the Chesapeake Bay has declined by 
more than 50-fold since the early part o f this century. The decline has been attributed to 
pollution, disease, loss o f habitat, and overfishing ( Heral, Rothschild. & Goulletquer. 1990: 
Kennedy & Breisch, 1981). However, the decline in the oyster harvests began well before the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
identified pollution problems or significant disease outbreaks. Heinle, D 'Elia, Taft, Wilson, 
Cole-Jones, Caplins, and Cronin (1980) pointed out in a historical review of the Bay's water 
quality that it had started to deteriorate significantly since 1950 and that correlated with a 
significant increase in nutrients delivered in effluent to the Bay by run-off from farms and 
urbanized areas. Oyster diseases such as the protozoan parasites Haplosporidium nelsoni (MSX) 
and Perkinsus marinus (Dermo) were not reported until the 1950s to 1960s in the Chesapeake 
Bay (Rothschild, Ault, Goulletquer, & Herat, 1994).
Whether one believes that the reduced oyster harvests are caused by overharvesting or 
disease, there are compounding variables that both contribute to, and are the result of. these 
factors and lead to further decline. These include loss o f  habitat caused by excessive siltation 
and summertime low oxygen concentrations, reproductive failure o f adults, or low larval 
recruitment and spat survival, and predation by numerous organisms from flatworms to crabs, 
fish, and waterfowl (Abbe, 1986: Kennedy & Breisch, 1981).
Beyond the loss o f oysters and other Bay species that depend on the oyster reefs for 
habitat lies another threat, and that is the loss o f a way o f  life that people have come to associate 
with the Chesapeake Bay. As the health o f the Bay declines, the seafood that the Bay provided 
for centuries is lost, as will be the watermen that make their living from the Bay. As those things 
which make up the character o f the Bay are lost, in a sense, the Chesapeake Bay itself is lost.
Independent and Dependent Variables
Fishing gear and habitat destruction. The primary cause o f the decline o f the oyster 
population is overfishing (Goldsborough, 1993; NOAA, 1994). Loss o f habitat is a dependent 
variable that is closely linked to fishing practices and is based on the biological life cycle and 
sessile nature o f oysters. As the oyster fishery developed, the physical integrity o f the oyster
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reefs was damaged by oyster fishing gear. Hand tongs were the principal oyster fishing gear 
from the m id-1600s to 1865. Hand tongs are unlikely to have had much effect on oyster reef 
structure because watermen that are hand-tonging can only cover a very limited area per day and 
can only operate at depths no greater than 6 meters. Therefore, the extent o f the area covered 
and the intensity o f hand tonging is relatively limited (Rothschild et al., 1994). In addition, hand 
tongs have a relatively small effect on the reef substrate due to their limited mobility, their hand- 
operation, small size, and mechanical inefficiency.
The huge harvests that characterized the oyster fishery o f the late 1800s, were possible 
due to a still abundant natural supply o f oysters and to the introduction o f large oyster dredges. 
Unfortunately, dredging is a destructive fishing practice. The legalization by the legislature of 
large oyster dredges in 1865 was the beginning o f increasingly destructive fishing practices and 
o f  the subsequent decline o f the fishery. However, initially the dredges made it possible to drag 
up from the reefs huge harvests o f oysters. The dredges were dragged over large areas o f  oyster 
bottom, and as they were dragged over the bottom they removed and disassociated components 
o f  the reef reducing the profile o f what once were tall reefs that jutted out o f the water at low tide 
to much flatter oyster beds. In addition, the dredges could be operated in deeper waters than the 
hand tongs. The use o f  these dredges began to degrade the physical integrity o f centuries old 
oyster shell accretions and the oyster reefs (DeAlteris, 1988; Winslow. 1881). By the late 1870s, 
over 700 vessels using dredge gear had contributed to increasing both the intensity o f fishing and 
its areal extent.
Attempts to constrain total fishing effort by restricting the use o f dredge gear to sail- 
powered vessels appears to have had limited effectiveness because the number o f  large sail- 
powered skipjacks had increased to greater than 1,000 by 1890 (Rothschild et al., 1994). Even as 
early as the turn o f this century, the realization that the fishing effort was too great and that the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
decline in catch reflected a decline in abundance was reinforced by the observation in 1900 by 
Grave (1907) that the dredges nearly exhausted the oyster beds before the end o f the fishing 
season.
In 1887. the introduction o f hand-operated patent-tongs enabled the harvesting o f  oysters 
in even deeper waters, extending the range and fishing efficiency o f the oyster fleet to previously 
unfished deep-water beds. By 1950, hydraulic-powered patent tongs were introduced. These 
tongs are very destructive to the oyster bed substrate because of their capability to penetrate and 
disassociate the reef structure. This capability arises from their weight and hydraulic power. 
Hydraulic-powered patent tongs operate much like an industrial crane in that the tongs take a bite 
out o f the oyster reef. In 1994, about 580 boats were operating with hydraulic patent tongs 
(Rothschild et al.. 1994).
When Yates (1913) conducted his survey o f the oyster beds in the Chesapeake Bay 
between 1907-1912, 25% of the Maryland portion of the Bay bottom was identified as natural 
oyster bed habitat. More recent surveys conducted by the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR), including one from 1974-1982, have clearly shown a decrease in suitable 
oyster habitat. Analysis shows that oyster bed acreage declined by more than 50% from 1907 to 
1982.
While local communities and watermen say they support the notion o f habitat 
conservation, they also want increased oyster harvests. Scientists and fisheries managers usually 
recommend that fishing effort be decreased in terms o f type of gear and total harvest to allow 
oyster beds to become repopulated with legal sized oysters and also to increase the size of the 
spawning stock. However, this goes against what the community and what the watermen want 
because it translates into lower employment and wealth (M ackenzie, 1989). Local people and 
watermen expect that scientists will cure their economic problems and that Mother Nature will
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5miraculously come through in spite o f the unchecked destruction and overharvesting of the beds.
Siltation and sedimentation. In addition to the substantial decline in substrate area upon 
which young oysters can grow, the quality of the existing substrate has also been affected. The 
reduced profile o f  oyster reefs modifies the water flow near the oysters and can increase the 
deposition o f  silt on the bed. In general, mature well developed oyster beds with a high profile 
are associated with relatively intense current flows (Lam & Wang, 1990). which provide 
conditions favorable for increased growth and survivorship. Relatively intense flow may 
mitigate the negative effects of siltation and biodeposition, and increase consumption rates.
Oysters exposed to sediments have decreased growth and reproductive efficiency, while 
mortality and disease susceptibility increase. Siltation also reduces the quality and quantity of 
suitable habitat for spat settlement (Rothschild et al.. 1994).
Over 100 years o f increasingly intensive and mechanized fishing has contributed to 
leveling the profile o f  the oyster reefs in the Chesapeake Bay. Now. the formerly productive 
areas are so covered with silt that as a result, they are not capable o f producing oysters, and those 
remaining unsilted areas are considerably less productive than in the past. The overfishing of the 
oyster stocks and destruction of oyster habitat by different types o f fishing gear are considered by 
many to be more important factors in causing the decline o f the oyster fishery than either 
pollution or disease, particularly since degraded habitat and susceptibility to parasitism may be 
correlated.
Disease. In the Chesapeake Bay, disease has been putting the last nail into the coffin o f 
an oyster population already weakened by a century o f  overharvesting, elevated pollution levels, 
and habitat destruction. The disease versus overharvesting debate is continually confused by
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6context. However, there is no doubt that, historically, overharvesting has been the primary 
reason for the decline o f the oyster fishery. Similarly, there is little disagreement that disease 
currently dominates oyster mortality (Goldsborough, 1993; NOAA, 1994). At the turn o f the 
century , fishing pressure far exceeded sustainable levels. However, subsequent habitat loss, 
predation, and disease have prevented populations from rebounding. The pathogens MSX and 
Dermo were first described in 1907 and 1914, respectively (Mackin, Owen & Collier. 1950: 
Wood & Andrews, 1962). Both diseases are deadly to oysters but harmless to humans. The 
parasites that cause both these diseases are single-celled protozoans and should not be confused 
with the organisms that cause paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP), which is extremely harmful, 
and sometimes deadly to humans and affects a wide variety o f shellfish species. Though PSP has 
sometimes found its way into the Chesapeake Bay, the incidence is rare. low. and localized.
Dermo was first reported as a lethal oyster pathogen in the Virginia waters o f  the 
Chesapeake Bay in 1954. MSX was later recognized in moribund and dead Chesapeake Bay 
oysters in 1957 (Leffler, 1993). These protozoan parasites affect the abundance o f  market size 
oysters (3 inches and larger) by attacking and killing oysters before they reach 3 inches. Dermo 
tends to have its largest impact on oyster populations just as, or just before they reach market 
size while MSX does more damage to young or smaller oysters. Mortality generally occurs 
between 1'/: and 2Yi inches in size. Whereas populations o f  oysters unaffected by the parasites 
contain all sizes and ages, affected populations consist o f oysters predominantly less than two 
years o f age, with the exception o f  the occasional older oyster that survives the parasites' attacks 
(Jensen & Travelstead. 1992). Consequently, the bulk of the oyster population in the parasite 
affected areas (over 70% of the oyster grounds in Maryland, 90% in Virginia) are composed o f 
oysters o f less than 3 inches.
Oysters mature and begin spawning at approximately one year and when their length is
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7around 1 'A inches. Therefore, the brood stock is affected by overharvesting and disease 
simultaneously.
The two strongest factors affecting the prevalence o f these oyster diseases appear to be 
temperature and salinity. While little is known about the parasite MSX. what is known is that it 
thrives in higher salinities and increases in prevalence in years o f drought. The ability o f Dermo 
to tolerate lower salinities makes it more persistent and damaging to oyster populations than 
MSX. Even though Dermo was first detected in the Bay in the 1950s, only within the last 10 
years has its virulence so devastated oyster beds throughout the Bay. It has overtaken MSX. 
which has caused mortalities in Virginia's high salinity waters since 1957. Unlike MSX. which 
seems to lose its virulence in water salinities under 15 parts per thousand, Dermo has proved 
considerably more adaptable and can kill oysters in salinities as low as 3 parts per thousand 
(Leffler, 1993).
The startling decline o f Bay oysters and the commercial fishery that depends upon them, 
coupled with the increasing recognition that the loss o f  oysters contributes to the deteriorating 
water quality, has become a catalyst for increased funding for oyster research. There are no 
known cures for MSX or Dermo though there is a substantial amount o f research being 
conducted in state and university laboratories on developing disease resistant strains of the 
Eastern oyster. In 1993 a major breakthrough gave scientists their first effective tool to help 
counter Dermo. That breakthrough, developed independently and simultaneously in three 
separate laboratories, was the ability to culture Dermo in the lab (Leffler, 1993). Being able to 
culture the protozoan opened the door to studying its life cycle, infection mechanisms, and 
interactions with the oyster.
The only strategy presently available for protecting oysters from disease is to move the 
young seed oysters to areas where the disease is less virulent. These areas are in the less saline
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8reaches o f tributaries and the upper Chesapeake Bay. Growth o f seed oysters is slower in the 
upper Bay than in the traditional lower Bay harvest areas, but low salinities suppress the 
virulence o f  the diseases and allow many of the oysters to grow to market size. The ability of 
this strategy to maintain harvests or populations is dependent on the availability o f large 
quantities o f  seed oysters. It is important to note that low salinity areas rarely produce a good 
natural set o f young oysters, so without supplements o f seed provided by the state repletion 
programs, these areas cannot produce continuing harvests.
Pollution and excess nutrients. Another contributing factor to the decline of the oyster 
fishery is pollution. Pollution in the Bay is usually one o f  two types, from chemicals that are 
generally considered toxic such as industrial effluents, or from excess inorganic nutrients from 
sewage treatment plants and overuse o f fertilizers on suburban lawns and rural farms (Leffler. 
1997).
Excess nutrients in the Chesapeake Bay are o f particular concern because the Bay is 
relatively enclosed so these nutrients are retained rather than diluted out and stimulate excess 
phytoplankton growth. This phytoplankton becomes so dense that it blocks light from reaching 
the bottom of the Bay and hence chokes out the native benthic plants such as eel grass. In 
addition, excess phytoplankton eventually sinks to the bottom waters where microbial 
degradation and decomposition take place. As these deep bottom waters have little oxygen input 
such active bacterial respiration depletes what little oxygen is present. Consequently, the water 
in the deep channels turns anoxic and contains hydrogen sulfide, a toxic chemical which is the 
end product o f  bacterial decomposition. Sessile benthic invertebrates such as oysters and 
mussels cannot survive such adverse conditions (Chew, 1993).
Oyster population decline and excess phytoplankton growth are interdependent factors
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9contributing to the decline o f the fishery because bivalve molluscs such as the oyster are active 
suspension-feeders that derive their food by filtering phytoplankton from the water column. The 
decline in the oyster population has reduced the amount o f phytoplankton consumed by oyster 
stocks (Jonas & Tuttle, 1991: UlanowiczA Tuttle, 1992). The phytoplankton, no longer 
consumed by the oysters, is partially responsible for the degradation in water quality, 
compounding the problems associated with increased nutrient inputs, and stimulating more 
phytoplankton production.
Purpose o f Study
The area o f fisheries resources is fertile ground for opportunities to change the existing 
business-as-usual management environment. The challenge o f creating a new way o f doing 
business, a new way o f managing, is intrinsically motivating to fisheries managers and other 
stakeholders alike. Routines, on the other hand, are comfortable, no matter how inappropriate or 
self-defeating, and can be the enemies o f change (Bennis, 1989). As in most highly political, 
extremely hierarchical, and bureaucratic organizations and systems cloaked in age old traditions, 
fisheries resource management is highly resistant to change. Even the most well-intended 
managers often become victims o f the vast, amorphous, unwitting, and unconscious conspiracy to 
prevent them from doing anything whatever to change the status quo.
If any organization, and in this case fisheries, is to make progress, then fisheries 
managers must be able to detect when routines or practices are becoming dysfunctional, if not 
outright destructive. Managers must be able to see when routines are smothering creative 
planning and blocking necessary change.
The purpose o f this study was to examine the concept o f property rights in relation to 
fisheries resource management in the Maryland oyster fishery. To achieve this, an analysis of
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the past and current state o f the Maryland oyster fishery in the Chesapeake Bay was conducted. 
There are in essence two oyster fisheries in Maryland: the public fishery , managed and 
subsidized by the state; and the private fishery, which operates on ground leased from the state 
and must abide by regulations set by the State.
The Maryland public oyster fishery is classified as a limited-access fishery . Different 
property rights management strategies can be used to achieve limited access with the intent to 
conserve and sustain the fishery. The strategies that have been used in the Maryland oyster 
fisheries, and their success or failure, are what are of interest. In the face of what is undeniably a 
catastrophic decline in the oyster fishery o f the Chesapeake Bay. it was important to understand 
what led to the current state o f  the fishery and examine, compare, and contrast the contributing 
factors. In particular, the social, political, and economic influences that affect the leasing o f Bay 
bottom for the private cultivation o f oysters versus the prevailing attitudes within the public 
fishery are as important, if not more important, than the biological factors that have contributed 
to the decline o f the fishery.
In other fisheries, both finfish and shellfish, as well as oyster fisheries in other parts of 
the United States, it has been shown that private cultivation is a highly successful property rights 
management strategy that has. in many cases, resurrected a declining if not failed fishery. Why 
then, have there been so many barriers that have discouraged leasing in the Chesapeake Bay, and 
in particular in Maryland? WTiy has the public fishery been managed and administered with 
virtually the same types o f limited-access strategies for the past 100 years in the face of 
continuing oyster population declines?
Part of addressing the purpose o f the study, to examine the concept o f property rights in 
the Maryland oyster fishery, was to answer these questions and to examine whether the private 
fishery, in its limited capacity, has been or can be a viable fisheries management strategy.
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Research Questions
1. Can a single property rights management scheme be suitable for all oyster fisheries?
2. What social influences have hindered the acceptance o f private cultivation of oysters 
in Maryland?
3. How have past and present oyster fishery regulations encouraged or discouraged 
private cultivation o f oysters in Maryland?
4. Has the economic burden of private cultivation, alone, deterred increased cultivation 
o f oysters or are other factors at work?
5. Do nonmonetary, intangible benefits provide watermen (sic) with sufficient 
compensation for the monetary loss incurred by working in the oyster fishery?
Overview
The Chesapeake Bav
The Chesapeake Bay. one o f the world’s most fertile, food-bearing estuaries, is located 
on the mid-Atlantic Coast o f the United States and is fringed on either side by tidewater 
Maryland and Virginia, ending at Norfolk, Virginia on the south and Havre de Grace. Maryland 
on the north (See Figure 1). Although the Bay is commonly described as 195 miles long and 
from 4 to 30 miles wide, it is in fact a system about 20 times that size (See Figure 2). Nearly 50 
significant rivers and thousands o f streams and creeks penetrate deep into the surrounding land to 
form what is known as the Chesapeake drainage basin, or watershed, that spans an area 
northward to Cooperstown. New York, site o f the Baseball Hall o f Fame, as far west as 
Pendleton County. West Virginia, southward in Virginia to Lynchburg and Virginia Beach, and 
eastward to Seaford, Delaware and Scranton, Pennsylvania (Horton & Eichbaum, 1991).
More than 300 years ago, when European explorers first arrived in the Chesapeake Bay.
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Figure 1. The Chesapeake Bay Watershed. Adapted from United States Environmental 
Protection Agency. (1983). Chesapeake Bav: A Profile in Environmental Change. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
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Figure 2. Maryland’s Chesapeake Bay. Adapted from V. S. Kennedy & L. L. Breisch. 
1981, Maryland’s Ovsters: Research and Management (Publication # UM-SG-TS-81-04) 
(p. 112). College Park, MD: Maryland Sea Grant College Publication.
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oysters were so abundant and grew in such deep vertical reefs, as coral does, that they posed a 
navigational hazard for ships. Undoubtedly introduced to the delicacy by the Native Americans, 
settlers soon began to harvest the species in earnest. By 1874, 14 million bushels were being 
shipped across the country and across the sea. At one time, the larger reefs were tall enough to 
protrude out o f  the water at low tide. However, after the Civil War. relentless harvesting resulted 
in the flattening and loss o f these reefs with the annual oyster harvest averaging 20 million 
bushels and today's harvests at less than 1% o f the 20 million bushel peak (Abbe. 1992). In 
retrospect, it is clear that the huge oyster harvests taken during the late 19* century were not 
sustainable. Rather they simply represented a short-term mining o f the wealth accrued on the 
Bay's bottom.
The Eastern Qvster
The Eastern oyster, Crassostrea virginica (classified by Gmelin, 1791), or as it is more 
commonly known, the Chesapeake, American, Malpeque, or Atlantic oyster, grows on shallow 
bottoms and inhabits Gulf and Atlantic Coast estuaries as far north as the Gulf o f  St. Lawrence 
and south to Key Biscayne, Florida. The Eastern oyster is frequently found where salinities 
range from 5 to 30%, provided other requirements are met including, but not limited to, a solid 
substrate, good water movement, temperatures between O’ and 32° C and an adequate food 
supply (Galtsoff, 1964). Since the 1880s, the Eastern oyster has been the basis for the most 
valuable commercial fishery in the Chesapeake Bay.
Before one can begin to understand the problems associated with managing an oyster 
fishery, one needs to have a rudimentary understanding o f the biology o f the oyster. Eastern 
oysters generally spawn from May through September in the Chesapeake Bay. Increases in water 
temperature to 18-20° C stimulates spawning activity. Eggs hatch into free-swimming larvae that
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settle to the bottom two to three weeks after hatching. They attach to oyster shells or other hard 
substrate. This attachment phase is called setting. The newly attached oysters are called spat. 
Oysters generally grow at a rate o f about 1 inch per year and growth rates can be affected by 
temperature, food quantity, salinity and parasitic infection. Shell growth usually occurs in the 
spring and soft body tissue growth occurs after spawning. Oysters usually reach market size (3 
inches across) 3 to 5 years after spat settlement (Kennedy. Newell & Eble. 1996).
Oysters have a unique ecological role in the estuarine environment. As a result o f  their 
reproduction, growth, and tremendous filtering capacity , the oyster reef community is radically 
different from surrounding sand and mud communities. Oysters draw water into their bodies 
through a siphon, separate needed food particles from debris, and expel the waste water and 
particulates through another siphon. The oyster reef provides not only crucial foundation for 
oyster spat, but also substrate for other organisms such as barnacles, mussels, hydroids. 
nudibranchs. and algae. These communities in turn furnish habitat and life support to the 
commercially valuable Chesapeake blue crabs and finfish such as croaker, striped bass (known 
locally as Rockfish), white perch, and trout. For example, over 90% of the Atlantic Coast 
population o f striped bass begin their lives in the Chesapeake Bay (Horton & Eichbaum. 1991). 
Striped bass depend upon the Bay for spawning and nursing grounds.
Another unique ecological role that oysters play in the Chesapeake Bay is as the Bay's 
water filters, removing dirt, algae, and other particles from the water and depositing it as 
compacted fecal matter on the Bay bottom. However, today’s oysters live at lower depths, where 
silt and toxins settle and oxygen and food are in short supply. In these less than ideal conditions, 
the oysters are weakened and more susceptible to disease. For fisheries scientists, the Eastern 
oyster in the Chesapeake Bay is an indicator species o f  the health o f the Bay. When the oyster 
population is sick and in decline, so is the entire Bay, so oysters serve as a biological sentinel.
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As recently as early this century the billions o f Eastern oysters living in the Bay could filter the 
entire body of water in 3 to 6 days. Today's much smaller oyster population is estimated to need 
about a year to do the same job (Gibson, 1995).
The Maryland Ovster Fishery
During the past century, the history o f the Maryland oyster fishery has experienced a 
roller coaster ride o f booms, slumps, and partial recoveries. Harvests that averaged more than 10 
million bushels a year during the late 19* century have averaged 2-3 million bushels a year 
during this century. Even at those levels, the oyster fishery helps support around 4.000 watermen 
who dredge and tong oysters out o f the northern Bay from early autumn through late winter 
(Kennedy & Breisch. 1981). The watermen's work is part o f a larger commercial industry that 
includes not only dockside sales but stimulates the State's economy through shucking, packing, 
shipping, and marketing.
Presently, hand tongers. patent tongers. and dredgers take oysters off nearly 1.000 
publicly (state) owned oyster beds spread over 215,000 underwater acres (Kennedy & Breisch. 
1981). Most watermen work as hand tongers, using long, low-sided workboats with a small 
cabin forward and an open cockpit aft for dumping and culling each day's catch. The watermen 
spend their days at hard, physical labor, anchored over oyster bars where they dislodge and pull 
oysters up from the bottom with long, wooden-shafted tongs tipped with metal rakes. A growing 
number o f watermen have equipped their boats with patent-tonging rigs that feature power-driven 
winches and some watermen have taken to hiring scuba divers. Only a handful o f watermen still 
sail their skipjacks. These wide-beamed, sloop-rigged sailboats, unique to the Chesapeake Bay 
and a symbol o f its past, are the last survivors o f a  commercial sailing fleet that once numbered 
in the hundreds. As o f  1996 there were less than 12 left (Meyer, 1996a, 1996b). The sailing
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
17
fleet o f skipjacks in Maryland is the last all-sail fleet o f  commercial craft operating in North 
American waters (Kennedy, 1989).
Over 30 years ago, the Maryland oyster fishery began changing from a hunter-gatherer 
fishery in which the watermen sought out and harvested only wild, naturally set oysters 
controlled only by natural cycles to a put-and-take harvest dependent in large part on human 
efforts (state funded) to replenish the oyster supply. Maryland taxpayers not living in counties 
that bound the Chesapeake often refer to the state funded Repletion Program as watermen's 
welfare or subsidies. On the public (state-owned) oyster beds, state fisheries management 
officials organize a major seed and shell planting program each spring on selected beds in an 
effort to offset erratic natural sets o f new oysters (Kennedy & Breisch, 1981). The selection of 
which oyster beds in which counties are to be seeded each year is a combination o f science and 
politics and, therefore, is not always conducted in the most optimal way. On private oyster beds 
some watermen lease Bay bottom from the state and plant seed and cultch to farm their owr, 
oysters.
For the Maryland oyster fishery, nearly all change stirs controversy and reactions tend to 
be extreme, fueled by politics and misinformation. When harvests decline, when watermen hire 
scuba divers, when fisheries resource managers alter seeding plans, when oyster leasing 
increases, then watermen, scientists, and fishery managers begin arguing about the causes and 
effects, the costs and benefits o f change, and who will profit from the change. The history of the 
Maryland oyster fishery has been one with a record o f abundance and decline, o f evolution and 
o f controversy, increased research, and increased management efforts to address the declines and 
maintain the fishery. It is fortunate that the Eastern oyster is a resilient species and the 
Chesapeake Bay, a resilient ecosystem, for the management o f the Chesapeake oyster fishery has 
resulted in overfishing, poor conservation, and environmental degradation, and the oyster
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population would have been wiped out long ago were it not for this resilience.
B ^ kgTQund
Ovster Fisheries Management-Historical Overview
To both the scientist and the waterman, the oyster is the indicator species that reflects the 
health and vitality o f the Bay. The Eastern oyster is such a resilient species that any threat to the 
survival o f  the oyster is an indication that the entire Chesapeake Bay ecosystem is threatened. 
The oyster is part o f a complex Bay ecosystem, and a decline in the oyster population represents 
a loss o f the vitality, resiliency, and productivity for the whole Bay. The management o f the 
oyster fishery raises a complex set o f issues to deal with including habitat, harvest, disease, and 
the introduction o f non-native species. In addition, the continued inability to reach a broad 
consensus on how to manage the oyster fishery is an indicator that all is not well with the overall 
scheme o f  cooperation that lies at the heart o f  any effort to restore the Bay and its resources.
The stakeholders in the oyster fishery are as diverse as they can be, as are the three main 
reasons for wanting to restore the fishery (Matuszeski, 1992):
1. To provide for the commercial harvest o f  a valuable but much depleted species.
2. To protect a highly valued traditional way of life on the Bay.
3. To restore the oyster’s role in the Bay’s ecology.
However, for a variety o f reasons, most fisheries management strategies focus almost 
exclusively on the commercial aspect o f the oyster fishery. By most if not all accounts, the 
commercial harvest o f oysters in the Bay continues to be characterized as an industry on the 
brink o f collapse. Whether from overharvesting, disease, or both, the fact is that there are few 
harvestable natural reefs remaining. Many steps have been taken by state fishery managers to 
stabilize the oyster harvest through reseeding, relocation o f seed, reef construction, and
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sanctuaries, to name a few. All of them have been controversial and have for the most part been 
characterized as subsidies or watermen’s welfare (Matuszeski. 1992). The efforts appear to be 
more focused on surviving another year without a major decline in the oyster harvest rather than 
on long-term remediation.
The preservation of a traditional way o f life on the Bay and a symbol o f the 
Chesapeake's legacy, watermen tonging for oysters, has not been given much direct attention 
when considering solutions to the oyster population decline. However, it is indeed responsible 
for much o f the political and financial capital that is expended on the oysters. A relatively small 
number o f watermen in the oyster fishery (compared to other professions such as teachers or 
lawyers) wield an incredible amount o f  clout in the legislative and executive chambers o f the 
Maryland legislature. This tremendous influence lies not in their numbers but in the broad public 
support they enlist around the Bay and the inland parts o f the state for protecting and even 
encouraging a lifestyle associated with self-reliance, physical challenge, and the uncertainties of 
nature.
Even if alternative employment were available outside the fishery or as hired labor for 
other fishers, owning one’s own boat and gear gives the waterman a sense o f  independence not 
available in alternative employments. Evidence o f the existence o f these nonmonetary benefits 
can be inferred by the reluctance of the watermen to leave the oyster fishery even when it is no 
longer financially beneficial to stay (Santopietro, 1986). Eighty-eight percent o f the watermen 
have lived in their present communities for 20 years or more, and most o f the watermen live in 
homes in communities bordering the water, so that they are near the grounds they harvest, or 
have harvested.
Since 1820, when the first law was passed in Maryland relating to the oyster fishery, 
management o f  the fishery has been controlled to a large extent by state legislators. Initially,
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laws were passed in an effort to conserve the fishery. However, more and more o f those laws 
were repealed, or new ones passed, in an effort to appease the watermen, a very' vocal minority 
with much influence in the state legislature. The sociopolitical influences have been 
disproportionately large and the state legislature has generally ignored the results o f various 
scientific surveys and the reports o f numerous advisory committees appointed to make 
recommendations to the legislature concerning the oyster fishery (Kennedy & Breisch. 1983).
O f all the states with a natural oyster fishery, Maryland is unusual in that it has persisted 
for over a century in maintaining an extensive public fishery while discriminating against private 
cultivation on leased Bay bottom. It has been over a 100 years since the first scientific 
investigators surveyed oyster grounds in the Maryland portion o f the Chesapeake Bay. 
documented their despoliation and recommended conservation measures including private 
cultivation, or oyster farming. Other parts o f the United States have been successful in oyster 
farming enterprises that are managed privately by individuals or corporations. By placing the 
responsibility for the fishery in the hands o f those most likely to benefit from its success, 
conservation and production methods were employed to help ensure the long-term sustainability 
o f the fishery.
Management o f today’s oyster fishery in Maryland is the responsibility o f the Tidewater 
Administration of the Maryland DNR. However, important control over the management 
decisions and regulations resides in the Maryland General Assembly, the state legislative body 
that passes, and rescinds, the laws governing the fishery. Local county committees o f  watermen 
also play a key role in advising the Tidewater Administration on its fishery management 
decisions. Licensed watermen from each tidewater county select five representative licensed 
watermen from each category o f  tongers, dredgers, patent tongers, and divers to serve on the 
Tidewater Administration oyster committee for a term o f  4 years (Maryland Department of
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The Chesapeake Bay, especially the Maryland portion, has been an ideal habitat for 
oysters (Kennedy & Breisch, 1983). Since before the turn o f the century , many researchers and 
fisheries managers have indicated that the potential Maryland harvest could be increased and 
sustained substantially by combining a public fishery and private oyster farming (Quittmeyer. 
1966). However, in spite o f numerous recommendations from a variety o f sources, no real action 
has ever been taken to encourage the private cultivation o f oysters. The lack of regard by- 
Maryland legislators for the results o f extensive scientific studies and analyses even stimulated 
Bowman (1940) to use the Maryland oyster fishery as one o f his three examples o f the failures of 
attempts to apply science to social problems. He noted in his paper that the state legislators had 
chosen to ignore all the data and recommendations that were presented to them and chose instead 
to consult with the more practical (sic) watermen. One should note that at the time of Bowman's 
writing, disease and pollution were not factors in the decline o f the fishery. The primary , if not 
sole, cause for the oyster population decline was overfishing by the watermen. Reflecting on the 
sociopolitical influences on the Maryland oyster fishery since the passage o f the first oyster- 
related law in 1820 can be instructive because resource management involves not just an 
application o f biological principles but also an interaction with social attitudes, many o f which 
have been decades in the formation (McHugh & Bailey, 1957).
Though there is some archeological evidence o f oyster fishing and consumption by 
Native American populations around the Bay, there was little written evidence until the 1800s, 
when production data were first collected. The first known tabulation o f  oyster harvests in 
Maryland was 710,000 bushels and was recorded in 1839 (Stevenson, 1894). From that time up 
to the late 1800s many large oyster reefs were discovered and the fishery expanded greatly. 
Meanwhile, the oyster beds o f New England had become badly depleted throughout the 1700s by
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overfishing (Ingersoll, 1881; Sweet, 1941). Up to this time, the center o f the American oyster 
industry had been Connecticut. Having depleted their own stocks, beginning around 1808. 
dredge schooners traveled to New Jersey and Virginia to obtain oysters for the New England 
markets. Due to this increasing activity from nonresidents. Virginia passed legislation in 1811 
prohibiting dredging in its waters, forcing the New England fleet north up the Bay to Mary land. 
Concern about such increased fishing led the Maryland Legislature to follow suit and in 1820 
enacted its first oyster-related law, prohibiting both dredging in the state and transport of oysters 
from the state in ships not wholly owned by Maryland residents. Not to be defeated. New 
England businessmen began establishing branches o f  their oyster packing plants in Baltimore. 
Maryland throughout the 1830s. With improved transportation systems such as the railroad and 
roadways linking the states. New England packers were soon exporting increasing numbers of 
oysters out o f the state. In addition, as demand rose, so did the number o f local and out-of-state 
raw oyster packers, steam packers, and canners around the Bay. By 1874. the oyster harvest was 
estimated to be 14 million bushels, with a peak o f  20 million bushels harvested in 1885. 
Associated with this great increase in harvest were changes in legislation concerning harvesting 
techniques or gear and fishing regulations.
In 1865. two major pieces o f related legislation were enacted. The first abolished the old 
general oystering laws and enacted a new code, including adoption of a state-wide license system 
governing tongers and dredgers, called the General License Law. Thus the use o f large dredges 
on boats under sail became legal again after 45 years. The large dredges were very effective and 
could reach the oysters living in deeper Bay waters. The new code did. however, prohibit the use 
o f  steam-powered boats or steam-powered machinery for harvesting, and enforced a closed 
season on dredging from June 1“ to September I5'. For most o f the Bay there was no closed 
season on tonging. The new code attempted a balancing act between trying to appease the
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watermen by allowing the use o f more efficient gear to reap the very profitable harvest from the 
Bay and trying to conserve the oyster population by imposing some harvesting limits.
The second legislative initiative allowed riparian landowners to plant oysters on five 
acres o f leased ground. This privilege was later extended to any Maryland citizen. However, 
instead o f  using this privilege to increase production of oysters, most took advantage o f  the new 
law to use the ground for holding oysters until market prices for oysters went up and were more 
lucrative for their sale (Grave, 1912). This law drew a distinction between natural oyster beds. 
which could not be leased, and barren ground, which could.
The General License Law was extremely unpopular with the watermen, many of whom 
refused to obtain licenses or to abide by any other provisions o f the new code. Consequently , in 
1868 a State Fishery Force, popularly known as the Oyster Navy or Oyster Police, was 
established: consisting o f both steamer and sailing vessels patrolled the Bay and its tributaries to 
enforce the law. with varying degrees o f success. Run-ins between the watermen and the Force 
escalated over time, resulting in the sinking o f  several fishing vessels by cannon fire and the 
death o f some watermen (Burgess, 1963).
The laws enacted by the Maryland Legislature prior to the 20*^  century were attempts to 
protect the public fishery and to manage the exploitation o f a resource that was providing jobs 
for tens o f thousands o f  Marylanders. It should be noted that ail o f  this was done at a time when 
little was known about the biology o f the oyster and the full extent o f the natural oyster beds was 
not yet discovered since no formal survey o f the oyster grounds had been conducted.
Private Ovster Culture - Leasing Bottom
Regulatory' history. In 1830 the One-Acre Planting Law was enacted, allowing Maryland 
citizens to use one acre o f Bay bottom for planting and growing oysters. Unfortunately, at the
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time, it was only a misdemeanor for others to harvest another's planted oysters without 
permission (poaching). The One-Acre Planting Law was the third in the nation to be enacted 
after New Jersey (1820) and Rhode Island (1827). This was later expanded to 5 acres in 1865.
A marked decline in the oyster harvest from the boom years starting in 1875 provided 
incentive for the General Assembly to commission the United States Coast and Geodetic Surve> 
to study the extensive oyster grounds (Winslow, 1882). Results o f  this 2-year survey from 1878- 
1879. often called the Winslow Survey, included valuable descriptions o f the structural and 
biological differences between older fished grounds and new, yet undiscovered grounds.
Winslow (1881) even set up experiments in the Bay with tiles as spat collectors to study optimal 
conditions for spat settlement and oyster growth, but vandals destroyed most o f  his experiment. 
So distrustful were the watermen o f government involvement in the fishery, even if it were 
intended for their benefit, that any attempts to gain knowledge o f the fishery were often thwarted 
by those most likely to have benefited. Winslow was the first to advance the idea that cultch and 
thereby increased surface area, free from silt or other contamination, could increase oyster 
settlement and yield. Winslow also recommended that more limitations be put on dredging, that 
there be a closed season which included the spawning period and that before spatfall occurred 
that the watermen be required to add cultch back to the oyster beds to provide for more substrate. 
Winslow 's  recommendations were, unfortunately, generally ignored.
Later, Winslow (1884) recommended that the Maryland oyster fishery follow the 
example o f  the New England states which, having already overfished their own oyster grounds, 
had established private oyster culture on grounds leased from the state. Winslow' noted that the 
yield in M aryland's public fishery was 40 bushels per acre compared with triple this yield in the 
northern states, which depended on private oyster culture on less acreage than that of Maryland's 
public fishery. Winslow believed that a common property resource was not easily conserved or
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improved, whereas self-interest could inspire such aims in a private oyster planter. Since 
Winslow’s time, there has been a flood o f literature bemoaning the tragedy of the commons 
across the globe and many recommendations for limited access fisheries management strategies.
Winslow had recommended that a commission, free o f political interference, be formed 
to oversee the management o f the fishery. In 1882. a three-person Oyster Commission was 
established to examine the oyster beds and advise as to their protection and improvement 
(Brooks. 1905). However, reflective o f the importance the Maryland Legislature would place on 
the Commission’s recommendations, the legislature prov ided no financial support for the Oyster 
Commission's work.
The Oyster Commission recommended conservation measures and a system of private 
oyster culture beyond that envisioned in the expanded Five Acre Planting Law (Brooks. Waddell 
& Legg. 1884: Grave. 1912). It recommended annual surveying and marking (delineating) of the 
oyster grounds by the oyster police. It advocated that oyster beds should be closed to harvesting 
where and when necessary to allow for rehabilitation, spawning, and growth, and that the 
opening and closing o f areas should be decided upon by experts. Oy ster shells should be 
returned to the beds to serve as cultch.
In The Oyster (1905). Brooks presented the findings o f  the Oyster Commission. In it he 
strongly urged that there be private oyster culture on Bay bottom leased from the state and 
reiterated the success o f  private culture in rehabilitating the depleted oyster populations in New 
England. Brooks described a number o f advantages of private culture, noting that some 
harvesting and processing activities contributed to the depletion o f the fisher/, and suggesting 
that oyster farming could alleviate these problems. The strong recommendations by Winslow. 
Brooks, and others in favor o f private oyster culture were vehemently rejected by many 
stakeholders for a number o f  reasons, particularly by the watermen.
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While the legislature ignored many o f the recommendations o f the Oy ster Commission, it 
did pass the Cull Law in 1890. which required that shells with spat and young oysters be thrown 
back, culled, on the beds from which they were harvested. This was and can be an efficient 
method for protecting oyster beds and conserving the diversity o f the population (Grave. 1912). 
Maryland was one o f the first states to pass such a law. However, it was extremely unpopular 
among the watermen, who had been selling the undersized (legal market size then was 2 
inches) oysters to steam canners or had been selling them to private oyster growers out-of-state 
as seed (Brooks, 1905). Most watermen ignored the law and it was poorly enforced.
However, as harvests declined at the turn o f the century and oyster packing houses 
closed their doors, demands for state action increased. Demands for protection o f the oyster beds 
through enforcement o f cull and gear laws, as well as enhancement o f  production through 
leasing, grew (Leffler. 1987a). The demands became so heated that even strong opposition from 
tidewater counties could not stop the passage of the Haman Oyster Act in 1906. It was the most 
far-reaching attempt in Maryland to this day to open the doors to private oyster culture in the 
industry's history.
A strong advocate o f  private oyster culture was a Baltimore attorney. B.H. Haman. w ho 
submined a number of bills to the Maryland Legislature related to oyster culture. For support for 
these bills he had turned to the inland Maryland counties, describing the potential increased 
revenues that could accrue from a revitalized oyster fishery and linking this with the opportunity 
to improve state roads and bridges ("Good roads and oyster planting," 1903 ). After intense 
political maneuvering and controversy, the Haman Oyster Act was passed in 1906. It allowed 
individuals to lease up to 30 acres o f barren bottom in county waters and up to 100 acres in the 
Bay's open waters beyond county boundary limits. Such leases were to be on ground found to be 
barren by a survey performed by the Shell Fish Commission, which was provided for in the law
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(Kennedy & Breisch. 1983). In 1906, in cooperation with United States Coast and Geodetic 
Survey, the Commission began an ambitious 6-year survey o f  the natural oyster bars in the state 
of Maryland.
Unfortunately, there were several shortcomings to the Haman Oyster Act that served to 
discourage any potential private planters from risking the investment. The Legislature allowed 
the opponents o f  the bill to include in it arbitrary restrictions on the area that could be leased and 
defined as barren ground, on the types o f gear that private planters could use on their own beds 
and on the seasons open to harvesting on leased plots. In addition, unlike the watermen that were 
harvesting from the public beds, the private oyster farmers or culturists had the expense of 
leasing fees, purchasing and placing shell on the bottom to build up substrate, and the purchase 
of seed. While amendments to the Haman act in the succeeding years would destroy any chance 
it had to be really effective, the Haman Act is still the basis for oyster farming in Maryland today 
(Case studies in management. 1991). State regulations favoring the reseeding o f public bars 
virtually prevented the sale o f Maryland oyster seed to leaseholders, which meant that private 
planters had to go to Virginia to buy seed. Since the Oyster Police were underfunded and 
understaffed, many instances o f poaching occurred leading to hesitation in risking money and 
effort by planters whose crop might be stolen overnight. As William Brooks (1891) had pointed 
out in his book before the turn o f  this century, “The most serious obstacle to the development o f  
a great planting industry in Maryland is the absence of all respect for private property in oysters" 
(p. 139). The poaching of planted oysters is as severe now as it was in Haman's time and can be 
a significant factor for those who lease oyster bottom. If that were not enough to kill the desire 
o f most Marylanders to lease bottom for oyster cultivation, to prevent a monopoly o f any sort, 
corporations or joint stock companies were prohibited from renting oyster grounds for 
cultivation. This particular restriction was and is unique to the state o f Maryland among states
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with an oyster fishery.
In response to concerns about these shortcomings o f the Haman Oyster Act. the Price- 
Campbell Act was passed in 1912. It allowed for the additional leasing o f up to ! 00 acres of 
barren bottom per lease in the Tangier Sound part o f the Bay and increased allowable Bay 
holdings to 500 acres. It allowed the lessee to use dredges and extended the lessee's working 
season. However, the Price-Campbell Act did not change the regulations against corporate 
holdings or use o f powered equipment.
Another shortcoming of the Haman Oyster Act was the attempt to make the results o f the 
1906-1912 oyster survey a permanent determination of the character o f the Bay bottom without 
flexibility to allow for changes in future conditions. Thus, natural ground might become barren 
from disease or over harvesting, or barren bottom might become replenished naturally (Kennedy 
& Breisch. 1983). However, this could not be taken into account by the Commission because the 
watermen had insisted on a rigid design for the survey to guard against further shrinking o f the 
legal boundaries o f areas designated as natural grounds. Unfortunately, even at that time, it was 
recognized that shrinkage o f  productive grounds was occurring rapidly.
Passage of the Price-Campbell Act in 1912 had led to an increase in applications for 
leases (Fairbanks. 1932), with a parallel increase in protests from watermen that a ground for 
which there was a leasing application was natural and not barren bottom. This ill-informed and 
deliberately obstructive behavior occurs even today whenever someone applies for a new lease. 
Due to the increasing number o f protests and the formation o f  county-based watermen’s 
associations, pressure mounted to change the leasing act.
Hence, the Anderson Bill was introduced in 1914 to repeal the Haman and Price- 
Campbell Acts. Understandably, this greatly angered supporters o f private culture among the 
watermen, scientists, and the Commission. In March 1914 the Baltimore Sun (“Oyster politics,"
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1914a, 1914b) noted in an editorial that watermen comprised less than 20% of the population in 
the tidewater counties, a numerical strength much less than their political strength. The clamor 
that arose from the public against the Anderson Bill resulted in its being replaced by the Shepard 
Bill, which was designed to be more helpful to planters.
In the Spring o f 1914, the Shepard Act was passed, establishing a neutral zone 50 to 200 
yards wide around natural bars where no person could plant or cultivate oysters. Essentially, this 
just enlarged the area of natural oyster bar where watermen were allowed to work and planters 
were not. so territorial disputes continued (Green, Revel 1,& Maitbie, 1916). There was a 
provision in the Shepard Act for the reclassification o f oyster grounds either on the initiative of 
the Board o f Shell Fish Commissioners or by any three or more residents that wished to dispute a 
barren bottom designation. Thousands o f acres were reclassified as natural grounds as a result of 
challenges in court to lease applications (Powers, 1970). The Shepard Act has to this day 
effectively hamstrung the granting o f oyster leases.
From the time o f the Great Depression onward, concerned organizations or the Maryland 
General Assembly, periodically commissioned reports on the state of the oyster fishery 
(Fairbanks, 1932). In 1932 the Baltimore Association o f  Commerce reviewed the history of the 
oyster fishery and o f leasing. It recommended that the Conservation Department be given full 
rein to resurvey and reclassify unused oyster grounds to allow for increased private culture and to 
repeal the restrictions against corporate involvement in private culture, and to strengthen the laws 
to require planting o f shell or oysters on leased bottom within specified time periods.
Another Commission reviewed the fishery in 1936 and blamed the continuing population 
decline on overharvesting, export o f seed oysters to out-of-state planters, and the failure to return 
shell to the beds (Kennedy & Breisch, 1983). Like the Baltimore Association o f Commerce, it 
recommended a change in the leasing laws including allowing for larger holdings and lifting the
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restrictions on corporate holdings, and that the authority to regulate this, not just administer it. be 
given to the Conservation Commission.
In 1943 the Tidewater Fisheries Department developed an Oyster Management Plan to 
gradually increase production and annual harvests from 1944-1978 (Bowman. 1948). It was to 
be financed from general funds and a tax on harvested oysters. Shell cultch and seed oysters 
were to be planted in appropriate areas. However, poor enforcement resulted in a failure to 
collect the tax ($0.20/bushel) and the quantities o f seed and shell available were not sufficient to 
be very useful. Ironically, the practice o f  seed and shell planting continues even today, at 
taxpayer's expense. The annual oyster seed and shell planting program, the Repletion Program, 
is considered by state fisheries managers to be one of the most important management practices 
for maintaining levels o f  production during periods o f poor natural reproduction (Ulanowicz. 
Caplins, & Dunnington, 1980).
Over the years, the state o f Maryland and particularly various tidewater counties have 
put into place laws whose aims were to protect the Bay oyster against the kind o f unregulated 
overfishing that ruined the fishery in New England. There, oyster harvesting had largely come to 
an end and was replaced by private leaseholds for oyster farming which have become the 
mainstay o f and are the oyster fishery of New England today (Hedeen, 1986).
Despite the long-standing Maryland legislation that authorizes leasing, state support has 
gone toward conserving and rehabilitating public oyster beds, through shell and seed planting 
programs, regulations that set minimum legal catch size (3 inches), limits to harvests, and 
restrictions on the kind o f gear the watermen can use (Leffler, 1987a).
While Maryland was one o f the first states to tiy to regulate overharvesting with 
restrictions that included licensing fees, gear limitations, and eventually, minimum cull sizes, the 
laws did not effectively limit the number o f watermen and the immense harvests. In the late
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1800s there were over 28,000 watermen working on the Bay. The predicament of Maryland’s 
oyster fishery was foreseen over a century ago, and the recommendations o f the various 
commissions, if enacted, could have prevented the poor state o f today's fishery. If, as Hedeen 
(1986) has suggested, the state had listened to its oyster biologists and allocated sufficient funds 
for enforcement and to spread the message o f  conservation to all elements o f society', the 
situation might be quite different today. Instead, the legislators succumbed to political rather 
than ecological considerations in rehabilitating the fishery and created major barriers to hinder 
the private propagation o f oysters.
Significance of this Study 
The Chesapeake Bay’s celebrated oyster population has been ravaged by overfishing, 
disease, and pollution. This single fishery once provided a quarter o f America's oy sters but. if 
current trends continue, it may soon become a memory. The decline o f the oyster population has 
had a significant impact on the communities surrounding the Bay. Beyond the loss o f oysters 
and other Bay species that depend on the oyster reefs for habitat, lies another threat, and that is 
the loss o f a way o f life that people have come to associate with the Chesapeake Bay. The oyster 
population, the Bay ecosystem, and the socioeconomic institutions and value systems of the 
Tidewater communities are irrefutably intertwined. As the oyster population continues to 
decline, the health o f the Bay will increasingly decline, and the community structure that the Bay 
provided for centuries will be lost, as will be the watermen that make their living from the Bay. 
the tidewater towns, and the communities. As those things which make up the character of the 
Bay are lost, in a sense, the Chesapeake Bay itself is lost.
Such crises, which threaten livelihoods and community sustainability, should call 
fisheries managers to action to explore and develop alternative approaches to issues such as the
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management o f access to, and participation in, the fishery and the socioeconomic organization o f 
fishers, their communities, and their industry. Those most dependent upon fishing as their 
livelihood will be confronted with widespread reductions in the availability o f fisheries 
resources, and very uncertain economic and social futures. It is important to understand how and 
why the Maryland oyster fishery has reached its present state and explore alternative 
management strategies because the fishery is not just a commercial enterprise that can easily be 
abandoned for another. The oyster fishery is an ecological lynchpin for other species and the 
Bay ecosystem as a whole. Most importantly, the fishery is a way o f life.
Definition of Terms
Barren ground  Bay bottom that is not considered to naturally support oyster or clam
populations without human intervention. Also, any Chesapeake Bay 
bottom represented as barren on the charts o f the Oyster Survey of 1906 
to 1912 and its subsequent amendments.
Bottom dwelling, as in organisms that live on the bottom beneath a body 
o f water.
Populations o f adult oysters that will spawn to produce the next 
generation o f oysters. For aquatic species that expel their eggs and 
sperm into the water column, the brood stock population must be large 
enough and close enough to each other for the eggs and sperm to come 
in contact with each other.
Any boat engaged or used in buying, selling or transporting oysters 
caught on other boats.
Shells with spat and young oysters are separated from market sized (5 
inches from hinge to bill) oysters and thrown back on the beds from 
which they were harvested.
Oyster shell or other hard material where free swimming oyster larvae 
set and grow.
Watermen who scoop or scrape oysters from the bottom by dragging a 
dredge over the oyster beds.
Benthic
Brood stock
Buy boats 
Culling
Cultch
Dredgers
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Estuarine 
Farm oysters 
Gear
Hand tongers 
Larva, larvae
Moribund 
Natural oyster bed
Patent tongers 
Planting
Repletion Program
Riparian
Seed oysters
Sessile
Setting
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Water that is a mix of salt/ocean and fresh water. Point at which tidal 
water meets river currents.
Sow seed, cultivate and protect oysters on bottom lying beneath the 
water that is leased from the state. Aquaculture.
Fishing equipment such as tongs, patent tongs, dredges or scuba outfit 
and tanks.
Watermen who dislodge and pull oysters up from the bottom with long, 
wooden-shafted tongs (pincers, nippers) tipped with metal rakes.
Free swimming pre-adult stage of an oyster; when first spawned, an 
oyster larva may swim for two to three weeks before settling down. At 
this time the oyster develops a foot, settles to the bottom and attaches 
itself (sets) to a hard, clean substrate, cementing itself to a permanent 
location, usually on other oyster shells.
In a state o f dying or approaching death.
Any bed or reef beneath the waters o f the state where the natural growth 
of oysters is extensive enough that the public has resorted at one time or 
another to the bed for a livelihood. Also, any bed or reef represented as 
an oyster bar/bed or reef on the charts o f the Oyster Survey o f 1906 to 
1912 and its subsequent amendments.
Watermen who have equipped their boats with tonging (pincers, nippers) 
rigs that are raised with rope, cable or other hoisting gear.
Put or place oyster seed on the bottom beneath the water for growth to 
market size.
Oyster seed and shell are planted on public oyster beds by the state. 
Oyster shell is collected from oyster processors or mined from large 
deposits o f  old buried shell and then planted on the public grounds. The 
availability o f  this material, called cultch, for the larvae to attach to 
increases the number likely to set and mature to market size.
Pertaining to the banks and bottom o f a natural course o f water such as 
creeks, coves and inlets.
Young oysters generally less than one year old.
Permanently attached or fixed, not free-moving.
When oyster larvae settle upon and attach themselves to a substrate, 
usually oyster shell.
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Shucking
Skipjack
Spawn
Spat, spat set
Suspemion-feeders
Tidewater
Tongs
Watermen
Removing the shell o f  an oyster or clam.
Sloop-rigged, wide-beamed, shallow-draft sailing vessels whose design 
is unique to the Chesapeake Bay. Reportedly named after a fish that 
skips along the surface o f the water or is an archaic English word 
meaning “ inexpensive yet useful servant.” Built specifically for oyster 
dredging in the 1800s. Designated the official Maryland state boat in 
1985.
Produce or expel eggs or sperm. Oysters spawn by releasing sperm and 
eggs into the water column, where fertilization occurs.
Oyster larvae which have completed the free swimming stage of their 
lives and have settled on a permanent location.
Organisms that feed off of organic material suspended in the water 
column.
Refers to geographic area or counties that border the Chesapeake Bay. 
Derived from term meaning land that touches tidal waters.
Scissor-like devices used to harvest oysters consisting of long poles with 
a toothed rake at the end o f each. Design originated with the Native 
Americans.
Local term, specific to the Chesapeake Bay, to describe the fishers of the 
Bay. Fishers that work within the confines of the Bay and not in open 
ocean. Traditionally the fishers on the Bay have been almost exclusively 
men.
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of the Related Literature 
Property Rights as Fisheries Management Strategies 
Fisheries Management Processes and Organization
Commercial and subsistence fisheries around the world are both in crisis, most likely 
because o f over-fishing as a consequence o f too many people and too much fishing effort chasing 
too few ocean resources, frequently in an ecologically disastrous manner (Jentoft & Davis,
1993). This explanation may be overly simplified, but there is no doubt that those most 
dependent upon fishing as their livelihood will be confronted with widespread reductions in the 
availability o f marine resources and very uncertain economic and social futures.
Such crises, which threaten livelihoods and community sustainability, frequently renew 
interest in exploring and developing alternative approaches to issues such as the management of 
access to, and participation in, fisheries and the socioeconomic organization o f fishers, their 
communities, and their industry. For example, within the last decade alternative approaches to 
fisheries management have been suggested and explored, ranging from the implementation of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQ) through govemment-fisher cooperative management 
arrangements to fisher self-management (Jentoft & Davis, 1993). Interest has also served the 
ways and means o f developing organizational approaches dedicated to enhancing the 
socioeconomic viability and the sustainability o f localized small boat fisheries and the coastal 
communities dependent upon them.
The traditional view of fisheries managers has been that they are professionals who 
manipulate fin/shellfish populations and their habitat. This view has changed radically within 
the past 2 decades. Fisheries management professionals are now moving toward the belief that 
they primarily manage people and secondarily manage fin/shellfish populations. Unfortunately, 
old habits die hard and change in the fisheries management culture has been slow.
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In following the traditional view, the concept o f fishery management fell under the rubric 
of fishery science, and the education of those who eventually managed fisheries was primarily in 
the biological and natural sciences. Eventually, it was recognized that there was a dichotomy 
between the education o f those who develop scientific information and those who manage 
fisheries. In other words, there was a need to be better prepared to function in the nonscientific 
aspects o f  fisheries management, that is, in the management o f  people (scientists, fishers, 
government regulators).
The evolution o f fishery management goals in the Western world can be divided into 
three periods that represent stages o f increasing complexity o f fishery management issues. The 
first period might be considered the pre-1900s. In that era, implied goals were laissez-faire and 
there was recognition that hard political choices would have to be made if there were 
management decisions leading to disruption o f the free-flowing lifestyle (few, if  any regulations) 
o f the fishers. This was a period o f essentially no fisheries management with, seemingly, a 
refusal to recognize depletion as a possibility. I f  fisheries management
institutions/agencies/organizations admitted that depletion occurred, they minimized its effect on 
fishing with supplemental plantings (stocking) or transplantation o f  nonresident species and 
exotics (Barber & Taylor, 1990).
During the next period, from the early 1900s to the late 1960s, maximum sustainable 
yield IMSY) was the management goal. As a consequence, maximizing the harvested catch was 
an explicit goal and managers focused on maintenance o f fin/shellfish populations and 
establishing appropriate harvest levels for long-term yields. Other implied goals o f fisheries 
management involved economic and social considerations, such as maximizing employment. 
Approaches by fisheries management organizations continued as in the past, but habitat 
manipulation techniques were also developed, as were various types o f restrictions on fishing
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efficiency.
Within management approaches to maintain MSY, there was implicit recognition of 
social and economic concerns. Criticisms of, and failure o f  the MSY approach however, 
produced the current era in which fisheries managers now explicitly recognize that social, 
political, economic, and biological goals must all be addressed. The current guiding concept is 
optimum yield  (OY). The industry stakeholders, comprising the fishers, processors, packers, and 
restauranteurs. argued that the primary difficulty with maintaining and managing for an OY was 
open access to a common resource, with its attendant allocation problems. In these arguments, 
social and economic goals were identified, such as full employment or maximizing profit. 
Consequently, limited entry (limited access to the resource) or restricted fishing rights, in its 
many different forms, became a more recognized and applied tool o f fisheries management 
(Barber & Taylor, 1990). Inherent in the goal setting for OY and limited entry was the real 
challenge to fisheries management, determining appropriate harvest/fishing limits, implementing 
them, and enforcing them. To calculate OY. one begins with the biological concept o f MSY. that 
being the greatest amount of fin/shellfish that can be caught every year without permanently 
diminishing the stock (McManus, 1995). Next, the MSY is usually adjusted up or down, 
depending on political pressures.
The mathematical neatness o f  this management process is deceptive. Its biological 
component depends on accurate data concerning living, and in some cases, highly mobile 
organisms, perhaps adjusted for predicted variations in the weather, prey and predation, and 
disease. Its economic component depends on the ability o f state and/or federal regulators to 
predict the behavior o f regulated interests. In addition, it must be implemented by means of 
institutional arrangements and procedures that are currently deeply flawed.
To generalize, efforts have focused on management measures that restrict fishing effort
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by various command-and-control stratagems, such as closed fishing seasons or limited seasons, 
fishing gear restrictions, closed areas, or catch quotas, all of which are government-regulated and 
controlled (McManus, 1995). This current state o f affairs is easy to take for granted, but some 
fisheries academics consider it symptomatic o f  management regimes doomed to failure.
Fisheries management has frequently been defined as the analysis o f  alternative 
decisions and implementation o f these decisions to meet human goals and objectives for the 
utilization o f  aquatic resources. A key point is not the decision-making process itself, but its 
role in accomplishing predetermined goals and objectives for utilizing fishery resources. 
Fisheries management is more inclusive than just the decision-making process for utilizing 
aquatic organisms. It also incorporates human interests in how the habitat and human resources 
are to be utilized and considers that the use o f these resources is greatly influenced by external 
social, legal, political, scientific, technical and economic goals, objectives, and values.
There are many criteria and objectives by which methods o f fisheries management can 
be judged. For example, biologists are interested in the maintenance o f adequate recruitment (of 
species) or improvement in recruitment, population age structure, and genetic diversity. 
Economists are interested in the long-term achievement o f  these goals in an economically 
efficient manner. Economic efficiency is loosely defined here as society’s ability to maximize 
the combined value o f commercial, recreational, and aesthetic products and services that can be 
obtained for a given level o f  cost, or the achievement o f  a given level o f products and services at 
minimum cost (Waters, 1991). Unfortunately, economists have not yet grasped the economic 
benefit to habitat maintenance and ecological diversity and tend to have an anthropocentric view 
in defining monetary values for natural resources (Smith, 1993).
Marine fisheries today represent a  version o f Hardin’s (1968) now famous tragedy o f the 
commons in which fishers, each acting in his or her own self-interest, are compelled to overfish
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and deplete the resources upon which they depend. Fin/shellfish are said to be common property 
because no individual owns the ocean or the living creatures in it. Hence, fin/shellfish have 
generally been harvested on a first-come-first-served basis by anyone with appropriate fishing 
gear, subject to existing regulations by state and federal governments as trustees of the public's 
natural resource (Waters. 1991). This creates a situation in which what is optimal for an 
individual fisher is not always optimal for all fishers combined.
The field o f natural resource management is undergoing a fundamental transition. The 
development o f  a global free economy, the onset o f unprecedented diversity in the workforce, the 
degree o f competition, and the apparent necessity o f integrating the private sector with the public 
sector in mutually supportive ways that protect the integrity o f both, are all trends that demand an 
exceptional level of excellence in performance from organizations of all types. Perhaps as a 
reflection o f the obvious need for new ways of organizing and managing, is that the debate 
between advocates o f  hierarchical versus participative modes o f organizing has virtually 
vanished from the scene. Such controversy seems irrelevant and off the point, given the scale 
and depth o f the changes that appear to be required.
Historically, open-access. and even limited-access policies have led to overcrowding by 
fishers and overcapitalization of fisheries, contributing to or exacerbating overfishing, escalated 
by-catch problems (unintentionally catching nontargeted species, e.g., dolphins in tuna nets), 
waste, user conflicts, high management costs, and economic inefficiency (Hinman & Paulsen. 
1993).
Too often, marine fisheries are characterized by (Alverson & Larkin, 1992):
1. A continued trend toward overcapitalization.
2. Inadequate statistics and scientific information about the exploited resources.
3. Failure to take timely measures.
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4. Inability to monitor and influence necessary management regimes.
5. Continued squabbles about shared and transboundary stocks.
When fisheries management fails, there is a tendency to point the finger at the fishing 
industry itself as greedy, uncaring, morally bankrupt culprits responsible for overfishing and for 
incidental and indirect impacts on habitats and other marine organisms. Responsibility for 
natural resource management has been, and still is. vested in state and federal governments. 
Though there is some truth in the perception that the fishing industry itself is only interested in 
its own short-term gains, governments ultimately bear the responsibility for the historical course 
of natural resource management (Alverson. 1995). For in reality , the fishing industry maximizes 
its economic opportunities within a competitive environment, social attitudes, and legal regimes. 
If industry pressures overly influence those responsible for policy and regulations and their 
enforcement, the fault lies with policy and decision makers, enforcement officials, and their 
political masters.
Unfortunately, politics is the stuff that fisheries management is made of: fishery 
scientists play ing in the high stakes game o f fishery politics soon find that politics trumps 
science. However, the politics versus science scenario is an integral part o f the mechanism that 
will forge the fisheries o f the future. An important part o f selling science to those involved in 
fisheries is having credibility and standing in the political and regulatory process (Radonski. 
1995). Some o f that comes from breaking down the us-versus-them barriers. In addition, 
scientists must be able to articulate science on the level o f the users o f the fishery' resource.
The principal issues that will drive fisheries management are determination o f  fishery 
management objectives, control o f  exploitation and rebuilding o f depleted marine fin/shellfish 
stocks, allocation o f harvestablc surplus, and who will pay the costs o f fisheries management 
(Radonski. 1995).
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The outcome o f critical management decisions is likely to depend on the quality and 
believability o f the facts presented regarding the risks versus expectations of making a particular 
decision. In a fishery setting, the sector o f society involved in or influencing decision making 
has, until recently, been narrow and mostly government but frequently weighted toward the users 
themselves. However, during the past decade, the principles o f fin/shellfish and other natural 
resources management have been in transition, and the breadth o f societal involvement has 
greatly expanded.
If  from some time in the future a backward look at the history o f  marine fisheries use 
reveals failure, then the societal check-and-balance mechanisms and institutional arrangements 
for their implementation, need serious adjustment now. Perhaps the appropriate question is 
whether existing institutional arrangements can remedy the perceived problems and whether the 
political will can be mustered to modify human behavior adequately.
A General Overview of Property Rights Theories
Developing a fisheries management strategy is a challenging prospect in itself because of 
the complexity o f problems associated with fisheries. Fish, finfish or shellfish, inhabit an 
environment that is so variable and often so vast that fundamental biological relationships remain 
largely unknown. In addition, fish are wild and cannot be managed directly but only indirectly, 
by controlling the behavior o f one o f their primary predators, humans. In a perpetual cycle of 
regulatory action and reaction, fisheries management becomes increasingly more difficult 
(Sylvia. 1992). Yet while demand for fish and fishing effort increase, fish remain constrained 
within the limitations o f the natural world.
Fisheries management has long had a history o f  biological orientation, which often 
means that the goals o f management focus upon issues related to stock size and yield rather than
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on other equally important issues such as the long-term costs, benefits, and social impacts o f the 
regulatory controls developed to meet the yield or stock objectives (Sylvia. 1992). The common 
result is short-sighted analysis and the implementation of regulations that ultimately fuel future 
management crises.
Two o f the major problems in fisheries management that have been explored more 
recently by researchers from both the social and biological science disciplines are the problems 
o f managing common property and o f dealing with resource uncertainty. According to Sylvia 
(1992). the common property problem is characterized by two major concepts. The first is that 
like most hunting industries, the size o f the resource is limited by the carry ing capacity o f the 
natural environment. The second and more important concept is that without effective 
management institutions users will ignore their long-term aggregate impacts on the resource and 
collectively increase their efforts until net gains can no longer be realized (Gordon. 1954). Since 
most fish stocks cannot be cost-effectively augmented by seeding or other forms o f restocking, 
increasing fishing effort and harvests will affect the ability o f the resource to renew itself, 
ultimately resulting in a reduction in the size o f the stocks and harvests to levels below what 
might be most beneficial to society.
Fisheries resources show high variability, often as a result o f changes in the natural 
environment. This variation significantly increases risk, makes it difficult to forecast future 
resource supply and complicates the design o f fisheries management schemes. Since the aquatic 
environment is so environmentally complex, it confounds a fisheries manager's ability to 
understand even the most basic issues affecting the size and behavior o f the resource.
The debate over the effectiveness o f  the fisheries policy process has led managers to 
explore methods for strengthening the fisheries policy process and for improving social benefits. 
Management strategy research has focused primarily on rights-based management systems and
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fisher behavior. According to Sylvia (1992), advocates o f rights-based management systems 
argue that traditional bureaucratic and politically oriented strategies for managing natural 
resources are fundamentally flawed because they separate authority from responsibility. They 
also believe that when resource users have rights to resources that the evolving market system 
ultimately leads to resource use that is more effective, efficient, and fair than traditional systems. 
Though rights-based resource management systems are certainly not without their problems, they 
continue to gain support from fisheries managers and scientists because of the inability o f 
traditional management systems to effectively address fisheries management issues.
Traditional fisheries management systems have been severely criticized for their focus 
solely on the behavior o f fish while ignoring the behavior of fishers (Opaluche & Bockstael,
1984). In their study. Opaluche and Bockstael showed that ignoring the interrelationships of 
fish, fishers, and regulators inevitably leads to the adoption o f regulatory strategies that fail to 
meet long-term objectives. Usually this results because the regulation acts as an incentive for 
fishers to  increase effort in ways that are not yet regulated, resulting in behavior that may be 
beneficial for the individual fisher, but not for society as a whole.
From an economic perspective (Karpoff.1987), the effectiveness o f  a pluralistic process 
that integrates rights-based systems and fishers’ behavior will be limited if  fisheries managers 
continue to rely heavily on crisis-driven political agendas. Management strategies that enhance 
the wealth, or minimize the loss, o f those who are contending for control over the resource will 
tend to predominate. Meanwhile, strategies that are broader in scope and that would include 
analysis of impacts on groups receiving indirect benefits, including supporting industries and the 
community itself, receive far less attention. Comprehensive analysis requires foresight and 
planning, a high degree o f cooperation and a recognition o f the role that socioeconomic policy 
information can play in guiding and improving the fisheries policy process. Proponents, like
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Sylvia (1992), o f rights-based fishery management systems argue that only rights-based 
management rather than traditional management systems can effectively (a) capture the complex 
and dynamic technological, market, and biological information that characterizes the fisheries 
problem; (b) make the appropriate behavioral and market adjustments; and (c) act to promote not 
only their own interests, but also the interests o f the community and the state.
The granting o f  territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) to fishers' organizations, 
similar to that practiced in Japan, has been gaining acceptance worldwide as a management tool 
for small-scale fisheries (Siar, Agbayani, & Valera, 1992). Open access in fisheries has resulted 
in wasteful exploitation o f the resource; fishers are unable to regulate their catch, economic 
waste is brought about by too much effort on a finite resource, there is decline in fishers' income, 
and conflict has developed between fishers with the same gear for the same resource, or between 
those using different gear for the same resource (Christy, 1982; Hardin. 1968). This is Hardin's 
well-known tragedy o f  the commons. The participation o f  fishers themselves is believed to be 
the key to achieving long-term fisheries management goals (Ferrer, 1989). Community-based 
management has proved effective in maintaining coral reef habitat, improving species 
abundance, and arresting the decline o f coastal productivity in the Philippines (Alix. 1989;
White, 1988. 1989). The granting o f TURFs to fisher associations, similar to that practiced in 
Japan (Ruddle, 1987), is gaining popularity as a management tool for municipal fisheries also 
(Lacanilao. 1989).
One o f the barriers to introducing TURFs as a fisheries management strategy in coastal 
communities is that, generally, the economic standard o f  living is low and incomes are closely 
tied to the fishery (Smith, 1979). Acquiring TURFs may not solve the overfishing problem in an 
already overcrowded fishery. To reduce fishing effort, the granting o f  TURFs must be coupled 
w'ith the introduction o f other sources o f  livelihood. These could come in the form of
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aquaculture or land-based activities. Such alternative employment activities could alleviate the 
low economic standard characteristic of coastal fishing communities. As a legal right. TURFs 
become meaningful when placed within the context o f what is sustainable and economically 
beneficial to fishers. They can contribute to raising fishers' standard o f living and protecting the 
environment from destructive fishing practices. A sustainable fishery may be more possible 
through TURFs or some variation on TURFs than by current management strategies that are 
under the auspices of government-controlled fisheries. As the majority of fishers are still solely 
dependent on fishing or fishing-related activities for their livelihood, the concept of. and 
rationale behind, comm unity-based management may be a step in a new direction worth 
considering.
The real challenge for fisheries managers, Sylvia (1992) feels, is to develop management 
systems that reconcile people’s diverse values and dynamic behavior with the complexities and 
limitations o f  the natural environment. Resource managers must develop management sy stems 
that not only rationally conserve the resource but are to a great extent effectively self-regulating. 
It must be a management system that provides the users with the responsibility and the freedom 
to directly determine how they can most effectively use the resource, in other words, a rights- 
based management system.
The problems associated with managing collective or public resources arise when 
individuals must cooperate to achieve a goal that is in both their collective and their individual 
interests. As McKean (1992) points out, even in the face of declining fish stocks, fishers will 
persist in overharvesting if  they perceive that the individual short-term costs o f  cooperating 
exceed the long-term collective benefits. In order for sustainable management and regulation of 
a publicly or collectively held resource to succeed, there has to be what Garrett Hardin (1968) 
described as “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon.” Margaret Levi (1988) makes it clear from
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her analysis that the need for cooperation even in the interest o f survival is an inadequate 
motivation to cooperate.
The definition o f property and property rights is often confusing, which is unfortunate 
because different arrangements o f property rights have different consequences for management 
o f  the resources in question. Common property is probably the most misused term in property 
rights discussions. Its definition ranges from unowned resources to which no one has recognized 
rights nor the right to restrict anyone else’s use o f the resource, to public property which is 
property owned by the state and ostensibly held in trust for the well-being o f  the general public 
and is often accessible to the public, to jointly-owned private property which is property' held in 
common by a group o f people that have exclusive use o f the resource. Unowned resources are 
the most vulnerable to degradation because no one has the right to keep any one out or to limit 
use. McKean (1992) points out that public property can be just as vulnerable to overuse as 
unowned property because it is subject to severe principle-agent disease. Ownership of public 
property', she explains, is vested in the public. However, the public’s representatives are usually 
state legislators, who provide inadequate funds to police it and who are often physically too far 
removed from the resource to assess the damage.
M cKean’s point is readily illustrated when one looks at the oyster fishery in Mary land. 
Though more locally based DNR officials are left to administer the fishery regulations on the 
Chesapeake Bay, it is the legislators in the state capitol o f Annapolis that make the laws and 
allocate the funds to enforce and administer those laws.
Private ownership of a resource has more to do with exclusivity of use than it has to do 
with number o f owners or actual ownership. As is the case in Mary land, private property rights 
are extended to those who lease oyster ground from the state for the cultivation o f oysters and the 
lessee has exclusive rights to the leased ground, albeit with some state-imposed restrictions.
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Limiting Access to a Common Resource
In No More Fish in the Sea (1994), Caroline Wheal points out a commonly held theory 
that if you give fishers a stake in the resource, they will be more likely to conserve for tomorrow 
what they do not catch today. Rights to a common resource becomes a privilege granted to select 
fishers in the form of licences/permits for rights of access, leased territory, or gear restrictions.
In regions such as New England or the Chesapeake Bay where generation after generation have 
been fishers, any change in the system by which these privileges are granted is hard to implement 
and can drastically alter the way the community functions.
In his report on the Northeast fishery. Beyond Denial (1995). Charles Collins warns that 
if fishing pressure on the resource is not reduced, the Northeast fishery crisis will rapidly become 
the whole Atlantic Coast fishery crisis. To bring fishing effort into line with the amount offish 
that can be harvested, the number and ability (type of gear) o f the boats have to be cut by 50%. 
Collins believes. In New England, government buy-outs have been proposed, in which fishers 
would be paid for their boats (below market value, many fear). Many taxpayers wonder why 
government should bail the fishers out at all. In the long run, however, the government will end 
up paying one way or another, either through buy-outs or welfare.
Since the 1950s, economists have recognized that the structure of property rights affects 
the way people use a natural resource (Coase, 1960; Gordon, 1954; Santopietro & Shabman. 
1992a; Scott. 1955). As a result, economists have expanded the study o f particular property 
rights systems to how property rights systems change over time. The new resource economics 
fNRE) literature offers one perspective (Anderson, 1982). When stakeholders identify 
alternative property rights systems that can enhance the potential economic value o f  the resource, 
change results. The stakeholders then enter the political arena to bring about the necessary 
changes to capture these economic benefits for themselves (Anderson & Hill, 1976; Gardner,
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1985). In accord with this economic decision model o f individual choice, in which individuals 
pursue their own self-interest, stakeholders trying to bring about change take political action 
based on a marginal analysis o f their benefits versus their cost. Included in the cost analysis is 
the cost o f  transactions to bring about change. The result is a change in property rights that 
enhances the economic value o f the resource.
However, another group o f economists have an entirely different approach on property 
rights that considers more than just the opportunities for efficiency gains (Runge, 1985: Schmid. 
1987; Shabman, 1985). This alternative approach uses not only the distribution o f economic 
benefits, but also the social values, environmental conditions, and noneconomic sources of 
political power as determining factors in the evolution o f  property rights systems.
Anderson and Hill (1976) point out that the advocates o f the NRE approach generally 
propose replacing open-access and common property rights with private property rights because 
"When exclusivity and transferability are insured through private property rights, resources move 
to their highest valued alternative subject to the constraint o f positive transaction costs” (p. 938). 
In other words, the NRE advocates believe that economic forces not only drive changes in 
property rights but move them to attain economic efficiency (Dahlman. 1980).
Transaction costs are the key to the move toward privatization and subsequently, 
innovative approaches to greater efficiencies. The cost o f establishing and enforcing property 
rights are a part o f  these transaction costs. Therefore, private property rights evolve either as the 
resource’s economic value increases to the point that stakeholders find it worthwhile to bear the 
transaction costs, or as the transaction costs decline, becoming less o f  a barrier to privatization 
(Santopietro &  Shabman, 1992b).
As Santopietro and Shabman ( 1992b) explain it, from an NRE perspective, the role of 
the economists and social scientists that are advising fisheries managers, is to design and
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promote policy reforms that encourage movement toward private property rights o f natural 
resources. This often means finding ways to reduce transaction costs. Those less enamored with 
the NRE approach are not as convinced that private property rights to natural resources provide 
the best management strategy toward resource conservation and sustainable harvests. It is 
perhaps naive to assume that all fisheries stakeholders, including the economists, scientists, and 
managers, are striving toward conservation and sustainability goals, but it is reasonable to 
assume that they are part o f  any stakeholder’s operational strategy if there is to be a fishery at all. 
Those skeptical o f the NRE approach are careful to draw a clear distinction between open access, 
in which access to a resource is unrestrained and common property, in which access is limited to 
members o f a specific group (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1976). Common property is the case 
in which ownership o f the resource is held by a group, and rules for access to, or use of. the 
resource are established by the group or some regulating body. In this respect, common property 
and limited-access property can be considered the same. The public oyster fisheries (Maryland 
and Virginia) o f the Chesapeake Bay are a limited-access fisheries in which the group that has 
access is limited by required licenses and further limits are placed on the fisheries by season and 
gear restrictions. Pure private property exists only when the government grants to a single 
economic agent (individual or corporate) discretion over ail resource exploitation decisions. The 
private oyster fisheries of the Chesapeake Bay are not truly private in this strict interpretation. 
They are in a sense a cross between a very exclusive limited-access property and true private 
property. For in fact, the state still owns the property, in this case Bay or river bottom, but limits 
access solely to the lessee. This is not unlike many condominium properties, in which the owner 
owns the airspace within the walls o f the condominium but the managing company owns the 
walls o f the actual structure.
The push by the NRE advocates toward private leasing of oyster beds in the Bay is based
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
50
upon a number o f economic studies showing greater financial returns being made on private 
oyster beds than on the public commons (Agneilo & Donnelley, 1975, 1976: Alford. 1975: 
Christy, 1964: Powers, 1970). Given the apparently greater financial return from a private 
property rights structure, from an NRE perspective it would follow that if privatization has not 
occurred, it is because the transaction costs o f achieving private property exceed the economic 
benefits. Yet, it is clear that there must be other factors at play since, in the Chesapeake Bay, 
common and private property (public and leased oyster beds) exist side by side. In addition, 
though Virginia also has common and private property existing side by side, its property rights 
structures are very different from Maryland’s. In other words, with respect to the oyster grounds 
o f the Chesapeake Bay, there is (a) the coexistence of common and private property , and (b) two 
states with very different property rights structures for the same resource.
Can the transaction costs of privatization or the value o f the oyster beds be so different 
from one acre o f oyster bottom to the next, or between oyster bottom in one state and oyster 
bottom in another state, to explain the failure to privatize all oyster bottoms? No. clearly 
transaction costs alone cannot explain the patchwork pattern of property rights to the oyster 
grounds. The property rights system in the Bay, Santopietro and Shabman (1992a) believe, is the 
result o f  a complex o f factors that can best be explained by a more detailed historical perspective 
that includes a broad conception o f  the social values and concerns that have been associated with 
the oyster fishery. Santopietro and Shabman look at the reasons for the original creation and 
persistence o f this mixed property rights system during the past 100 years, as well as draw 
implications from this history for the role o f the social scientist in research and policy advising 
on oyster fishery management.
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A Comparison with Ovster Farming Elsewhere in the United States
A growing industry. Aquaculture, or the farming o f finfish and shellfish, is a growing 
industry nationwide. In the United States, controlled cultivation and harvest of fin/shellfish 
accounts for around 15% o f fisheries production, and by the year 2000 that number is expected to 
rise to 20% (Leffler, 1988). Eventually, cultured production o f finfish and shellfish could 
surpass harvests from the wild fisheries. The attraction to aquaculture is that it promises a more 
stable market and is less subject to cycles o f boom or bust.
West Coast. In some states aquaculture is already far along. Virtually all oysters 
harvested in Washington state are the result o f hatchery-produced seed and private planting. 
Oyster farming on leased and privately owned bottom has become a way of life in Washington. 
Oregon, and California since the 1800s. Like the New England and the G ulf Coast, the West 
Coast oyster fishery has faced overfishing, poor management, and pollution. In addition, 
particularly since World War II, there has been a shortage o f  seed oysters for oyster farmers. In 
other words, like the other parts o f  the United States, the history o f the fishery followed a similar 
pattern: initial discovery o f the oysters, followed by heavy harvesting, ineffective management to 
conserve and replenish them, and eventual depletion o f the resource. However, that is where the 
similarity ends.
On the West Coast, the state governments did not step in to halt the decline. The 
opening o f the transcontinental railroad in 1869 made it easier for enterprising fishers to bring 
oysters in from the East Coast and to transplant them on leased grounds. For a while it looked as 
if the Eastern oyster might replace the native Pacific oyster species. However, the Eastern oyster 
did not fare well. It did not reproduce well in the cold waters o f  the West Coast, and an 
increasing human population brought with it pollution and deteriorating water quality. So,
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harvests fell and by the 1930s imports o f Eastern oyster seed stopped (Leffler. 1987b).
However, this did not put an end to the West Coast oyster fishery.
West Coast oyster farmers had already begun importing Japanese oysters (Crassostrea 
gigas) by the turn o f the century. By 1919, the Japanese oysters had taken hold in Washington 
state and soon became the mainstay in Oregon and California. That was the beginning o f an 
import industry that, until World War II, brought hundreds o f  thousands o f bushels o f Japanese 
oyster seed to oyster grounds on the West Coast.
Though oyster farmers did benefit from some natural spawning, water temperatures were 
generally too cold for the Japanese oyster to encourage a dependable natural set. West Coast 
oyster farmers had to continue to rely upon Japanese oyster seed. and. after World War II. 
imports o f seed began again. However, with the rising price o f seed. West Coast oyster farmers 
soon realized that what they needed was low-cost seed that could be produced on the West Coast. 
The time was ripe for hatchery technology, and enterprising oyster farmers embraced it. Since 
the hatcheries started, 90% of all the oyster seed planted on the West Coast has come from 
hatchery tanks (Leffler, 1987b). There are only a small number o f hatcheries, owned by large 
integrated corporations, that supply the oyster seed for the entire West Coast fishery.
West Coast oyster fishers have been successful in growing the Japanese oyster because 
of their own entrepreneurship, and in no small part, because the Japanese oyster has generally 
been free of disease. So far, the West Coast fishery has not been plagued by anything such as 
MSX or Dermo. Planting oysters in the Chesapeake Bay as they have been planted on the West 
Coast may consequently be more challenging and require more work (LeGrand, 1997). In 
addition, by allowing large corporations to participate in the raising o f seed and planting of 
oysters, a more stable economic base is available to withstand the ups and downs o f the fishery. 
However, if the natural production in the Bay continues its downward spiral, the success of the
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West Coast oyster industry may stand as an example o f  the way that the Bay’s oyster fishery 
could have been managed, and lead to a change in management strategies.
New England. In the 1700s, the center of the American oyster industry was Connecticut. 
However, unregulated overfishing ruined the fishery in New England. By the 1800s oyster 
harvesting on public grounds had largely come to an end and was replaced by private leaseholds 
for oyster fanning (Hedeen, 1986) on grounds rented from the state. Private leaseholds are not 
only the mainstay, they are the oyster fishery o f New England today.
Having depleted their own stocks, dredge schooners began traveling to New Jersey and 
Virginia around 1808 to obtain oysters for the New England markets (Stevenson, 1894). By 
1820. laws had been enacted in both Maryland and Virginia prohibiting both dredging in the 
Chesapeake Bay and transport o f oysters from the state in ships not wholly owned for the 
preceding year by Bay residents. So not wishing to miss out on such a lucrative business. New 
England businessmen began establishing branches o f their own oyster packing plants in 
Baltimore, Maryland, throughout the 1830s. With improved transportation systems such as the 
railroad and interconnecting state roads, New England packers were soon exporting increasing 
numbers o f oysters, and then oyster seed, out of the state.
Although, as Caroline Wheal (1994) points out, fish fanning is not the panacea to 
correcting badly managed wild fish stocks, aquaculture has been used successfully in New 
England for years to raise not only oysters, but salmon, carp, and shrimp. On one hand, Wheal 
believes, it is poorly placed faith in technology that encourages humans’ firm convictions that 
technological solutions can always be substituted for dealing with the fundamental problem. 
However, on the other hand, aquaculture not only can take fishing pressure off the natural stocks, 
but allows the flexibility to move stocks to safer areas to avoid disease and maximize
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survivability.
Delaware Bav. The natural shellfish growing areas o f  Delaware Bay are primarily along 
the Atlantic Coast o f New Jersey and the New Jersey side of the Delaware Bay. with some 
shellfish beds on the Delaware side. Delaware Bay supports two commercially important 
molluscan species. Eastern oysters and Atlantic quahogs {Mercenaria mercenaria). also known 
as hard-shell clams. The commercial shellfish fishery of Delaware Bay began around colonial 
times and grew with the expansion o f population centers around Wilmington. Delaware, as well 
as Philadelphia and New York (Weslager. 1967). Today, the quahog commercial industry 
remains high but. like in the Chesapeake Bay, overharvesting and disease have greatly reduced 
oyster harvests.
Also like the Chesapeake Bay. regulatory jurisdiction for the fisheries is shared by two 
states. As early as 1719 New Jersey passed legislation that prohibited the harvesting of oy sters 
during the summer spawning season, and by nonresidents. This is the earliest recorded 
legislation in Delaware Bay designed to protect and enhance the resource (Ingersoll, 1881). In 
1846. New Jersey passed much broader legislation that not only protected the natural resource by 
reiterating previous legislation, but it encouraged cultivation o f oysters by legalizing and 
protecting the planting o f  seed oysters in creeks, ditches, and ponds (Bacon. 1903). The state of 
Delaware began enacting oyster fishery-related laws in 1812 by restricting harvesting to residents 
only and subsequent laws generally followed the management strategy laid out by New Jersey 
(Miller. 1962). In 1882 Samuel Lockwood (1882) surveyed the New Jersey oyster grounds for 
the state's Bureau o f Labor and Industry. A few years later. Julius Nelson (1889) reported on the 
status of the oyster industry and came to the same conclusion, that the oyster industry had 
already severely depleted the natural beds and that the supply o f oysters could be increased by
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When oysters were first harvested commercially from the Delaware Bay. they were 
transported directly to Philadelphia by the same boats that harvested them, and most of the 
commerce was controlled by the Philadelphians. However, after the opening o f the Chesapeake 
and Delaware Canal in 1829, oysters from the Delaware Bay were taken to Baltimore, Maryland, 
for shucking, canning, and shipment west (Ingersoll, 1881). In an attempt to preserve the 
resource, both New Jersey and Delaware passed legislation in 1856 that promoted oyster farming 
in Delaware Bay. Ten acre plots in areas rich in seed were leased to the highest bidder for 
periods of up to five years to promote planting and growth o f oysters. In addition, fishing boats 
were assessed a licensing fee that was paid into an oyster fund that was administered by several 
commissioners and was expected to be used to enforce oyster laws and prevent theft. However 
enforcement, as in the Chesapeake Bay, was almost nonexistent.
To remedy the defects in the enforcement o f the shellfish laws. New Jersey enacted 
legislation in 1871 that created the Maurice River Cove and Delaware Bay Oyster Association. 
The association was made up o f  licensed fishers and was intended to be self-governing. Boat and 
lease fees that were collected by the association were deposited into an oyster fund that was used 
to hire a watch boat and crew to patrol the leased oyster grounds. Since all members of the 
association had a vested interest in the oyster industry, it was expected that they would want to 
enforce the laws protecting it (Ford, 1994).
At the same time, the state o f Delaware was trying to protect and encourage its oyster 
industry. So, in 1871 the Delaware side o f the Delaware Bay was officially divided into upper 
bay public beds and lower bay planting grounds (Miller, 1962). Later, in 1873, an act was 
passed in the legislature that allowed anyone to stake up a one-acre plot o f bay bottom for 
planting (Ingersoll, 1881). It also allowed for larger 15 acre plots to be leased from the state. No
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leasing fees were charged for the one-acre plots. The only major restriction was that existing 
natural beds could not be leased or staked up. In contrast with New Jersey, fees collected from 
boat licenses and leases were paid directly to the state o f Delaware, which administered and 
regulated the fishery (Ford, 1994).
By the first decade o f the 20th century the oyster fishery was already well on its way to 
devastation. To add to the oyster fishers' problems several large grants containing natural oyster 
beds were sold, not leased, by the State Riparian Commission (Ford, 1994). Private ownership of 
producing seed areas by a few corporations threatened to displace hundreds o f oyster fishers who 
had made their living tonging on what the state legislature itself had deemed public oystering 
grounds. Tempers flared and came to a head in 1907 during a violent clash between oyster 
fishers and guards hired by the Sooy Oyster Company, which claimed one o f the riparian grants 
(New Jersey Bureau of Shellfisheries, 1908). In the end however, the grants were upheld.
On both sides o f  the Delaware Bay tensions rose because o f  the division between 
privately leased grounds and natural seed beds, which remained in the public domain. During the 
1880s and 1890s, perceived encroachment on the public beds by planters who obtained riparian 
grants which extended into the bay, precipitated a bloodless oyster war (Hall. 1894). The 
conflict ended with New Jersey buying back the grants (New Jersey Bureau o f Shellfisheries. 
1906).
Between 1902-1905 the state o f New Jersey assumed control o f  most o f the oyster 
industry along the boardering Atlantic Coast. There were frequent conflicts reported between 
quahog fishers and oyster fishers, and between oyster fishers who wanted all areas open to public 
harvest and planters who wanted to lease acreage for private cultivation. At the time, tonging 
was the only legal harvest method. However, that was later to change. Seed oysters were in 
chronic short supply, and the cost o f importing seed from the Chesapeake Bay and Long Island
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Sound was prohibitively high for most small oyster farmers (New Jersey Bureau o f 
Shellfisheries, 1912). But, with the outbreak of MSX in 1957. all imports and exports were 
banned (Ford, 1994).
Both the New Jersey and the Delaware oyster fisheries were devastated by the outbreak 
of MSX. but gradually the Fisheries rebounded as the seed beds recovered in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In addition, it was determined that some of the native oysters developed some 
resistance to MSX as a result o f  natural selection (Haskin & Ford, 1979). Changes in oyster 
farming and harvesting practices added to the recovery. Before the outbreak o f MSX. seed 
oysters were planted while small in size and remained on the leased grounds for 2 to 4 years 
before harvest. After MSX, even though the disease remained in some parts o f  the lower bay. the 
farmers learned to avoid areas o f high disease incidence and sought oyster seed large enough to 
plant and market after only a single growing season, which minimized the time the oysters were 
exposed to infection.
The extent o f the post-MSX recovery was not reflected in the harvest data because, as 
Haskin and Ford (1983) hypothesized, the return to profitability o f an industry that was nearly 
lost encouraged substantial under-reporting o f marketed oysters (subject to taxes). Although to 
this day the Delaware Bay oyster fishery has not reached pre-MSX harvest levels, the fishers is 
based entirely on seed grown in the Delaware Bay. In other words, although harvests do not 
equal those o f  earlier years, it should be emphasized that they are based entirely on native seed 
(Ford, 1994). Enforced harvest seasons on both sides o f the bay and the introduction of culling 
machines also helped enhance the fishery. Before the outbreak o f MSX, every time the seed 
beds received a heavy set. they were dredged out within 2 to 3 years. Hence, the strategy in 
recent years has been to restrict the harvest season and to close the beds if  necessary, when the 
oyster population on a bed falls below 40% of its sustainable volume of oysters. With this plan.
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oysters are spared to spawn for the succeeding generations.
After a modest come back, the Delaware oyster industry was dealt another blow in 1985. 
when severe drought (consequently raising salinities) accompanied a resurgence of MSX. By 
1990, just as the fishery was rebounding a new problem surfaced, Dermo. Though Dermo was 
believed to have been introduced to the Delaware Bay back in the 1950s from seed imported 
from the Chesapeake Bay, Ford and Haskin (1982) believed that without warm enough 
temperatures and continued introductions, Dermo did not take hold at the time. The ban on 
imports succeeded in keeping Dermo in check but it is believed that it persisted in low incidence 
until the ideal conditions presented themselves in 1990 (Ford, 1992).
The Delaware Bay oyster industry faces an uncertain future. Some of the seed beds that 
provided oyster farmers with seed were closed for a number o f years due to poor sets and to give 
the oyster population a chance to rebound naturally. In addition, the presence o f MSX and 
Dermo makes the planting o f seed in the more saline lower bay more risky (Ford, 1994). One 
thing to keep in mind that sets Delaware Bay oyster fishers and fanners far apart from 
Chesapeake Bay watermen is that neither the governments o f New Jersey nor Delaware stepped 
in at any time to subsidize the fishery, by placing seed on public beds or anything else. Since this 
has been understood since before the turn o f the century, Delaware Bay fishers have generally 
relied on other income, such as land farming, to supplement their eamings (personal 
communication. Dr. Susan Ford, Haskin Shellfish Laboratory, Port Norris, NJ, 1995). This has 
perhaps made it easier for the state governments to restrict the harvesting seasons or close the 
public beds entirely, since there is less reliance on the fishery than in the Chesapeake Bay. 
Currently, regulators, and government and university researchers are trying to encourage the 
industry to find new methods for farming oysters. At present, the only cost to oyster farmers for 
natural seed, exclusive o f  boat operating costs is a  small licensing fee. Susan Ford (1994)
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believes that until the cost o f  natural seed comes more into line with its true value, serious 
private investment in alternative methods for obtaining and culturing seed will not occur.
Applying Research Strategies to the Study of Fisheries Management
Applicability
While most research projects share five basic stages, they exhibit much diversity in the 
way in which these stages are carried out. Research projects can range from highly controlled 
experimental laboratory studies to uncontrolled observational studies. A paradigm can be the 
mental window through which the researcher views the world. What the researcher observes in a 
laboratory setting, in the social world, or when reviewing historical events is interpreted by her 
or his paradigm o f concepts, categories, assumptions, and biases. Thus, two researchers 
describing the same thing from two different perspectives may produce considerably different 
accounts. Even the very problem that the researcher chooses to pursue is influenced by her or his 
values, methodology, and whether the study is to be conducted over time or at a single point in 
time (Bailey, 1994).
Research is never value-free and though researchers should try to avoid taking sides in 
their studies, it is perhaps more realistic to admit to some biases and to allow the reader to judge 
whether the presentation o f  the data/information is too one-sided. In contrast to many forms o f 
evaluation in research, qualitative evaluation allows the researcher to focus on how things 
actually work rather than on whether they work (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The researcher can 
set aside official goals and objectives to explore what is really happening in an organization, 
program, or region.
The following discussion will consider the modified case study methodology and its 
appropriateness for studying fisheries in terms o f the harvesting o f shellfish, specifically oysters.
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from the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, and various resource management strategies. 
Qualitative Research
Qualitative studies are often conducted to explore a new area and develop a theory about 
it. But they are also designed to test and thereby confirm or disprove the theory. A qualitative 
study can be used to fill in the gaps o f information that help explain the theory (Rein & Schon. 
1977). Along this line, it is difficult to explain something unless one understands it. Therefore, 
the analytical progression should be constructed so as to formalize the elements of the story, 
locating the key variables, building a theory, and realizing how the variables are connected and 
influence each other.
After doing so the information must be presented or displayed in such a manner that the 
reader, policy makers, and so forth can draw valid conclusions and take appropriate action (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). The format must always be driven by the research questions involved and 
the evolving concepts. Matrices are a popular form o f displaying the crossing of two lists of 
information. If the focus on the study is understanding a chronology, then the matrix is time- 
ordered. This kind o f display is particularly helpful for understanding the flow, location, and 
connection o f  events. It is also useful for exploratory scoping. Then it can lead to more causal 
explanations. With analysis and commentary attached, it can provide a good thumbnail sketch of 
the progress o f change for use in the final report.
To do this one must reduce the data through a process o f selecting, focusing, simplifying, 
abstracting, and transforming the data. Data reduction is a form o f analysis that sharpens, sorts, 
focuses, discards, and organizes the data in such a way that conclusions can be drawn and 
verified (Tesch, 1990). It is a form o f data condensation. Once this is done the meanings 
emerging from the data have to be tested for their plausibility, their robustness, and their validity.
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Without this, one is left with just a story o f what happened, o f unknown truth and utility.
Causal explanations are often erroneously assigned to random events believing that the 
events are systematic, ordered, and real rather than random, chaotic, and illusionary (Gilovich. 
1991). Causality decisively brings in the question of time. In other words, what sequence o f 
events caused the present circumstances. Prior events are assumed to have some connection w ith 
following events (Kim, 1981), even though the connection may not be neat and clear. The 
deductive researcher starts with a preliminary causal network, and the inductive researcher ends 
with one (Wolcott, 1992). Drawing conclusions from the network goes along with its 
production. It is important to specify which decision rules are employed in the construction of 
the network.
The Case Study
While the ever popular survey is extensive and cross-sectional, a case study is intensive 
and longitudinal, carefully analyzing a single case or a limited number o f typical cases. A case 
may be an individual, a type, a group, a region, or an institution. The analysis is detailed, noting 
change, growth, or development in the life cycle (or an important part o f the life cycle) o f the 
case under consideration. The distinctions between a survey and a case study are, realistically, 
meant purely as points o f reference. In truth, many research studies exhibit characteristics of 
both the survey and the case study thereby making any classification difficult (Yin. 1994).
Case studies are generally preferred when the why or the how questions are being posed 
and particularly when the researcher has little or no control over events and when the focus is on 
contemporary phenomena with a real-life context. O f greater advantage here, when investigating 
events leading to current practices in natural resource management, is that a case study approach 
does not depend solely on participant-observer data. This approach generally begins with a
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thorough review o f  the literature on the topic to examine events leading to the present situation 
(Cooper. 1984). The disadvantage to this approach is that too much information, generally from 
secondhand and thirdhand sources can lead to long, unwieldy write-ups (Feagin. Orum. &
Sjoberg, 1991).
When the focus o f attention is directed toward a single case or a limited number of cases, 
the process becomes personalized. The case study is concerned with everything that is 
significant in the history or development o f the case. The purpose is to understand the life cycle, 
or an important part o f the life cycle, o f an individual unit. This unit may be a person, a family, 
social group, community, ecosystem, institution, or geographic region. The case method probes 
deeply and intensively analyzes interaction between the factors that produce change or growth. It 
emphasizes the longitudinal approach thereby showing development over a period o f time. This 
is an important fact for a common flaw is to consider the case study as merely the exploratory 
stage o f some other type o f research strategy (Hoaglin, Light, McPeak. Mosteller & Stoto. 1982).
In social work or psychiatry the term case study usually assumes a more limited meaning. 
In this context emphasis is placed upon the study o f an individual person for the purpose o f 
diagnosing her or his problems and recommending remedial measures for her or his 
rehabilitation. Here the emphasis is not upon the individual representing a type but upon the 
individual as a unique personality, with her or his own constellation o f problems and needs. 
Ordinarily, the social work or psychiatric case study is not research oriented but is directed 
toward the solution o f an individual’s problems. A study o f a number o f these individual cases 
can be expanded into a research project particularly where the typical aspects o f each case are 
contrasted or compared for the purpose o f arriving at a greater understanding o f human behavior 
or for the purpose o f discovering new generalizations (Best, 1970; Yin. 1994).
Community studies are a specialized type o f case study where the community serves as
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the case under investigation. A well-conducted community study is a careful description and 
analysis of a group of people living together in a particular geographic location in a corporate 
way. The community study can deal with such elements of the community as location, prevailing 
economic activity, climate and natural resources, historical development, how the people live, the 
social structure, life values and patterns, people or factors that exert the dominant influence and 
the impact of the world outside the community on the community (Yin, 1994). This can be 
particularly useful when examining the connection between a fishing community and the state of 
the fishery.
A case study is an empirical inquiry that not only looks at contemporary issues within a 
real-life context but permits investigation even when the boundaries between phenomena and 
context are not clearly evident. In contrast, an experiment deliberately separates a phenomenon 
from its context so that attention can be focused on only a few variables. It is a more controlled 
study, such as in a laboratory in which the investigator can control the conditions (Yin, 1994).
By further comparison, a history does deal with the entangled situation between phenomenon and 
context, but usually with noncontemporary events (Horwich, 1993). Surveys, on the other hand, 
can tiy to deal with a phenomenon and context, but their ability to investigate the context is 
extremely limited.
A case study, particularly one involving natural resource management, is a useful tool in 
that it allows the investigator to deal with a technically distinctive situation in which there may 
be more variables of interest than data points. A case study relies on multiple sources of 
evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and often benefits from the 
prior development o f  theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Andersson, 
1994).
There are four dominant analytical techniques for case studies: pattern-matching,
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explanation-building, time-series analysis, and program logic models. Any of these techniques 
are applicable to both single- and multiple-case studies. For case study analysis, one of the most 
desirable strategies is to use a pattern-matching logic. Such a logic compares an empirically 
based pattern with a predicted one or with several alternative predictions (Trochim, 1989). If the 
patterns coincide, the results can help a case study strengthen its internal validity. If the case 
study is an explanatory one, the patterns may be related to the dependent or independent 
variables o f the study, or both. For example, if one were trying to determine whether the decline 
in the population o f fish within a fishery was caused by disease, one would try to match the 
pattern o f decline in population numbers with the increase in disease incidence. The inference 
here is that the decline in one is dependent upon a rise in the other (Cook & Campbell. 1979). A 
second type o f pattern-matching is that for independent variables. The same outcome may be 
known to occur in several cases but the how and the why this outcome occurred needs to be 
investigated. This analysis requires the development o f rival theoretical explanations that each 
involves a pattern o f independent variables that is mutually exclusive. In other words, if one 
explanation is to be valid, then the others cannot be valid. This means that the presence of 
certain independent variables precludes the presence o f other independent variables. With a 
single-case study, this can mean that the successful matching o f the pattern to one rival 
explanation was the correct one and that the other explanations are incorrect. To explain a 
phenomenon is to stipulate a set o f causal links about it. These causal links are similar to 
independent variables. In most cases, particularly in natural resource management studies, the 
links may be complex and difficult to measure in any precise manner.
Case studies have several applications in evaluating events or phenomena, such as in 
natural resource management. One o f  the most important is to explain causal links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental strategies (Cronbach, 1980; Guba
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& Lincoln, 1981; Patton. 1980; Yin, 1993). In other words, the explanations could link resource 
management strategy implementation with effects on the resource. A case study allows the 
investigator to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
investigation and defines the domain within which generalizations to a larger population or 
different situations can be made (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992).
As mentioned above, one o f the ways in which inferences can be drawn is from pattern- 
matching. whereby several pieces o f information from the same case may be related to some 
theoretical proposition (Campbell, 1975). It is essential, however, that theory development be 
part o f the early design phase o f a case study before any criteria or methodology such as pattern- 
matching can be used to interpret the data, whether the ensuing case study's purpose is to 
develop or test a theory. Theory development not only facilitates the data collection phase o f a 
case study but an appropriately developed theory is also the level at which generalizations o f the 
case study results will occur (Yin, 1994).
The essential logic underlying a time-series design is the match between a trend o f data 
points compared with a theoretically significant trend specified before the onset o f the 
investigation versus some rival trend (Yin, 1994). The analysis o f chronological events is a 
frequently used technique in case studies and may be considered a special form of time-series 
analysis. The chronological sequence allows the investigator to trace events over time. The 
arraying o f events into a  chronology permits the investigator to determine causal events over time 
because the basic sequence o f a cause and its effect cannot be temporally inverted. However, 
unlike the more general time-series approaches, the chronology is likely to cover many different 
types of variables and not be limited to a single independent or dependent variable. On those 
occasions when a  time-series analysis is relevant to a case study, an essential feature is to 
identify the specific indicators) to be traced over time as well as the specific time intervals to be
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covered. Only as a result o f  such prior specification are the relevant data likely to be collected 
and analyzed.
Building validity into a case study, internal or external validity, is probably one of the 
most difficult things to do. Internal validity, in particular, is a concern for causal or explanatory 
case studies in which the investigator is trying to determine whether event A led to event B. If 
the investigator incorrectly concludes that there is a causal relationship between events A and B 
without knowing that some third factor, event C, may actually have caused event B. the research 
design has failed to deal with some threat to internal validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1966: Cook 
& Campbell. 1979). The concern over internal validity for case study research may be extended 
to the broader problem o f making inferences. A case study involves an inference every time an 
event cannot be directly observed. Thus the investigator will infer that a particular event resulted 
from some earlier occurrence, based on interviews and documentary evidence collected as part of 
the case. This is particularly troubling when dealing with natural resources (living things, 
ecosystems) in that not all the contributing factors to an event may ever be known and factors not 
apparently directly or logically related to an ecosystem, such as politics, may have a  great 
influence on the outcome o f  events.
Another problem, which deals with the external validity o f a case study, involves 
knowing whether a study's findings can be translated into theories or models applicable beyond 
the immediate case study. For example, are the factors influencing the decline o f the Chesapeake 
Bay oyster fishery the same as the causes for the decline o f fisheries elsewhere or are they 
specific to the Chesapeake Bay? Are the social and political factors affecting the Chesapeake 
oyster fishery unique to Maryland and Virginia or are they common to fishing communities in 
general?
One reason that a single-case study design may be preferred at times is that it can be set
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up to test a well-formulated theory that has specified a clear set o f propositions as well as 
circumstances within which the propositions are believed to be true. Selected subunits within the 
study can be used to focus a case study inquiry such as harvest data or disease incidence (Yin. 
Bateman. & Moore, 1983). Within a single case may be incorporated subunits of analyses so that 
a more complex design is developed. The subunits can often add significant opportunities for 
extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case. However, if too much attention is 
given to these subunits, and if the larger, holistic aspects o f the case begin to be ignored, the case 
study itself will have shifted its orientation and shifted its nature.
One o f the main reasons that people chose comparative or multiple-case studies over 
single-case studies is that the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling 
and the overall study is therefore considered more robust (Herriott & Firestone. 1983). A case is 
generally about what has already occurred or leads up to what is occurring now. Therefore, it is 
left to the investigator to make inferences about what actually transpired. The inferences, in turn, 
are based on convergent evidence as well as on an unmeasurable amount o f common sense.
When the inferences are made on multiple cases to determine whether there is a common thread 
or connection then this is similar to the replication logic that underlies multiple-case studies 
(Abbott. 1992).
Sometimes two variables are negatively correlated. When a large variable is associated 
with a small variable, then as one increases the other decreases. When the relationship between 
two variables is a pure chance relationship, then it is said that there is no correlation between the 
two (Miles & Huberman, 1994). One o f the most important applications o f correlational analysis 
is that of prediction. When the relationship between two sets o f variables has been established, it 
is possible to make predictions about one o f  the variables from a knowledge o f one o f the others. 
A case study approach can include both single and multiple case studies and when multiple cases
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are involved this approach is called a comparative case study (Agranoff & Radin. 1991: George. 
1979; Lijphart. 1975).
When collecting the data for a case study, single- or multiple-case. the evidence may 
come from six sources: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant- 
observation, and physical artifacts. Special attention needs to be paid to the chain of evidence 
that may provide explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the 
conclusions drawn. The use o f multiple sources o f evidence allows the investigator to address a 
broader range o f  historical, attitudinal, and behavioral issues that have clearly become key 
factors in resource management studies. The most important advantage to using multiple sources 
o f evidence is the development o f converging lines of inquiry , which is a process of triangulation 
(Patton, 1987). With triangulation, the potential problems of construct validity' can also be 
addressed because the multiple sources o f evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the 
same phenomenon (Yin, Bateman. & Moore, 1983).
The following will provide a description o f  the characteristics o f historical research 
methodology and causal comparative research methodology combined into a case study with 
commingled research strategies, and their advantages and disadvantages, particularly as they 
relate to the study o f  natural resource management strategies and specifically to fisheries. The 
harvesting o f natural resources such as finfish and shellfish from oceans and lakes on a 
commercial level has many dependent industries associated with it including packing and 
canning, transportation, marketing, and restaurants. The discussion that follows will consider 
the modified case study methodology and its appropriateness for studying fisheries in terms o f 
the harvesting o f shellfish, specifically oysters, from the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries, and 
various resource management strategies.
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
Causal Comparative Research Design
Scoping a Research Strategy
The Maryland oyster fishery is in itself a study o f science conflicting with politics, and 
culture conflicting with sustainable fishery practices. Within the framework of a causal 
comparative research design, fisheries management strategies were examined to determine how. 
or if, they addressed politics and culture within their own setting and time, and how their 
successes or failures could be applied to, or avoided by, the Maryland oyster fishery . The 
contributing and restraining factors, and the determinants and consequences, o f all the fisheries 
management strategies investigated were used to glean a workable strategy(ies) that could be 
tailored to the needs o f  M aryland's oyster fishery, today and in the future.
Causal comparative research is a type o f descriptive research that seeks to find the 
answers to problems through the analysis o f  causal relationships. What factors seem to be 
associated with certain occurrences, conditions, or types o f behavior? Since it is often 
impractical to arrange occurrences, an analysis o f  what actually does happen is the only feasible 
way to study causation. By the method o f  descriptive research an attempt is made to find the 
factor or factors associated with certain events (Best, 1970).
One o f the dangers o f causal comparative research is the post-hoc fallacy, in other words, 
to conclude that because two factors occur simultaneously, that one is the cause and the other the 
effect. While conducting this case study using causal comparative research, an attempt was 
made to single out the really significant causal factor(s) and yet recognize that events often have 
multiple rather than single causes. It was important not to base conclusions on a too-limited 
number o f occurrences or fail to recognize that factors may go together without having a cause- 
effect relationship, thereby leading to false or misleading conclusions. In scientific inquiry, one
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must learn to recognize as causes what have ordinarily been taken to be effects (Horwich, 1993: 
Andersson, 1994). To illustrate, one can ask the question, what is responsible for the decline in 
the oyster population? Is it overharvesting, disease, or pollution? Do each o f these factors 
contribute to the decline independently or are they interrelated or are they coincidental?
In order to conduct inter- and intra-regional research there was a need to incorporate 
more than one o f a wide range o f methodologies and disciplinary traditions to study comparative 
issues, such as the significance of different forms o f fisheries management strategies on the 
private and the public oyster fisheries. Interregional comparisons were used to advance 
substantive and methodological knowledge in fisheries management. The advantages o f 
combining several research strategies into a case study approach when examining natural 
resource management, were that the evidence could be examined as a network o f implications, 
comparisons could be made with other strategies and, as with all living systems, conclusions 
could be drawn with the understanding that the influencing factors are ongoing and ever 
changing.
Comparative research can be and was employed in an interdisciplinary fashion to address 
the causal as well as historical factors that contribute to the cultural, political, economic, and 
ecological characteristics o f regions to formulate practical resource management strategies for a 
sustainable future.
A Historical Perspective
Causal comparative research methodology is a highly adaptive tool for studying resource 
management strategies and comparing institutional structures, whether they are government or 
private enterprise. It is necessary, however, to incorporate a historical perspective into one's 
research design when studying ecosystems and living organisms. Whatever changes take place
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within an ecosystem, be they small or large, transient or long-lasting, they will take place in 
graduated steps over time through a highly interactive matrix o f feed-back mechanisms.
Historical research describes what was. The process involves investigating, recording, 
analyzing, and interpreting the events o f the past for the purpose o f discovering generalizations 
that are helpful in understanding the past and to a limited extent, in anticipating the future.
Historical records provide a meaningful perspective on the achievements or failures of 
particular resource management strategies. History can also serve as a record o f Mother Nature's 
struggles, triumphs, and failed battles. Extinct species, habitat alteration, and changes in 
harvesting/fishing practices are the symptoms, causes, or results o f  what was in ecological 
history. The history o f  a fisheries is not merely a list o f chronological events but an integrated 
account o f the relationships between resource management strategies, naturally occurring events, 
times, and places.
By incorporating a historical perspective into a comparative analysis o f oyster fisheries 
management strategies between the private and the public fisheries o f Maryland as well as other 
regions o f the United States, it is hoped that a greater understanding o f the present was achieved 
as well as gaining the ability to plan for. or predict, future resource management strategies and 
their outcomes (Felt, 1981).
Barzun and G raff (1970) suggest that there are two popular ways to write about historical 
trends, in chronological order or by topic. The fault o f the strict chronological order is that it 
mixes events great and small without due subordination and that it combines incidents that occur 
only once with permanent truths about habits and tastes, character, and belief. However, strict 
topical order entails a lot of repetition o f shared chronological events and does not leave a clear 
portrait. It appears, therefore, that the best way is to combine the topical and chronological 
arrangements. In the combined form, the chronology moves forward within each topic, giving an
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A historical perspective has generally been a relatively small segment o f causal 
comparative research but is gaining popularity in environmental and ecosystem research. When 
it is feasible, there are obvious advantages to a historical perspective. Historical trends in a 
fisheries can serve as an effective complement to causal comparative research by documenting 
surrounding and contributing historical events. Further, if one is interested in learning how' some 
contemporary situation, such as the decline o f a fisheries, came into being or explore the efficacy 
of a resource management strategy, a historical approach is indispensable. Historical studies 
tend to be qualitative or humanistic rather than quantitative. In environmental research, if. for 
example, one is examining fisheries management strategies, it is appropriate if not desirable to 
include numerical data such as yearly harvests or viable habitat.
A Resource Management Orientation
Natural resource management must contend with the biological and reproductive patterns 
o f the resource, politics, and culture. Therefore, it is within this matrix that a natural resource 
management strategy is evolved and executed. Awareness o f the cultural influences, hidden 
political agendas, and socioeconomic values lead to a better understanding o f why certain 
resource management decisions are made in seeming contrast to the science o f the natural 
resource.
Resource management is both a social institution and a  biological science institution and 
can therefore be viewed as having evolved out o f compromises with individuals and groups 
which may have different perceptions, attitudes, values, goals, and interests. Add to this the 
somewhat unpredictable responses o f living organisms, such as oysters and the other living 
organisms on which they depend, to their environmental conditions, both human-influenced and
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strategies must be treated not as inert machinery that can be readily manipulated to bring about 
the resolution o f  declining harvests or achieve sustainable yields for a limitless future, but as a 
social, biological, living entity.
The workings o f resource management as an institution and their influence on the 
survival of the resource, such as an oyster fisheries, are legitimate focal points for inquiry that 
were integrated with the overriding concern in resource management with understanding the 
changing environmental and economic conditions in which people live, regionally and globally.
Comparative methodology has been used more recently to compare a broad range of 
subjects beyond the humanities and social sciences. The following are a number o f ways in 
which comparative methodology was used to approach a wide variety o f issues associated with 
fisheries resource management:
1. Rethinking relationships between economic, political, and environmental 
transformations across and between regions. Comparative research was used to better 
understand the range o f options available to promote sustainable resource development and 
fisheries management in different settings and to clarify the nature o f the processes that are 
underway and to analyze the constraints and opportunities that they introduce.
2. Comparative perspectives on the socioeconomics o f sustainable fisheries 
development.
A deeper understanding framed in specific comparative terms is useful to examine the 
causal links between regional fisheries management patterns and cultural variations related to 
occupational traditions and practices. Conceptual and empirical findings can be used to build 
bridges between these domains, and influence public policy and fisheries resource management 
strategies in different cultural contexts.
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The problem of generalization and prediction in fisheries management is o f particular 
concern for two reasons (a) one is concerned with the problems o f  economic development and 
environmental change in the contemporary world, and (b) unraveling the contributing 
sociopolitical and socioeconomic factors that influence the resource management strategies and 
how they are implemented is daunting. These reasons are part o f  the challenge to both 
environmental and social researchers alike to describe and explain the present conditions, as well 
as predict events and conditions o f  the future.
In comparative research, causal inference is the process o f reaching the conclusion that 
one set o f events, either directly or indirectly, brought about present conditions. In the case of 
the efficacy o f  a fisheries management strategy, it may be concluded that a particular set o f 
events weighs more heavily than others as the cause o f the present state o f the fisheries.
However, as was the case with the Maryland oyster fishery, it could not be proven that any one 
event, decision, or strategy was the cause o f the present situation. But it was necessary to be 
aware o f the assumptions that underlie the inferred cause o f a sequence o f  events.
While making regional comparisons, it was essential to distinguish between causal 
relationships in which changes in one variable produce changes in another variable, and 
correlational relationships in which the values o f the variables are linked and change together, 
but it is not implied that change in the value o f one variable causes changes in the value o f 
another (Bordens & Abbott, 1991). When explanations are first developed for observed 
phenomena, knowledge o f observed relationships can serve as an important guide, even if it is 
unknown which relationships are causal and which are correlational. Distinguishing between 
causal and correlational relationships is thus an important part o f  the research process, 
particularly in the hypothesis testing phase. However, the ability to distinguish causal from 
correlational relationships varied with the amount o f information that was available to be
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gathered on the variables in the study.
For example, it was discovered that sustainable oyster harvests occur in parts o f the 
United States that have a high number of privately leased oyster beds. So. the Maryland harvest 
data were examined over a period o f time and clues were sought as to the possible causes of 
differences between the regions o f the United States with a high number o f privately leased beds 
and Maryland, with its high number o f public beds. In the process it was discovered that there 
have been, and are, differences in the fisheries regulations and/or regulatory leasing incentives, 
the allowable method of harvest, the regulated length o f the harvest season, the incidence of 
disease, impact of pollution, degree o f habitat destruction, and weather. With several research 
questions in mind, the past fisheries management strategies of the different regions were 
examined, searching for cause-effect relationships for each region and then making a 
comparison.
Margaret McKean (1992) believes that the notorious tragedy o f the commons is 
incorrectly held to be the eventual fate o f all natural resources that are used collectively rather 
than by individual, private owners. She demonstrated that a comparative analysis o f successful 
and unsuccessful collective management strategies o f natural resources within the institutional 
regimes that have operated for decades or even centuries can be used to explore the features 
shared by historically unconnected institutional regimes in order to begin specifying the 
characteristics o f regimes that circumvent tragedy. She identifies that successful systems usually 
have well-defined communities o f eligible user-managers and clear, easily enforced and 
environmentally cautious rules to constrain resource use. But they vary greatly in terms o f the 
allocation o f the harvested supply o f the resource, from hierarchical systems o f rights with 
unequal allocation o f  the resource to very egalitarian systems that assign equal shares by lottery'.
Increasingly, communities and societies across the globe are confronting unprecedented
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changes in the character and scope o f the underlying processes that shape social and cultural life 
(Hershberg, 1992). In the past, geographic boundaries provided an organizing principle through 
which researchers could interpret distinctive cultural, social, political, and economic behav iors 
and institutions. Research was conducted within geographic areas to make comparisons across 
these areas to explain similarities and differences. Research in this tradition remains essential to 
the development o f  knowledge but, according to Hershberg, it is no longer sufficient since 
critical forces now shaping institutions and behaviors are not rooted in territorially-defined areas. 
Rather, they involve a multiplicity o f processes that originate outside of, and often transcend, 
geographical boundaries. Fisheries markets contract and expand and the systems of production 
and exchange which cause them take place on a global scale and elicit overlapping policy 
responses in highly divergent contexts. Similarly, changes in the natural environment are 
experienced by citizens and governments on a global scale and have led to widespread 
experimentation with new regulatory practices and with innovative forms o f resource 
management.
Implementation and Validation
A study o f causal relationships from the past to the present was used to understand past 
resource management strategies and to try to understand the present conditions in light o f past 
events and developments. This analysis was directed toward the private and public oyster 
fisheries o f the Maryland portion o f the Chesapeake Bay, but in fact encompasses a whole 
ecosystem, many resource management strategies, their acceptance by regional oyster fishers, 
and whether successful alternatives are available. None o f  these could be examined in isolation 
for there is a great deal o f  interaction between them. In this study, the oyster fisheries o f the 
Chesapeake Bay refers to the commercial harvest o f the only indigenous species o f the region.
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Crassostrea virginica, commonly referred to as the Eastern oyster. Atlantic oyster. New England 
oyster. Malpeque oyster, Chesapeake oyster, and other regionally-connected names.
The major difficulty involved in this process was delimiting the problem so that a 
satisfactory analysis was possible. According to Best ( 1970), too often the problem is stated too 
broadly, when what is needed is an in-depth analysis of a limited problem, rather than involving 
only a superficial examination o f a broad area.
Carl Kaestle (1992) raises the issue o f how information that is gathered to address 
proposed hypotheses can be presented as the truth and with certainty. For now. even the truths of 
the physical and biological sciences are seen as relative and impermanent. If the issue is 
certainty then, Kaestle asks, certainty about what kinds o f issues and for whom? It is not hard to 
find consensus on many low-level matters which can readily be called factual. On the other 
hand, the more significant and interpretive the generalization, the less certain one can be about it. 
Kaestle summarizes by saying that truth is plural, relative, and tentative on issues o f  importance.
There is an ethical principle common to all good work in history, whether the work be 
collecting, analyzing, editing, or writing history. It is not just the principle of respect for the 
truth, but o f  respect for the whole truth. In practical terms, respect for the whole truth means 
making an honest appraisal o f all the facts and interpretations one has found up to the moment. 
Sentimentality, poetic nostalgia, pride, whimsy, and wishful thinking all have their place and a 
place should be kept for them, but not in history, unless they are labeled and treated as what they 
are (Felt, 1981). Many so-called historical reviews have been published in North America on the 
lives o f fishers, then and now. These books and articles tend to be nostalgic and romanticize the 
independent nature and hardships o f fishers while glorifying their existence. These make 
wonderful reading but are unreliable in practical terms. James M icheners Chesapeake (1978), a 
classic in its own time, and his The Watermen (1979) are examples o f  many fictional tales that
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have drawn on the Chesapeake Bay’s history. It is particularly confounding when the very 
practices that are romanticized are the ones that may lead to the demise of entire fisheries.
An important point that Bronowski (1963) makes is that the key to the actions of liv ing 
things is that the actions are directed toward the future. The condition for the survival of liv ing 
things, individually and as a species, is that unless they can adapt themselves to the future and 
interpret signals in advance, they will perish. There is a relationship between the past, present, 
and future. This is particularly germane as one observes the decline of ecosystems.
People use history to understand the past and to try to understand the present in light o f 
past events and developments. Historical analysis may be directed toward an individual, an idea, 
an ecosystem, a movement, a location, or an institution. None o f these can be examined in 
isolation for there is a great deal o f interaction between them. The subject or focus merely 
determines the point o f emphasis toward which the historian directs her or his attention (Strauss. 
1995).
The case study is concerned with everything that is significant in the history or 
development o f  the case. The purpose is to understand the life cycle, or an important part of the 
life cycle, o f  an individual unit. This unit may be a person, a family, social group, community, 
institution, or geographic region. The case method probes deeply and intensively analyzes the 
interaction between the factors that produce change or growth. It emphasizes the longitudinal 
approach thereby showing development over a  period of time.
Historical and current information and data on Maryland oyster harvests in the 
Chesapeake Bay was collected, distinguishing between the public and private oyster fisheries, to 
the extent that it was possible. The data/information gathered and a description o f the prevailing 
conditions or practices associated with oyster fisheries management strategies was organized and 
analyzed so that conclusions could be derived. These conclusions were based upon comparisons.
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contrasts, or causal relationships o f specific resource management strategies within and between 
the Chesapeake Bay and other parts of the United States.
According to John Best (1970), causal comparative research may be used in problem 
solving, and in solving a problem or charting a course o f action several types of information may 
be needed. That was certainly the case for the Maryland oyster fishery. The types of 
information needed for this study follow:
1. Historical and current Maryland oyster harvest data. Historical and current data on 
Maryland oyster harvests were collected, distinguishing between the public and private fisheries, 
to the extent possible.
2. Virginia harvest data. Oyster harvest data from Virginia, which is also a part o f the 
Chesapeake Bay, was collected, compared, and contrasted with Maryland’s harvests.
3. Past and prevailing conditions or practices. Information was gathered and a 
description o f  past and prevailing conditions or practices associated with oyster fisheries 
management strategies was analyzed, compared, and contrasted, within and between the 
Chesapeake Bay (Maryland and Virginia) and other parts o f  the United States. It was 
particularly important to assess and compare the oyster fisheries management strategies of 
Virginia and Delaware Bay since these fisheries involve not only the same species o f oyster, but 
are geographically close and are subject to the same problems, such as disease and pollution.
4. Property rights schemes. Information on the different property rights schemes used in 
fisheries management strategies in fisheries that are generally accepted as successful were 
analyzed, and compared and contrasted between each other, and with Maryland.
5. Influences on fisheries management strategies. Information on what types o f 
regulations, incentives, disincentives, political factors, values systems, and social norms affect 
oyster fisheries management strategies were collected and analyzed.
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6. Experiences o f oyster fisheries managers and researchers. Oyster fisheries managers 
and researchers around the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays were contacted to learn first hand 
from their experiences and in-sights in the field. Their practical knowledge and perspectives 
were integrated into an analysis o f the present state of the oyster fishery and the potential 
viability o f alternative fisheries management strategies in Maryland's oyster fishery.
Some research studies emphasize only one aspect o f  problem solving while others may 
deal with two or more o f the elements. Although a research study does not necessarily embrace 
all the steps necessary (they may not be known) for the solution to the problem, it may still make 
a valuable contribution by clarifying only one o f the necessary steps, from the description o f the 
present status to the charting o f  a path to the goal.
One o f the problems inherent in trying to assess the efficacy or even the success or 
failure o f an oyster fisheries management strategy was to find a nominal form of measurement by 
which to (a) analyze efficacy, (b) make comparisons between strategies, and (c) make 
comparisons between the private and public fisheries.
According to Bailey (1994), all qualitative measurement is nominal, regardless of 
whether the categories are designated by names or numerals. Nominal measurement is 
essentially a classification system. Basically all that is required o f a nominally measured 
variable is that there be at least two categories and that they be distinct and mutually exclusive.
It was important to be clear about what kind o f information or data were being compared 
so that the credibility and validity o f the analysis o f  efficacy, and the comparison between 
regions could be judged. The success of an oyster fisheries or the efficacy o f a management 
strategy is measured in terms o f sustainability (equal or greater harvests on successive years), 
while harvests are measured and compared in bushels per year (bu/yr) or number o f viable 
(producing) oyster beds and their size.
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!t is important to explain how the data presented were gathered and interpreted so that 
they can be understood in context. For example, total harvest numbers alone do not reflect 
whether there were low harvests on multiple oyster beds or high harvests on a small number of 
beds. Additionally, without this explanation it would be difficult to know whether the findings 
came from cultural knowledge, prior theoretical frameworks, direct personal experience, or 
actual fieldwork. Such explanations therefore made it possible to judge the credibility and 
validity o f the information.
Without these types o f analyses, it would have been difficult to judge whether, for 
example, the concept o f harvesting from privately leased beds is a successful fisheries 
management strategy over the everyone-for-themselves harvesting from public beds indicative of 
the law of the commons. If the general hypothesis that regions in which public (state managed) 
oyster beds are predominant suffer from overharvesting, destruction of habitat, and reduction of 
viable stocks for continuing sustainable yields is assumed to be true, then why is there not a 
preponderance o f privately leased beds throughout the Chesapeake Bay? This introduces the 
second part o f this study and the most difficult to analyze and compare. What variables 
exist/existed that influence the number and size o f privately leased beds and their harvests, the 
regulatory incentives or disincentives, or acceptance by the watermen?
Particularly worthy o f  mention was the utility o f  comparative methodology, including 
interregional comparisons, to explain variations in phenomena in different settings, to identify 
distinctive responses to transregional processes and ultimately, to produce generalizable 
propositions about the nature and consequences o f these phenomena.
Researchers in transregional or transnational research often need to incorporate more 
than one o f  a wide range of methodologies and disciplinary traditions to study comparative 
issues, such as the significance o f different forms o f fisheries management strategies on
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environmental and commercial sustainability or degradation. Interregional comparisons can be 
used to advance substantive and methodological knowledge in fisheries management.
Historical research can be described as the systematic search for documents and other 
sources that contain facts relating to the historical researcher's questions about the past. By 
studying the past, the historian hopes to reach a better understanding o f  present sociopolitical 
conditions, management practices, and ecological problems in natural resource management. In 
the last century, the popular view of historical research was a chronological compilation of 
events. A more contemporary approach tends to subordinate historical facts to an interpretive 
framework within which they are given meaning and significance.
Though Taylor and Bogdan (1984) describe the characteristics o f historical research, and 
specifically a life history, in terms o f sociological research and an individual's life history, the 
concepts can be applied to a geographic region’s life history. A life history contains a 
description o f the important events and experiences in the life of a region. As a potential 
environmental management/planning document, a life history can be constructed to illuminate 
the significant features o f  a region’s life, such as a fishing community. The concept directs o n es  
attention to the fact that people’s definitions o f a region, themselves, and others are not unique 
but rather follow a standard and orderly pattern. The definition o f a fishing community can be 
defined in people's eyes in terms o f place, an economic resource, or a recreational area. In 
putting together a life history, one tries to identify the critical stages and period’s in a region’s 
life that shape its definitions and perspectives (Strauss, 1995).
Comparative research is useful in that it can be used to better understand the range of 
options available to promote sustainable development and resource management in different 
settings and to clarify the nature o f the processes that are under way and to analyze the 
constraints and opportunities that they introduce. Cultural dimensions o f human conflict.
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including disputes, are rooted in ethnic, political, racial, or religious differences. Comparative 
research can be used to examine how collective identities are formed through shared patterns of 
cultural expression, interpretations of shared traditions, and common experience. Comparativ e 
research can be employed in an interdisciplinary fashion to address the causal as well as 
historical factors that contribute to the cultural, political, economic, and ecological 
characteristics o f  regions to formulate practical strategies for a sustainable future.
According to Holt and Turner (1970), the logical consequences of a theory are verified, 
not the theory itself, in comparative research. Since it is only possible to observe particular facts, 
then only the particular consequences o f a theory' can be verified. In principle, there is not any 
difference between comparative cross-regional research and research conducted within a single 
region. The differences rather, lie in the magnitude o f certain types o f problems that have to be 
faced. Holt and Turner believe that often much of comparative research is not oriented toward 
hypothesis testing at all, but is exploratory in nature and is undertaken to aid in the development 
of hypotheses. But regardless of how the research questions have been derived, a major purpose 
of much of the research is to identify' the relationships between the variables.
Resource management, whether it be implemented through regulatory action, incentives, 
or otherwise, is inescapably burdened by politics. Though political leaders profess 10 find 
historical trends the best guide to action and say that history moves minds by what it inspires, 
some politicians have not hesitated to admit their desire to influence events by proving the 
rightness or wrongness o f a cause out o f  its historical antecedents.
An Environmental Ethics View 
Mark Sagoff (1992) provides an insightful look at the way in which resource managers 
should address ecological communities and systems when examining and comparing resource
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management strategies. Unfortunately, as Sagoff points out, it is generally believed that there 
must be hard scientific reasons to justify environmental management decisions that may be based 
on moral and aesthetic values. If one is to accept the idea that ecosystems may be objects not 
only of use but also o f  aesthetic appreciation and moral attention, then one must accept the 
possibility that these systems have a good o f their own that should be respected and therefore, 
protected. It should not take the hard facts o f the decline or mismanagement o f a natural 
resource to provide a reason for doing what is morally correct.
Rushworth Kidder (1995) suggests that it is easy to choose between right and wrong, but 
increasingly ethical dilemmas force people to choose between right and right. Rapid changes in 
society, technology, and global relationships are increasing the number and intensity o f ethical 
dilemmas facing resource managers as they enter the 21“ century. Research into resource 
management strategies today and in the future cannot ignore this dilemma and in addressing this 
dilemma, the need to assess the alternatives and rank the consequences. There is a need to be 
ever mindful that the so-called obvious answer to a resource management problem is not so clear 
and should include a weighing o f two needs and their two appropriate management strategies.
The concept o f resource management as a scientific and communicative process 
manifests itself in the view that institutional arrangements are value-neutral instruments of public 
policy in both policy formulation and in regulatory enforcement. The notion that science drives 
policy remains firmly, if  not naively, entrenched as the mainstream philosophy of resource 
managers, planners, and economists (Friedmann, 1987). This view persists despite obvious 
practices and implementation to the contrary, because it serves as a tool to advance otherwise 
unpopular regulations and processes and it appears to put into simple straight forward terms what 
would seemingly come across as a complex matrix o f confounding rhetoric. The importance o f 
the institutional arrangements o f  resource management as being culturally and politically
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influenced should not be lost on the resource manager.
Commingling Research Methodologies
One of the primary tasks o f historical research concerns investigating the causes of past 
events. What were the forces and events that brought about the conditions of today?
Specifically, for one who is examining the success or failure o f a fisheries management strategy, 
one would wish to go back in history to analyze the causes o f a decline, increase, or maintenance 
o f a sustainable level o f harvest, and then compare the historical causes and the present 
conditions to a similar fisheries elsewhere. When studying living systems, like a fisheries for 
instance, that involve an entire ecosystem o f  interdependent plants and animals, weather, 
interactions with humans, including the consequences o f regulatory legislation and resource 
management strategies, one must always be aware that changes, such as a decline or a rise, do not 
happen overnight. Therefore, events o f  the near or distant past can have profound and far- 
reaching effects on the present state-of-affairs and on into the future.
Causal inference is the process of reaching the conclusion that one set o f events brought 
about the existing conditions, either directly or indirectly. In the case o f the decline o f a fisheries 
one might conclude that a particular set o f events may weigh more heavily than others as the 
cause o f the present state of the fisheries. It is unlikely that the researcher can prove that one 
event, decision, or strategy is the cause o f the present situation however, she or he can be aware 
o f  the assumptions that underlie the inferred cause o f a sequence o f  events. In making causal 
inferences the researcher should be aware of her or his assumptions about the causative factors 
sometimes used to explain occurrences in another point in time. However, it is also likely that 
the more researchers know about the antecedents o f a historical event, the more liable they are to 
discover the possible causes o f the event.
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When making regional comparisons, one must be careful to distinguish between causal 
relationships in which changes in one variable produce changes in another variable, and 
correlational relationships, in which the values o f the variables are linked and change together 
but it is not implied that change in the value o f  one variable causes changes in the value of 
another (Bordens & Abbott, 1991). When variables change together in this way they are said to 
covary. When one first develops explanations for observed phenomena, knowledge o f  observed 
relationships can serve as an important guide, even if  one may not yet know which relationships 
are causal and which are correlational. Distinguishing between causal and correlational 
relationships is thus an important part o f the research process, particularly in the hypothesis 
testing phase. However, one’s ability to distinguish causal from correlational relationships may 
vary with the degree o f control, or amount o f information, one has over the variables in the study.
In historical research, one is examining the records o f the past for one's data so. there is 
little or no opportunity to manipulate any variables. Therefore when approaching a problem, 
such as the success or failure o f a particular natural resource management strategy , it is probably 
inappropriate to state the problem in terms o f variable causal relationships such as, does the 
management strategy work? A more straightforward and useful statement of the problem such 
as, what were the events that led to the success or failure o f particular fisheries management 
strategies, implies that a particular sequence o f events led to the decline. Therefore, one can 
make a comparison between the sequences o f  causes or events that led to the decline or success 
o f the fisheries in different regions. The timing o f the events, rather than the events themselves, 
becomes the focus o f  the comparison and not the events themselves.
In a commingled methodology that integrates a causal comparative approach with a 
historical approach in a case study, the researcher must realize the danger o f limiting the 
comparison to just the sequence or timing o f  events. Other variables, which are out o f  the
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control o f the researcher, such as the magnitude o f each event, the synergistic or antagonistic 
effects o f the events on each other, as well as cultural differences, may greatly affect the timing 
o f events or be affected by the timing of events.
Ex post facto cause-effect comparative research is a variation of this commingled 
methodology in which one has an existing situation whose historical causes one wants to 
establish and compare to a similar situation. Since the variables cannot be manipulated, one can 
never be sure that a cause and effect relationship exists but the evidence can be used to imply a 
relationship to varying degrees o f certainty. Some o f the hurdles to be surmounted are that the 
researcher may fail to single out a really significant factor, fail to recognize that events often 
have multiple rather than single causes, base conclusions on a too-limited number o f occurrences 
or fail to recognize that some factors may go together without having a cause-effect (causal) 
relationship (i.e., correlational) and may lead the researcher to false or misleading conclusions.
It is incumbent upon the researcher to obtain a sufficient amount o f  reliable data to convince the 
reader that there is a high probability that a cause and effect relationship exists (Keppel, 1991).
By combining or commingling causal comparative methodology with a historical 
approach this study was able to explore why once decimated fisheries harvests in one region have 
reached sustainable levels while in other regions the harvests have not reached those levels and 
are, in fact, continuing to decline. In the process differences in the fisheries regulations and/or 
regulatory incentives, the allowable method of harvest, the regulated length of the harvest season, 
the incidence o f disease, impact o f pollution, degree o f habitat destruction, or weather variations 
were discovered. With a research question or questions in mind, the records and past conditions 
o f differing regions were searched for a cause-effect relationship(s) for each region and then they 
were compared. The assumption was that if a cause was present that an effect was generally 
observed.
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In general, descriptive research may be used to define goals or objectives and the ways in 
which they might be reached. Causal comparative research, with or without a historical 
perspective, involves more than just fact gathering and tabulation. Specifically, this study dealt 
with the analysis and interpretation o f the data which was gathered for the purpose o f examining 
the different oyster fishery management strategies employed in the Chesapeake Bay and 
elsewhere, their efficacy, the causal factors that contribute to or inhibit their level of efficacy, 
and comparing them between private and public fisheries in the Chesapeake Bay, and elsewhere 
in the United States. It was hoped that this would result in a better understanding o f the 
strategies employed and associated influences, and perhaps provide some direction toward a 
solution to the significant problems facing fisheries managers to build and sustain a viable 
fisheries in Maryland, and all o f  the Chesapeake Bay.
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Results
Maryland Ovster Fishery Regulations
Current Regulations
Limiting access. Current oyster fishery regulations, which include required licensing of 
watermen, as well as limitations on season duration and catch, reflect a limited-access 
management strategy particularly as it applies to use o f the public oyster beds. With few 
exceptions, the regulations that apply to leasing of bottom for oyster farming have been 
unchanged for over 100 years. The Maryland oyster fishery is administered by the Department 
o f Natural Resources (DNR) in cooperation with Tidewater county committees o f licensed 
watermen representing each o f the gear types (tonger, patent tonger, dredger, or diver) with five 
persons for each gear type. However, the Maryland legislature is still responsible for enacting 
the laws affecting the fishery.
The history o f the public oyster fishery in the Chesapeake Bay has not always been one 
of plummeting harvests. In recent times, there have been occasional increases in the population 
but they have not been anything close to what the harvests once were. In an effort to stave off 
any rapid increase in the number o f watermen harvesting oysters in times o f oyster population 
rises, the DNR only accepts applications for new licenses from those who have been crew 
members for a licensed waterman for at least the prior 2 years (Maryland Department o f  Natural 
Resources, 1994-1995). Therefore, a rush o f new watermen and subsequent increased harvesting 
is avoided in times o f plenty by the mandatory 2- year delay. In addition, the DNR determines 
when the start o f  the oyster harvesting season is and how long the season will last. The length 
and starting date are subject to the DNR’s assessment o f the population abundance. However, 
here again, the start and length o f  the season are often points o f dispute by the watermen, and the 
Legislature often intervenes in the watermen’s favor, against the recommendations of the DNR.
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There are also times and places where only certain types o f gear may be used, per person catch 
limits (25 busheis/Iicensee/day if hand or patent tongs are used), and per boat catch limits (75 
bushels total/boat regardless o f the number o f licensed tongers). It is required that all oysters 
harvested from natural bars be culled on the bar where they were caught. Any oyster less than 3 
inches in length must be returned to the bar where it was caught.
In an effort to provide some incentive for leasing of oyster ground, the DNR annually 
designates certain areas o f natural oyster bars as off limits to the public fishery for the planting of 
seed by the state. Only lessees o f private oyster grounds may take seed from these areas to build 
up their own beds. However, there is a limit as to the amount of seed that can be harvested and 
there is a per bushel fee for the seed. Not long ago, Maryland oyster farmers obtained most of 
their seed from Virginia and Delaware Bay, which was more expensive. However, now there is a 
ban on the export o f seed from Delaware Bay. Leasing o f oyster grounds in Maryland by a 
corporation or joint stock company is still prohibited. With the exception o f  a few counties, the 
amount o f barren ground that an individual may lease is 1-30 acres within county waters and 5- 
500 acres in Chesapeake Bay waters lying outside county waters. There is an application fee 
(S300) as well as an annual leasing fee. One serious barrier to leasing, beside the cost/risk, that 
is a holdover from times past, is that when a new application is made to lease, the lease may be 
challenged by any person who feels that granting o f the lease may adversely affect them. This 
often results in denial o f the lease application based on very flimsy evidence.
Taxation. Current legislation taxes each bushel o f oysters harvested and sold in 
Mary land and each bushel sold out o f state. Those taxes are collected by the DNR and are 
earmarked for the state's oyster repletion program (Leffler, 1988). The repletion program is the 
seeding o f public beds. However, in spite o f  the demonstrated resilience o f  Eastern oyster
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populations in the Bay, decades if not a century o f overfishing and mismanagement, coupled with 
repeated failures in recruitment o f young oysters, have led to historically low harvests. The 
harvest rate far exceeds the repletion rate, in spite of gear and season restrictions (Burling. 1991). 
Brood stock and cultch are removed from the public beds while insufficient attempts are made to 
establish adult reserves or to return shucked shell to the region from which it was taken 
(Kennedy, 1989). The leveling o f reefs has resulted in a reduction of suitable oyster habitat.
In years past, buy boats would ply the waters and circulate amongst the watermen's 
boats, buying their catch right at its source. Buyers were middlemen afloat and would in turn sell 
their purchased supply o f oysters to the restaurants and processors (Kennedy, 1989). Now the 
buyers stay dockside and the watermen go to them. Since it is the buyers that must pay the tax to 
the DNR for every bushel that they purchase, there is gross underreporting. This hurts the 
repletion program, and consequently the watermen, and it makes it difficult for the state to 
accurately gather reliable harvest data (personal communication. Connie Lewis. DNR,
Annapolis. MD, July 7, 1996).
The Property Rights Structure o f  the Chesapeake Bav Today
Leasing and limited access to the commons. Both Maryland and Virginia waters are 
plagued by disease, and one cannot consider the oyster fishery without considering the part that 
disease plays on its commercial viability. Some parts o f the Bay occasionally still receive large 
natural settings o f  larvae, though these are very rare. When this happens, both Mary land and 
Virginia hire watermen to harvest shell with spat attached from these areas, and then transplant 
them to areas better suited for rapid oyster growth and/or areas less likely to have a heavy disease 
infestation. This state-funded movement of seed and shell is known as the repletion program. It 
should be noted here that in Maryland the same watermen who were paid by the state to move
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seed can also turn around and harvest the market sized oysters off the same beds for a small tax 
and licensing fee and sell them for the highest price the market will bear. Also, in Virginia the 
seed harvesters may sell seed to private planters. Both states place shell (cultch) in seed- 
producing areas to enhance setting rates and seed production. In addition, planters have 
developed their own seed beds by placing shell on the barren grounds available for lease 
(Santopietro & Shabman, 1992a). However, most private growers must compete with state 
management programs for seed and shell.
The current property rights structure o f the Chesapeake Bay's oyster grounds was fully 
developed by 1910 and by then the differences between the two states, in terms of private leasing 
and management o f public grounds, were evident. Since then, oyster policy in both states has 
been primarily directed toward management strategies for the public grounds. In the evolution of 
these property rights structures, the watermen working the public grounds in Maryland have been 
more successful than their Virginia counterparts in their efforts to restrict private leasing and in 
obtaining support for public grounds management.
The distrust o f the government by the Maryland watermen, regardless of the lack of 
validity for their fears, suggests that they were, and still are, concerned that privatization would 
redistribute their perceived natural rights to employment and income in the fishery to a wealthy 
class o f  planters. The prevailing attitude amongst the watermen was, and is, that an open-access 
type o f fishery is an entitlement, if not a right defined by law. Historically, Maryland watermen 
were a poor class o f European Americans and former slaves with no interest in becoming 
farmers, whether o f the land or o f the sea (Stevenson, 1892; Wharton, 1948, 1949). In both 
Maryland and Virginia, the watermen believed that wealthy, outside corporate interests would 
gain control o f all grounds made available for lease if any leasing were permitted at all. In other 
words, a toe in the door by individuals might open wide the leasing grounds to corporations.
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This unfounded paranoia exists even today. This differs greatly from the attitude o f the 
Delaware Bay oyster fishers who, for the most part were, and are, both farmers of the land as 
well as oyster fishers, many with their own leases (personal communication. Dr. Susan Ford, 
Haskin Shellfish Laboratory, Port Norris, NJ, August 18, 1995).
The Maryland watermen have been successful in restricting leasing o f Bay bottom for 
the private cultivation o f oysters for a number of reasons:
1. The watermen were, and still are, considered an underclass and their possible 
displacement by expanding private leaseholds is considered to be detrimental to the local 
economies o f the regions around the Bay. Therefore, maintenance o f  the public fishery by the 
government is seen as a means of keeping the watermen employed and off welfare. This point is 
somewhat ironic, for over the years, the amount o f tax dollars that have gone into the public 
fishery far exceeds the return to the state (in the form of taxes and fees) (personal 
communication, Gary Smith, DNR, Oxford, MD, October 29, 1996). As Stevenson ( 1892) noted 
before the turn o f the century, the economic stability o f the tidewater counties depended on the 
wide distribution o f the benefits provided by the preservation o f the public grounds. Any change 
in policy adversely affecting the income-earning opportunities o f  the watermen, particularly the 
tongers, would have repercussions throughout the communities' economic structures. The 
question then becomes, are these economic structures appropriate?
2. In Maryland, the potential leaseholders were not, and still are not, a favored class. 
Since the cultivation o f oysters requires an initial investment in grounds preparation and allows 
the use o f  capital-intensive harvest techniques such as dredging, there was, at least in the past, 
reason to expect that the leaseholds would be taken up by the processors (shuckers, packers, 
shippers) who had access to investment funds (Santopietro & Shabman, 1992b). Before 1900. 
the processors were for the most part the descendants o f the New England dredgers and thus
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were considered outsiders, especially in Maryland. Since New England was already moving 
toward oyster farming and was realizing the economic benefits, the Bay processors tended to 
favor privatization.
3. Legislative representatives o f the tidewater counties were responsive to the voting 
numbers o f the watermen, who opposed leasing. These legislators took a leadership role in the 
development o f a property rights system that the watermen would accept (Alford. 1975). Today, 
the number o f watermen on the Bay is greatly reduced, and yet legislative policy, particularly in 
Maryland, is still fashioned to meet the needs o f so few at the expense o f  so many.
The forces opposed to, and in favor of, private leasing are not the same in Maryland as in 
Virginia. The pressures for granting private leasing in Virginia were stronger than in Maryland 
because the more saline waters o f Virginia offered a higher rate o f return for private cultivation. 
There were two reasons for this. One is that an oyster's growth is directly correlated with 
salinity: the growth rate is more rapid in saline waters than in less saline waters. The second 
reason is that Virginia oysters commanded a higher price because Northern consumers, 
accustomed to the taste o f  oysters taken from their own ocean coastal waters, preferred them to 
oysters taken from the less saline waters o f Maryland. With greater potential gains, prospective 
leaseholders were more active in the legislative process in Virginia (Winslow, 1894). Oyster 
laws passed in Virginia in 1892 permitted significant private leasing o f barren bottoms for 
cultivation. Grounds where oysters could grow naturally were reserved as public grounds. A 
survey of the Virginia grounds to identify the naturally producing bottoms was conducted by 
Lieutenant Baylor, USN, and hence, these grounds became known as the Baylor Grounds 
(Haven, Hargis, & Kendall, 1978).
Virginia watermen were less resistant to private leasing than were Maryland’s watermen 
for several reasons:
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1. One reason is that the expansion o f private planting created a market for seed 
harvested by hand-tongers. This was because the most important source o f seed was the James 
River in Virginia, where seed beds were reserved as public grounds (Shabman & Thunberg,
1988). Up to the 1990s the Virginia watermen jealously guarded their perceived entitlement to 
the James River seed. However, disease took a heavy toll on the seed beds in the 1960s and by 
the late 1980s oyster populations were barely at sustainable levels (Abrahms. 1992).
2. A second reason was that many Virginia planters were opposed to dredging on 
leaseholds because of the difficulty in keeping the dredge within one's property lines. They 
instead preferred to hire hand-tongers to harvest the oyster grounds, thereby creating employment 
opportunities.
3. A third reason is that many private planters had their grounds harvested by hand tong 
because if they dredged, the substrate in which they invested would become silted over and the 
integrity o f  the beds destroyed. Tonging minimized disturbance to the bottom.
As a result, tongers’ opposition to leasing was muted in Virginia by the higher expected 
returns (than in Maryland) and by the employment opportunities created by private planters on 
both the private and the public grounds. Leasing grew rapidly in Virginia and by 1902 
production from the private grounds exceeded the harvest from the public grounds (Stagg, 1985). 
It is important to note that this remained true until the 1970s, when the effects o f disease were 
being felt on both the private and the public beds.
Maryland’s watermen were strongly opposed to leasing o f either natural or barren 
bottoms. However, with its lower salinity levels, expected returns from private planting were not 
as large. Though leasing o f barren ground was eventually provided for in the Haman Act of 
1906, this law also included many provisions that inhibited private cultivation (Case studies in 
management, 1991). Most o f these restrictive provisions are still in place today, and the lack of
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adequate enforcement exacerbates the situation. Perhaps the greatest disincentive to private 
planting was the clause that permitted legal challenges to the lease. It in effect made all leases 
applied for subject to challenge and dismissal, or refusal.
Many basic textbooks on natural resource economics now use the public oyster grounds 
o f the Chesapeake Bay as a prime example o f the economic inefficiency of all common property 
resources (Randall, 1981; Tietenberg, 1988). Frequently these economic studies purport to 
demonstrate that there is too much labor and too many boats in the fishery. The call for 
privatization of the beds is even older than these relatively recent economic studies and can be 
traced back into the last century (Brooks, 1891; Paxton, 1858). Nonetheless, the evolution of 
property rights to the Chesapeake oyster grounds has not resulted in the complete privatization of 
the grounds, which was both predicted and advocated by the NRE approach.
According to Santopietro and Shabman (1992b), establishing a private property rights 
structure for all oyster grounds in the Maryland oyster fishery would have had two effects on 
labor;
1. Capital, in the form of dredges and patent tongs, would be substituted for labor, 
needed for hand tonging, thus reducing employment opportunities in the fishery. The argument 
against this notion, however, is seen in the Virginia fishery where hand-tonging is the preferred 
method o f  harvest since it retains the integrity o f  the oyster beds and reduces damage. Therefore, 
it is incorrect to assume that privatization o f Maryland beds will displace hand-tongers.
2. The character o f the work experience o f being a waterman would be altered from that 
o f a risk-taking harvester o f the natural oyster population, to that o f  a production manager or 
employee o f an aquaculture enterprise.
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Integrating corporate change strategies into fisheries management. Recent fisheries 
failures, combined with changing views on management, point to the critical and urgent need for 
a new approach to fisheries management. Serious consideration should be given to future 
management strategies focusing on integrated approaches in fisheries. Rather than focusing 
solely on fish populations, an appropriate combination o f biological considerations with 
operational, social, and economic considerations of the fishery should be implemented. This 
requires development o f both a conceptual framework and an appropriate methodology for 
interdisciplinary decision making in fisheries management. This would entail integration of the 
traditional fields o f fishery science and corporate management with the social sciences. This 
could provide the framework and methodologies for defining multiple objectives and constraints, 
modeling alternative management scenarios, and assessing and managing risk (Stephenson & 
Lane, 1995).
The limitations o f the current approaches to oyster fisheries management in Maryland 
are complex, but common characteristics with other failing fisheries include the following:
1. An inability o f management strategies to deal with the inherent variability o f the 
environmental, biological, and economic aspects o f fisheries systems (Magnuson. 1991).
2. Failure to define long term management goals that meet specific biological, social, 
and economic objectives and targets for fisheries (Serchuk & Smolowitz, 1990).
3. A lack of year-to-year accountability in management decision making and an inability 
to react to and anticipate change (Lane, 1992).
4. Predominance o f biological advice that does not adequately address economic, social, 
or operational considerations.
5. Lack o f effective involvement by stakeholders and vested interest groups in fisheries 
management decision making (Pearse & Waters, 1992).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
98
6. Pressure by government regulatory agencies (usually state) to rationalize cost cutting 
measures as a means o f improving efficiency (Parsons, 1993).
Biological evaluation o f stock status has been the cornerstone o f fisheries management. 
The post-World War II era saw some change in philosophy, from the pursuit o f maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) to the pursuit o f the more diffuse concepts of best use or optimal yield 
(OY) that were to incorporate biological, economic, and social objectives (Parsons, 1993). 
However, change has been slow and ineffective.
Communitv-Run Alternatives
Working together. There is evidence to suggest that the tragedy o f  the commons is 
neither universal nor inevitable (Leal, 1996). In several parts o f  the world, local fishers manage 
communal fishing grounds, usually without much government interference, and they are 
successful in preventing overfishing. For the most part, these arrangements are community- 
based. spontaneously developed, and informally organized (Jentoft & Kristoffersen, 1989).
The very existence o f  these fisheries challenges the notion that all fishers are necessarily 
locked into a self-destructive pattern o f competition that invariably leads to severe depletion of 
the resource. They serve to illustrate that a fishery can be self-regulated. Fisheries management 
attention has grown in recent years, providing valuable information on why such management 
can occur. Elinor Ostrom (1990) has identified the characteristics that have enabled groups of 
fishers to manage commons over long periods o f time without bringing about a tragedy o f over 
exploitation. She found that (a) boundaries must be well defined, (b) rules must be linked to 
local conditions, and (c) sanctions must be imposed when rules are violated. In addition, Ostrom 
found that strong community traditions are essential for such management, as well as an absence 
o f interference by governments.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
99
In Robert Pomeroy’s (1991) study on small-scale fisheries management, he determined 
that to develop a more effective fisheries management program, it is necessary' for decision 
makers to change their basic assumptions regarding the environment of small-scale fishers. Of 
particular concern are the mistaken assumptions o f homogeneity of fishers and fishing 
communities, and the perceived irrationality o f fishers’ behavior.
The prevalent problems in fisheries include limited resources, lack o f market power, lack 
of alternative income, and inflation (Pomeroy, 1991). To this list may be added inaccessibility to 
credit, inadequate infrastructure and support services, and lack o f  enforcement of regulations. 
Suppositional problems are those related to the assumptions held by fisheries managers 
concerning the behavior o f fishers, the social and economic structure o f the communities in 
which the fishers live and work, and the nature o f the resource base.
In searching for solutions to the problems that contribute to the low economic standard 
of living among small-scale fishers, like the Chesapeake watermen, fisheries managers have too 
often given limited priority to the social and economic diversity which exists among fishers and 
fishing communities, and to the perspective o f the fisher (Pomeroy, 1991). This results in 
conflicts arising between the objectives set by fisheries managers and the results obtained.
Many small-scale fishers exist at a subsistence level and have a short-run. survival 
strategy o f taking care o f themselves and their families each day. These fishers, due to limited 
mobility and lack o f sufficient alternative employment to move completely out o f the fishery , 
will utilize whatever resources are available to them (technology, skill, capital) to harvest as 
many fish as possible. For if they do not harvest as many fish as possible, the belief is that 
another fisher will. The fishers prefer profits and food now rather than a continual flow of fish 
and income later. In contrast to this short-run survival strategy of many fishers, fisheries 
managers are primarily interested in long-term sustainability o f  the resource to maintain a source
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of food and income.
An alternative strategy that may address this is a community-based approach designed to 
be responsive to the diversity o f factors which exist among fishers and fishing communities and 
the long-term survival o f  the community and the fishery (Pomeroy, 1991). While not a new 
approach, what is innovative about the community-based approach is that it would combine goals 
o f fishery management and rural community life to find solutions to both specific problems faced 
by fishers, and the underlying causes o f these problems.
As with terrestrial hunters, many fishers o f coastal waters lay claim to a right of first 
access to harvest, which is coupled with rules that govern participation and use. Measures such 
as ensuring that access to prime fishing ground is equitably distributed among rightful 
participants, rules governing fishing conduct, and the application o f specific sanctions against 
violators, have all been documented as forms o f traditional local self-management in coastal 
fishing settings (McCay & Acheson, 1987). Four examples o f  community-run, cooperative 
fisheries, with differing degrees o f government involvement, are presented below.
Matinicus Island. Maine. One example o f a successful, community-run fishery can be 
found on Matinicus Island in Maine. The island’s lobster fishery has operated successfully for 
over a century without official state recognition despite many changes, including expansion into 
regional markets and dramatic improvements in boat style, fishing technology, and navigational 
equipment (Bowles Sc Bowles, 1989). While the number of fishers has deviated little from the 
original number o f  36, fishers did move in and out o f  the fishery. On well-protected waters like 
those off Matinicus Island, lobster fishers themselves have instituted conservation efforts, 
including limiting the number of lobster traps used. The annual income of the Matinicus Island 
fishers is 40% higher than the income of lobster fishers in the more open areas off the coast of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
101
Maine, and the fishing is twice as productive as in more open areas (Acheson, 1993). The right 
o f an islander to fish for lobster is recognized and respected by the other islanders. Self-imposed 
restrictions on lobstering have existed for over a century and sanctions for violating these rights 
and restrictions include property destruction, such as trap cutting. It is because this is such a 
tightly-knit community and that the penalties for violating the restrictions developed by the 
lobstermen themselves are severe that this system o f  fishery management works. The fear is, 
though, that the state could wipe out the entire territorial system if it chose to by enforcing state 
and federal laws against trap cutting. According to Acheson (1993), communal management 
exists only because o f  the benign neglect o f the state. The key reason that this community-run 
fishery is so successful is because the rules and the enforcement o f those rules are implemented 
by the fishers themselves. The fishers have a role and a stake in its success.
Gulf Coast shrimp fishery'. For the most part, community management involves limiting 
entry and setting fishing rules. Another example o f what once was a community-run fishery is 
the Gulf Coast shrimp fishery where, from the 1930s to the 1950s, shrimpers themselves 
negotiated price agreements with shrimp purchasers, as well as determining entry limits. 
Economists observed that shrimp fishermen unions and trade associations negotiated with local 
wholesalers to  set minimum price floors and size limits for small shrimp taken from the 
Mississippi River. These higher prices reduced the quantity o f small shrimp taken from the 
Mississippi, since wholesalers would only pay if the shrimp were big enough to justify the higher 
prices.
Unfortunately, the communal fisheries management scheme was dismantled by the 
federal government as a violation o f the Sherman Act, which allows government intervention in 
the regulation o f a food source. Ironically, the pricing strategy to conserve the fishery and raise
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
102
incomes is now being carried out by every Gulf Coast state in the form o f state-instituted, 
minimum-size rules for harvesting shrimp. The informal arrangements that local fishers carried 
out to sustain their fisheries usually came about because government officials left local people 
free to design their own arrangements (Leal, 1996). Unfortunately, because these informal 
approaches have not always been recognized by the government and may in fact be defined as 
illegal, they are always at risk o f being dismantled.
Lofoten fishery. Norway. It should be recognized, however, that in some cases 
government recognition and some minimal involvement can give validity and stability to the 
management scheme. Such is the case in Norway’s Lofoten fishery. The Lofoten fishery is one 
o f the largest cod fisheries in the world, in terms o f  numbers o f fishers and the size of the harvest 
(Jentoft & Kristoffersen, 1989). There have never been government imposed harvest limits 
within the fishery nor a licensing system. For nearly a century, the fishers have successfully 
implemented their own fishing regulations, a responsibility officially delegated to them by the 
Norwegian government.
The impetus for community self-regulation came from overcrowding (too many fishers) 
and gear conflicts experienced in the fishery in the mid-late 1800s. Toward the end o f the 
century, the Lofoten fishers decided that they needed regulation to overcome crowding and gear 
problems but they wanted to carry it out themselves (Jentoft & Kristoffersen, 1989). In 1897. the 
Norwegian government enacted the Lofoten law, which gave the fishers responsibility' for 
regulating the fishery. The present system consists o f 15 districts, each with separate well- 
defined territories. Each local district is responsible for developing and implementing 
regulations, enforcing the regulations, and resolving disputes among fishers. Both regulation and 
dispute resolution are carried out by each district’s local regulatory committee, made up of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
103
representatives from each gear group. These committees are not unlike those drawn from the 
Chesapeake watermen, with each oyster gear type represented.
The regulatory duties of the committee include dividing the district's territory into 
separate fishing grounds and reserving each for a particular gear type. To participate in the 
fishery, every fisher must register with one of the districts and follow the rules of that district for 
that season. The committee decides how big each territory for a given gear type will be (Leal. 
1996). For example, seining, which represents the highest scale of harvesting power, has the 
least space available in the fishery. A sa  consequence, only about 15% of the total participants in 
the fishery use seine nets, thereby reducing the risk of overharvesting.
Newfoundland lobster fishery. Canada. The community-based, cooperative management 
strategy used in the Newfoundland lobster fishery provides an instructional example o f how an 
understanding o f indigenous values and practices can reveal the true motivation behind 
acceptance and enforcement of measures that conserve the lobster stocks. Erroneous 
assumptions about fishers and fishing communities can lead to conflicts in attempts between 
fishers and fisheries managers to co-manage and conserve the fishery.
Though the lobster fishery along the northwest coast of Newfoundland is governed by 
many o f  the usual institutional formal regulations (e.g., season limits, limited entry licensing, 
territorial divisions, and trap limits), it is generally considered to be successfully, cooperatively 
managed by both the lobster fishers and regulatory officials. In this example, it is useful to 
examine the relationship between indigenous practices and formal regulations in the 
Newfoundland fishery so that it might shed light on potential relationships between fisheries 
managers and fishers in other regions, such as the Chesapeake Bay. As Craig Palmer (1993) 
discovered, the success o f the formal regulations in Newfoundland has little to do with their
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similarity or even compatibility with the fishers’ self-imposed regulations. The acceptance of 
formal regulations, intended to conserve the fishery, appears to be largely based on the fishers' 
realization o f  the non-conserving nature o f their indigenous practices, as well as a desire to retain 
social norms. The absence o f conservation-minded, indigenous practices may be the result of the 
relatively short history o f the Newfoundland lobster fishery, and/or the exploitive market 
conditions under which it has operated.
Palmer (1993) argues that many current conceptions o f indigenous practices are based on 
a flawed theoretical approach, sometimes referred to as the notion o f the noble savage or soft 
evolutionism. He suggests that it is time to revise the current assumptions about the nature of 
indigenous management practices in order to understand their potential role in the formation of 
cooperatively managed fishery policies. Palmer goes on to argue that instead of using indigenous 
practices simply as models for formal regulations, attention should focus on the motivation of 
fishers engaging in indigenous practices and the socioeconomic context in which this occurs.
The lobster fishery along the northwest coast o f Newfoundland is currently regulated 
under many o f the restrictions that are common to entirely government regulated fisheries. 
However, in the Newfoundland lobster fishery these regulations have been relatively successful 
socially, as well as biologically, because most o f  them are supported by participants in the 
fishery. The biological and social success o f these formal regulations does not result from their 
being modeled on indigenous practices, as one might expect (Palmer, 1993).
The lobster fishery along the northwest coast o f Newfoundland originated in 1873 with 
the establishment o f the first lobster cannery. Harvesting and canning lobsters remained an 
important activity until the 1930s when canning was gradually replaced by the shipment o f  live 
lobsters to Boston (Sinclair, 1985). Before the 1960s, the enforcement of government imposed 
regulations along this coast was even more limited, if  not nonexistent, than in the rest o f Atlantic
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Canada. Local fishers who participated in the fishery before the current regulations were 
implemented made it clear to fisheries managers that there was little in the way of indigenous 
restraint. There were, for example, no locally imposed restrictions on the number o f participants 
in the fishery and fishers felt that it was their natural right to catch lobsters (Palmer, 1993). This 
has a familiar ring as one compares the attitudes o f Chesapeake watermen with Newfoundland 
fishers. A crucial point to be emphasized is that the indigenous management practices did not 
prevent a severe depletion o f the lobster population, and the fishery was at the point o f collapse 
from overexploitation. The realization by the fishers themselves o f the vulnerability o f the 
lobster stocks was a major motivation for supporting and participating in establishing co­
managed (government and lobster fishers) formal regulations.
The social acceptance by the Newfoundland fishers o f formal regulations, with all it 
entailed for reduced enforcement costs and the conservation o f the resource, depended on the 
conscious concerns and values o f  the fishers. The value o f  the indigenous practices lay in what 
they revealed about these concerns and values. The indigenous practices in northwest 
Newfoundland serve to illustrate why the conscious motivations for a practice are more relevant 
to fisheries managers than are the unintended effects o f the practice. For example, nearly all 
northwest Newfoundland lobster fishers observe a ban on Sunday fishing, a ban that was once 
part o f the government imposed regulations. When a few fishers convinced the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans to allow Sunday fishing, the majority o f fishers banded together and used 
informal means (coercion, community pressure) to keep the ban uniformly observed. Abstaining 
from fishing on Sundays certainly does have some conservation effect on the stocks, but that is 
not why the ban continues to be unofficially observed (Palmer, 1993). Most fishers do not want 
to fish on Sundays for religious or social reasons, and they do not want anyone else to fish on 
Sundays because they fear those who do will take advantage o f the opportunity to steal lobsters
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from other fishers' traps. From a regulatory perspective, the importance o f this indigenous 
practice lies in what it implies about the conscious values and concerns of fishers. Instead of 
reflecting an interest in conserving the resource for the long-term good of the group, the local 
adherence to this practice revealed that the fishers were concerned about retaining their 
social/religious norms and maintaining their personal catch levels by preventing poaching.
Hence, it cannot be assumed that these fishers would support new formal regulations aimed at 
conserving the resource if they resulted in decreased personal catch levels, even if these 
regulations superficially resembled established indigenous practices.
Here is an example of a relatively young fishery (as fisheries go) where completely 
handing the management o f the fishery over to the local fishers, as was done on Matinicus Island, 
would have resulted in the fishery’s collapse. Yet, imposition of government regulations without 
working with the fishers and understanding the motivations behind local practices would just as 
easily have resulted in failure.
The cooperative management o f the Newfoundland lobster fishery suggests that a focus 
on the conscious goals and motivations involved in indigenous practices contributes much more 
to the conservation o f  the resource than the prevailing sociological approach to indigenous 
practices based on the notion o f the noble savage (Palmer, 1993).
Nonmonetary Benefits
Quality o f Life
According to surveys o f mid-Atlantic region fishers conducted by Gatewood and McCay 
(1990), coastal (including Day and estuary) fishers derive relatively little satisfaction from 
competition (catch numbers) and prestige issues. After the chance to be working outdoors, it is 
the opportunity to be one’s own boss, being out on the water, having the ability to come and go
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as one pleases, the healthfulness, and the peace o f  mind, that top the fishers' list o f  nonmonetary 
rewards. These reflect the strongly independent nature of coastal fishing as key components of 
satisfaction. Interestingly, the surveys also noted that deep sea fishers, unlike coastal fishers, 
derive their satisfaction out o f the competition and the perceived prestige o f deep sea fishing.
Gatewood and McCay (1990) argue that a logical connection can be made between 
fishers' job satisfaction and fisheries management in the following manner:
1. The strategy that preserves what fishers like about their work as much as possible and 
takes into account the full range o f occupational rewards (monetary and nonmonetary) has the 
best chance of success because (a) its adoption may cause less resentment among the fishers, 
which in turn means that they may be less likely to try to circumvent the regulations, and (b) 
employing such criteria in formulating regulatory policies is more congruent with the central 
charge o f fisheries management, which is management for optimal sustainability and human 
benefit.
2. If the components o f  job satisfaction in a given fishery are known, this information 
can be used to select more appropriate regulatory policies.
What Gatewood and McCay elude to but do not state explicitly, as Barber and Taylor 
(1990) did, is that regulatory policies are more likely to have fishers' buy-in and commitment if 
the components o f job satisfaction are factored into the decision making. In so doing, the 
regulatory policies gain legitimacy.
Job satisfaction is truly multidimensional, and fishers are not a homogenous group. So 
too. in the applied context o f formulating regulatory policies, Gatewood and McCay (1990) 
suggest, fisheries managers should consider not only how to achieve their conservation and 
economic goals, but also the specific nonmonetary rewards o f  fishing as these vary among 
different fisheries and regions. Because the total configuration o f incentives and rewards is
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fishery- and region-specific, il is both naive and misguided to think that there is a single, best 
way to regulate fishing effort, for there is no regulatory strategy that applies equally well to all 
marine (or fresh water) fisheries in all regions.
The NRE approach does not explain the evolution or the retention o f the oyster fishery 
property rights structure o f  the Chesapeake Bay because the argument only considers the 
financial returns of substituting capital for labor (Santopietro, 1986). Economists studying the 
fishery have not, for the most part, included either the nonmonetary benefits that the watermen 
derive from the work itself nor the quality of life afforded by preserving opportunities to reside 
in the traditional fishing communities as the opportunity costs o f adopting what they, as 
outsiders, would define as the more efficient system of private property rights.
Even if alternative employment were available outside the fishery or as hired labor for 
private planters, the watermen would realize a loss o f  self-satisfaction and pride by being denied 
the lifestyle o f working on the water and being one’s own boss. Owning one's own boat and 
gear gives the waterman a sense o f  independence not available in the alternative employments. 
Evidence o f  the existence of these nonmonetary benefits can be inferred by the opposition o f the 
watermen to privatization. For example, in a survey o f Virginia’s watermen in 1985, 83% o f the 
respondents said that nonmonetary benefits are important to them and 58% said that they knew 
they could earn more money working at another job (Santopietro, 1986).
The survey also found that 88% of the watermen had lived in their present communities 
for 20 years or more. Most o f the watermen live in homes in communities bordering the water, 
so that they are near the grounds they harvest, or have harvested, and are able to return home 
each evening. An update to this particular point is that since the repletion program selects only 
particular areas to seed each year, some watermen are now traveling away from their homes to 
other parts o f  the Bay to where the oysters are available and may sometimes be away from home
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for several days (personal communication, Gary Smith, DNR, Oxford, MD, October 29. 1996). 
These fishing communities are characterized by tightly knit family relationships (Bundy & 
Williams, 1978) with little migration into the community from the outside. If anything, the 
opposite is true. Young people are leaving the fishing communities looking for better 
opportunities. The lack o f sufficient alternative employment opportunities in the fishing 
communities means that denying access to the public grounds is tantamount to denying 
individuals the right to continue to live in their own communities. The preservation o f the 
communities has historically depended on the distribution o f income afforded by a common 
property rights system (Santopietro & Shabman, 1992b).
The history of the Maryland oyster fishery, and the persistence o f  the property rights 
system, demonstrate that watermen prefer to work according to the rules and regulations 
necessary for the management o f the commons. With this arrangement, all benefits from the 
oyster fishery flow to a variable input, the waterman’s own labor. The limitations on harvest 
gear, the traditional use o f small craft, and the greater abundance o f oysters in shallow coastal 
waters have served to maintain these communities (Santopietro & Shabman, 1992b). A change 
in the property rights structure o f the Bay’s oyster fishery could involve a change in the 
distribution o f income that could threaten the existence o f the Bay communities. Only with this 
broader perspective o f nonmonetary benefits and their link to property rights systems is it 
possible to understand the history of the fishery and avoid making inappropriate and ineffective 
policy recommendations for the future.
Job Satisfaction
Research by Pollnac and Poggie (1988) with New England fishers has shown that job 
satisfaction is an important pivotal factor related both directly and indirectly to a wide variety of
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other social and economic variables. The relationships are positive, with high job satisfaction 
correlated with positive social and economic impacts, and low satisfaction with negative impacts. 
These relationships justify focusing on job satisfaction, and its social and occupational correlates 
among fishers as a means o f providing fisheries managers with the understanding needed to make 
policy recommendations in the context o f fisheries management decision making. Because job 
satisfaction is such a pivotal variable, fisheries management strategies that result in its 
maximization will help ensure positive social consequences.
Pollnac and Poggie’s (1988) study demonstrates that there is more to the occupation of 
fishing than simply making money. Fisheries managers must take these other, nonmonetary 
factors into account if they want to develop effective management strategies. Nonmonetary 
incomes (worker satisfaction bonus) can push exploitation o f  a fishery beyond maximum 
economic yield, hence increasing the chances for over exploitation (Anderson. 1980: Smith. 
1981).
Also, if  alternative employment producing equal or better levels o f  job satisfaction is not 
available, exploitation o f the fishery is pushed even harder. The complexity o f the 
interrelationships between numerous variables suggests that considerable caution should be taken 
in formulating fisheries management strategies if  the goal o f minimizing the negative social 
impact o f the management strategies is to be realized.
Accordingly, the introduction o f culture into resource management complicates the 
nature o f management. Cultural differences, particularly as they pertain to the most basic 
resource management tools and concepts, must be considered because resource management is a 
function o f  social and political institutions, not just biological considerations. Just as human 
impacts on ecosystems affect other aspects of the social system, very real social inputs affect 
natural systems (Tuan, 1990).
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For example, the mid-Atlantic region of the Eastern seaboard (from New Jersey to 
Virginia) is like many others in that potentially helpful social science findings have not been 
seriously incorporated into fisheries management decisions or even into accompanying strategies. 
There are many reasons for this omission, including the resilience and resistance o f traditional 
disciplinary biases. The culture o f fishing is an occupational culture. In addition to the general 
humanistic reasons for fishers wanting to fish, it is important to consider that job  satisfaction is 
particularly important in fisheries management. Unless fishers’ satisfaction bonus is taken into 
account, management strategies will fall seriously short o f their goals (Gatewood & McCay. 
1990). Regulatory policies that presume fishers are only in it for the money are prone to 
underestimate the perseverance o f fishing effort, the possible consequence being over-fishing of 
the resource.
By including job satisfaction in fisheries management objectives, it is recognized that 
what is economically optimal may not provide the maximal human benefits, because the rewards 
o f work take two forms; monetary and nonmonetary. When economic models and biological 
models o f  stock replenishment and species sustainability are integrated (Gatewood & McCay. 
1990), they show that unless fishing effort is regulated in some way, the common property nature 
o f marine fisheries will lead to overfishing, stock depletion, and profit loss. Without limitations, 
the fishing fleet’s collective effort will increase to the equilibrium point where revenue equals 
costs. The point o f  maximum economic yield (MEY) is determined by the level o f fishing effort 
at which the greatest profit is realized, and this effort is well below the biological point of 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), according to Schaefer’s (1954) biological model.
Economists argue that profit maximization is the proper management target and that fisheries 
must be regulated to achieve this goal, whether through catch quotas, gear restrictions, and/or 
limited entry licences.
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The Ovster Population Decline Continues 
Maryland is the only major oyster producing state in the United States in which private 
leasing plays such a minor role in production. The Maryland Legislature has provided few if any 
incentives to potential leaseholders to make such a large economic and time investment into 
aquaculture. In addition, there is no established means in Maryland for financing, or providing 
financial assistance for such potentially risky operations, especially with the hovering specter of 
oyster diseases. Corporations might have the financial stability to undertake oyster farming, as 
they have done in New England and on the West and Gulf Coasts, but century-old restrictions 
prevent the DNR from leasing grounds to businesses, and limit the number o f acres each 
individual can lease. Most watermen adamantly oppose large-scale leasing o f oyster grounds, 
arguing that oyster farming would limit their freedom and permanently alter a way of life that has 
shaped the distinctiveness of Maryland’s tidewater communities.
Supporters o f oyster farming in the Bay argue, however, that it will complement, not 
replace, the natural fishery. With potentially more oysters in the Bay from all sources, there will 
be more brood stock for spawning greater numbers o f young. This could contribute to stabilizing 
the economic prospects o f the watermen and the associated industries, such as the processors 
(shuckers. packers, shippers).
Recent pessimistic reviews o f global marine resources (Food & Agricultural 
Organization, 1994), in combination with a diagnosis o f global overcapitalization o f fishing 
fleets (Food & Agriculture Organization, 1993), provide a major impetus for the current wave of 
concern on the state o f marine resources and their management. Most people agree that there is a 
need to expand the fisheries management paradigm but do not agree on how. One thing that is 
commonly agreed upon is that there is a shortage o f socioeconomic analysis and its application to 
resource management, particularly fisheries management. Fisheries management strategies need
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to cross disciplinary divides and embrace the broader holistic perspective (Caddy, 1995).
Adapting recent concepts of management science and organizational theory to cope w ith 
environmental problems and declining harvests is a challenging approach that reaches out for 
alternatives to the current fisheries management strategies. In Managing Sustainable 
Development (1993), Michael Carley and Ian Christie argue that the context o f natural resource 
management problems is turbulence, characterized by uncertainty about the nature of complex 
problems and the consequences o f  collective action, inconsistent and ill-defined preferences and 
values, and complex networks o f  participants, or stakeholders with varying interests in problem 
resolution.
It is clear from the following graphs that the past and present oyster fisheries 
management strategies, including the repletion program, have failed to prevent the continuing 
decline in the oyster population. Though some would argue that disease and pollution are the 
causes for the continuing decline, and cannot be ignored as contributing factors, the decline 
clearly started before disease struck (beginning in the 1960s) or pollution played a significant 
role in the decline (Figure 3). Overharvesting, including gear type and habitat destruction, is the 
primary cause for the continued decline in the oyster population. Pollution, and particularly 
diseases, are major contributing factors to the population decline and serve to exacerbate the 
natural recovery' process o f the Eastern oyster populations. The regulations that govern the 
harvesting o f  oysters, on private or public grounds, have changed little since their inception, 
despite overwhelming data demonstrating their failure. To their credit, fisheries managers within 
the Maryland DNR have made numerous recommendations to the legislature to change the 
regulations and have been, for the most part, ignored. It has been suggested that the state-funded 
repletion program is little more than a fishery subsidy, and that as long as the state is willing to
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Figure 3. Total harvest 1840-1970. Maryland oyster fishery. Graph based on data in V. S.
Kennedy & L. L. Breisch. 1983. Journal o f Environmental Management. 16. 153-171: M.
Leffler, 1987a, Maryland Sea Grant. 8(2). 2-6.
pour money into it, then the watermen will continue to lobby against privatization, and for 
continued access to the public beds until the last oyster is gone.
Though the total harvest in 1996 (200,000 bushels) was up slightly from 1995 (personal 
communication, Connie Lewis, DNR, Annapolis MD, December 10, 1996), and the gear types 
restricted and season cut back substantially, many watermen did not go out on the water on many 
of the allowed harvest days and did not even catch their harvest limit (Meyer, 1996b). Only in 
some o f the tidal tributaries, where watermen operate tongs by hand from small boats, and where 
skipjacks and hydraulic patent-tongs are barred, were oysters said to be in any decent supply in 
1996. The rising cost o f  operating a boat and paying a crew, along with the poor harvest, do not 
make it worth the effort to go out on the water often.
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The dwindling fleet of skipjacks, which are the last commercial sailing fleet in North 
America, sit idle many days even when they are the only boats allowed to dredge. As a reminder, 
dredging is permitted on the Bay only under sail or on power days. Though some allowances 
have been made in that a motorized push boat may push the skipjacks two days a week during 
dredging season, giving them more maneuverability, the fishery is in such bad shape that 
opening day o f  dredging season in 1996 found no skipjacks on the Bay at all. Skipjacks cost 
approximately S 10,000 a year to maintain and require crews o f four to six experienced people to 
operate (Meyer, 1996b). The daily catch is limited to 150 bushels per skipjack, but during the 
1997 season. 9 in 10 oysters dredged from the water were dead (Clark, 1997). It is more 
efficient, and thus more profitable for the skipjacks to operate on the two legal power days, 
Monday and Tuesday, when the small push boats with outboard motors can nudge the large 
skipjacks as they dredge for oysters.
Small pockets o f naturally occurring disease resistant oyster populations have been found 
on rare occasion in the Bay, oysters that have clearly survived past the most susceptible stage. 
However, despite recommendations by fishery scientists to ban harvesting in these areas, 
harvesting has been allowed (personal communication, Gary Smith. DNR. Oxford. MD. October 
29. 1996). Thus, dashing any hopes that these disease resistant oysters might spawn to produce 
disease resistant progeny. Ironically, at great expense to the tax payers, state laboratories are in 
the process o f trying to develop genetically engineered, disease resistant oysters. Even if they 
are successful, it is unlikely that the tax/licensing fees, collected by the state for these disease 
resistant oysters will ever equal their true worth. In addition, as with mammalian diseases, what 
guarantee is there that MSX or Dermo will not mutate to more virulent forms?
There have been reports in the past, in Maryland and Virginia, that the harvest yield per 
acre o f oyster ground was greater on private grounds than on public grounds (Kennedy &
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Breisch, 1983). This added support to the notion that better care was taken o f  the private 
grounds, with less habitat destruction, because the lessee had a higher personal stake in the 
outcome. This argument is also used to promote the push for privatization to (a) protect oyster 
habitat, and (b) increase yield.
Further backing is added to this notion when one views the harvest yields between the 
public and private oyster beds in Virginia (Figure 4). Up until the late 1960s, when 
MSX struck Virginia's oyster beds in the more saline waters o f  the Bay (Andrews, 1968), leased 
bottoms were producing nearly five times as many oysters as the public bottoms and on fewer 
acres (Haven & Whitcomb, 1986).
difficult to demonstrate one way or another (Personal communication, Gary Smith. DNR.
Oxford, MD, October 29, 1996). For starters, leasing o f private grounds may only occur on 
barren grounds that are not known to have ever had any natural set. Therefore, from the onset, 
oyster seed must come from somewhere else and that somewhere has. for many years, been the 
public oyster grounds. In prior years, Marylanders could purchase seed from Virginia and 
Delaware Bay. However, declining seed availability from Virginia and Delaware Bay, and rising 
costs have resulted in the Maryland oyster farmers relying on state seeded beds for their supply 
of seed.
For over 100 years, greater than 75% o f  the seed planted on Virginia's leased beds came 
from the public bottoms o f the James River (Haven, Hargis & Kendall. 1981). MSX was the 
cause o f the initial major decline in production from Virginia's leased bottoms since many large 
leases were in high salinity areas, where oysters grow fastest but where unfortunately, conditions 
are more conducive to increased disease incidence. Since the 1960s. the steady decline in 
Virginia’s oyster population has been attributed to continued overharvesting o f the public 
grounds, the persistence o f MSX, reduced planting efforts by private growers due to adverse
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Figure 4. Annual harvest. Virginia oyster fishery. Graph based on data obtained from W. J. 
Hargis & D. S. Haven, 1988. Journal o f Shellfish Research. 7(21. 271-279; Personal 
communication, David Bower, Virginia Resource and Marine Commission, September 1996.
economic conditions related to the costs o f growing and harvesting oysters, and resistance to 
remedial improvements by industry and state managers (Hargis & Haven, 1988).
Thus, the oyster fanners in both Virginia and Maryland are highly dependent on the 
public bottoms for seed for their initial, and often continued, production. Therefore.
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comparisons o f  yield/acre between the private and public grounds are misleading, and cannot be 
validated as a true comparison of yield nor provide support for, or against, privatization. It 
should also be noted that one o f the reasons for the large difference in production between public 
and private beds in Virginia is that leased bottoms were usually planted with seed oysters from 
the James River at rates ranging from 500 to 1,000 bushels o f seed per acre. In contrast, harvests 
from the public bottoms originated from a natural set, or from limited (compared to Maryland) 
repletion efforts by the state. Another point must also be made and that is that corporate 
ownership of leased oyster bottoms was, and is, permitted in Virginia, which assumes some 
higher level o f  capital available than to individuals to purchase seed. In addition, it is difficult to 
gather data that are oyster bed/acreage specific since the watermen are no longer restricted to 
their own county to harvest from its waters, or to sell their catch within their county. Records, 
therefore, are difficult if not impossible to keep (personal communication, Connie Lewis. DNR. 
Annapolis, MD, July 26, 1996). Since the harvest numbers are based on the taxes per bushel that 
the buyer pays, the numbers do not necessarily represent the harvest from a specific area.
To make matters worse, Maryland’s natural beds have been subjected to heavy siltation, 
which makes it difficult for state surveyors to obtain accurate acreage data. Even annual harvest 
data comparing Maryland’s private fishery with the public one (Figure 5) do not help one make a 
true comparison since the amount o f leased acreage is so low. and by law, these beds need only 
be worked (seeded and harvested from) once every 3 years to be allowed to keep the lease 
(personal communication, Chris Judy, DNR, Oxford, MD, August 9, 1996; Maryland Department 
ofNatural Resources, 1994-1995).
Therefore, rather than trying to make futile attempts to explore yield/acre differences 
between the private and public fishery to try to lend support to privatization in Maryland, 
information/data were gathered to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the
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Figure S. Harvest 1972-1996. Maryland oyster fishery. Data obtained from the Maryland 
Department ofNatural Resources.
oyster fishery evolved to its current state, what socioeconomic and political factors influence it, 
how it compares to other oyster fisheries in the United States, and what alternative management 
strategies might be feasible. Clearly, as Figures 3, 4, and 5 show, change is needed now.
The Chesapeake Bay has long been known as one o f the world’s most favorable 
environments for the growth o f oysters (DeBroca, 1876; Smith, 1913). The mix of fresh and salt 
waters, the circulation patterns, relatively temperate climate, and shallowness o f the Bay create 
conditions under which oysters have flourished in the past. For more than 100 years the Bay was
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the primary supplier o f the nation’s oysters. However, by 1976 the Bay had already fallen to 
second place in market share to the Gulf states (National Fisheries Statistics Program. 1984), 
then fell behind the West Coast Fishery in 1987 (Abrahms. 1992), and now the total Bay harvest 
is less than 1% of what it was just after the Civil War (Brumbaugh, 1997).
Traditional bureaucratic, institutional forms and management approaches can no longer 
address natural resource management challenges adequately nor devise solutions that Fit the 
complex problems (Hviding, 1991). Some important issues relating to people's role in fisheries 
management and to the common property debate need to be considered. Hviding and Baines 
(1994) argue that Fisheries management must be viewed as linked to a number of contexts that 
are not specifically fisheries-related. with regard to the traditional perceptions and politics o f  
resource use. as well as to modem development issues. In Maryland, the prevailing mood o f  
many fisheries managers is one o f frustration. They are charged with the responsibility of 
increasing the oyster stocks, but their budgets are slashed and their recommendations ignored by 
the legislators who determine the regulations and set the policies.
In the face o f overwhelming data, scientific recommendations, and just plain common 
sense, the Maryland legislature and the watermen themselves have continued along a path that 
appears to be headed for the complete collapse of the oyster fishery. Why has this happened? 
Why is change so difficult? Is privatization o f  the Fishery really the answer? What other 
alternatives are there? What follows is a synthesis and analysis o f the information/data that have 
been collected to answer the many questions that have arisen, and to provide some understanding 
and guidance for future changes in the Maryland oyster Fishery.
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Summary
The Maryland oyster fishery, a dual fishery, has struggled with the question o f complete 
or increased privatization for over a century. Oyster fisheries in other parts o f the country have 
embraced privatization, and successfully so. Yet, in Maryland there is still resistance. Though 
economics play a role in hindering the acceptance o f increasing the role o f  privatization in the 
fishery, sociopolitical influences and nonmonetary benefits drive the legislative decisions that 
govern the fishery. The Maryland oyster fishery has a long history and carries with it a value 
system that is deeply rooted in the local traditions and a way o f life that has come to represent the 
Chesapeake Bay. The culture o f the tidewater communities and the Bay's unique ecosystem 
raise doubts as to whether the successful management strategies o f other oyster fisheries can be 
beneficial to Maryland’s oyster fishery, or whether community-based, common fishery 
alternatives are more suitable.
The Maryland oyster fishery, once the pride and economic mainstay o f the Chesapeake 
Bay, has been irreversibly changed. Writers weave stories about the Bay o f the past that depict 
quaint fishing villages and hard-working watermen dredging from their skipjacks under full sail 
or tonging from their workboats, with bushels o f oysters stacked on their decks. As pretty a 
picture as these stories paint, that picture is a memory now. Most o f the surviving skipjacks 
spend the majority o f  their time ferrying around tourists who are caught up in the nostalgia of the 
way things were. It is also more likely that one will find sport fishing charters on the watermen's 
workboats than bushels o f  oysters. In fact, the oyster population has declined so dramatically 
since the 1880s that the watermen, after taking all the oysters they can find off the public oyster 
grounds, still do not reach the quotas currently set by the state. Consequently, the watermen 
must find alternative uses for their boats just to make ends meet. In many o f the oystering
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families around the Bay, generation after generation has worked the oyster grounds. Now. the 
young family members seek alternative employment and often leave the small tightly-knit, 
coastal communities, resulting in a disruption o f the community structure.
One must also take into account how the demographics of the Bay have changed over the 
years and how that may influence decisions in the Legislature in the future. Where once the Bay 
was surrounded by small, rural fishing and agricultural communities, it is now surrounded by 
suburban sprawl and industry, with all its associated blight and pollution. With that has come a 
decline in the economic importance o f  farming and fishing. The regional economy no longer 
relies primarily on commercial fishing or farming (Greer & Leffler. 1996). An agrarian and 
fishing society is increasingly being replaced by a society that depends on service-oriented, 
professional, and technical jobs (Johnson, 1988). As a result, a far smaller proportion o f the 
population feels any economic connection with the Bay’s ecological features and systems. And 
yet. even though the vast majority of the human population may naively ignore the plight of the 
oysters, oysters are the biological indicators, the canaries in the mine as it were, o f the health of 
the Bay, and their presence or absence has broad implications.
Sociopolitical pressures against privatization have been a continuing saga since before 
the enactment of the Haman Act over 80 years ago. Fisheries managers need to accept that 
privatization is a management strategy that will likely never take hold in Maryland. Furthermore, 
the state administered repletion program is little more than a disguised welfare program that 
moves declining oyster populations from one commons area to another, to be completely fished 
out, and has done nothing to increase oyster populations.
Over a  century o f a tradition o f fishing the public grounds, the commons, and the 
entrenchment of a value system and community structure that revolves around fishing the 
commons have provided significant impediments to the introduction o f major legislative changes
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and the resultant life-style changes needed to expand or completely switch over to a 
predominantly private property rights structure. The necessary legislative and attitude changes 
needed to convert the Maryland oyster fishery to a private property rights structure o f fishery 
management would likely, if ever, take far too long to rescue the rapidly declining fishery. In 
addition, until there is a sizable disease resistant and/or disease free oyster population available 
as brood stock, there will be little chance o f any significant investment, corporate or otherwise, 
in the fishery. Therefore, private cultivation o f  oysters is a management strategy that will likely 
not gain significant acceptance in Maryland among watermen and legislators. It is important to 
interject here that some important work is being done in the area o f cultivation research. Many 
programs using the Eastern oyster, such as the one being conducted by VIMS, in which oysters 
are grown above the sediment laden bottoms, hold opportunities for both a private and a public 
fishery, but are not yet commercially viable. Change is needed now, and within a new 
management strategy, that is flexible and ever evolving, changes can ensue as other viable 
alternatives present themselves.
Nonmonetary, intangible benefits provide strong incentives for watermen to continue to 
fish the commons. This alone seems to supersede most economic arguments to privatize or leave 
the fishery entirely. Based on this notion, as well as the notion that successful corporate 
management strategies have a place in fisheries management, it is suggested that a variation o f 
the ITQ management strategy could be applied to Maryland’s public oyster fishery. Such an 
application would potentially meet with less resistance from watermen and legislators, be more 
compatible with the fishing communities’ value system, empower the watermen to determine 
their own destiny and at the same time take responsibility for their own fishery, their own 
livelihood. The role of the state fisheries managers and biologists could shift more toward one o f 
advisement, providing the expertise necessary to conduct disease incidence assessments.
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population surveys, and water quality analysis. Cooperative management strategies between 
government and fishers have been successful elsewhere and could be applied to the Chesapeake 
Bay oyster fishery. Part o f this advisement role o f  the government's would be to recommend 
when to close the oyster grounds to any harvesting to allow disease resistant or disease hardy 
oysters enough time to spawn and produce the next generation o f disease resistant oysters.
Embedded in the goal to rebuild the oyster fishery are three missions, which are (a) to 
protect a traditional way o f life, (b) to increase the commercial oyster harvest, and (c) to restore 
the oyster’s role in the Bay's ecology. If the pattern o f increasingly low harvests continues for 
many more years the Maryland fishery will collapse, as it did in New England. As the old adage 
goes, "He who ignores history is bound to repeat it."
A community-run. cooperative fishery challenges the notion that fishers will always be 
locked into the tragedy o f the commons unless there is government control. Given the failure of 
government to regulate fishing successfully, a self-regulated fishery may be an idea whose time 
has come on the Chesapeake Bay. The success o f  the fisheries on Matinicus Island, 
Newfoundland, Mississippi River, and Norway are but a few examples o f self-governed fisheries 
that work. As has been shown in corporate America, those who have the most to gain or lose in 
the fishery, should bear the greatest responsibility and cost. Reliance on government funding and 
programs has clearly not been successful in increasing oyster production or restoring oyster 
habitat. If anything, government efforts, however well intended, have made it possible for 
watermen to continue to over exploit the fishery on which their very livelihood depends. The 
watermen capture the benefits while the harm caused by overharvesting and habitat destruction is 
shared by all taxpayers, regardless o f their share of the impact.
Change is needed, and it is needed now. However, to embark upon any fisheries 
management plan without considering the nonmonetary benefits and community values derived
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from the fishery is to meet with failure from the onset. Unless a management strategy meshes, 
however tenuously, with these influencing factors, the watermen will not buy in to it. The oyster 
fishery is a traditional industry facing pressing challenges in a modem world. Whether it is up to 
the challenge may depend on if attitudes and sociopolitical influences can change, or whether 
barriers to innovation and entrepreneurialship remain.
Privatization is a Strategy Struggling for Acceptance in Maryland
1. What social influences have hindered the acceptance of private cultivation o f oysters 
in Maryland?
More than a century’s accumulation of scientific insights, commission recommendations, 
and general popular support o f private oyster culture has been ignored to a great extent in favor 
of political sensitivity to an influential, vocal minority. In the Chesapeake Bay the oyster fishery 
takes two forms, the public fishery that harvests from the natural bars and the private fishery that 
farms Bay bottom that is leased from the state. The difference is as much philosophical as it is 
economic. The watermen, and those who seek to preserve the image their lifestyle invokes, 
argue that the Chesapeake Bay provides the last place where someone can earn a living from 
nature's bounty', and that the watermen represent a spirit o f  American individualism.
This has proven to be a powerful argument, powerful enough to act as a barrier in the 
legislature to incentives for Maryland oyster farming. Dire predictions about the future o f the 
fishery have not persuaded fisheries’ managers or watermen to take a different course. Despite 
age-old and unsupportabie arguments to the contrary, any new technologies or management 
strategies that could benefit a private oyster fishery would also benefit the public fishery.
Also o f  important consideration is how the livelihoods o f smail-boat fishers, such as the 
Chesapeake watermen, are rooted in the community. Generally, the mind set and dynamics o f
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fisheries management policies give little recognition to the fact that for many people in these 
community settings, fishing and Bay resources are as much expressions o f social and political 
relationships as they are about economics and property (Davis & Bailey, 1996). The resistance 
to leasing is often expressed as concern about its meaning for community and family life, of 
fisheries management policies that might provide income advantages for a select few while 
excluding most from a share o f the benefits. The nature o f the conflict between watermen, 
scientists, and fisheries managers over leasing reflects the differing understanding of property 
rights.
However, the fairness and equity rhetoric can frequently be used to mask pursuit of self- 
interest and protection o f a power base, particularly in local community settings, where status 
and favoritism are embedded. Leasing in Maryland, and particularly the notion o f leasing to 
corporations, is perceived as a threat to the existing power structure among the watermen.
Leasing o f potentially productive ground means that there will be others excluded from the use 
of it (Davis & Bailey, 1996). Yet, the excluded watermen's view of fairness may express little 
more than a desire to be allowed entry to reap the benefits, rather than some commitment to a 
notion o f broadened social equity.
Without appearing to present too cynical a  view, one needs to be reminded that 
traditions, as in cultural practices, are rarely benign, and are frequently conjured up in the 
employ o f present-time social and economic special interests. Certainly, the social and economic 
relations o f exploitative appropriation both within fishing communities as well as between 
fishing communities are as amenable to being interpreted as traditional as are resource 
boundaries (private versus public oyster grounds), and use (gear, season) practices (Davis & 
Bailey, 1996).
In 1916, Green, Revell, and Maltbie presented a sociopolitical analysis o f  the watermen's
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of the beliefs o f the watermen shaped the legislation that was enacted:
a. Natural oyster beds belong to the people o f  Maryland and that harvesting from these 
beds is a privilege to be reserved for Maryland citizens only. It was and still is a common 
attitude among the watermen that the oyster fishery is an ancient privilege that cannot be taken 
away under common law rights and that the public has an unrestricted right to the fishery 
(Leffler. 1987a).
b. There is a fear that there would be a monopoly by some corporate entity o f the leased 
grounds. Watermen value their status as independent self-sufficient workers. At the heart o f  the 
opposition to leasing is the fear o f not only losing access to the oyster grounds but o f  losing 
independence, and of becoming hired hands for large corporations (Leffler. 1987a). Though the 
Haman Oy ster Act and its prohibition to leasing oyster bottom to corporations are still in effect 
today, the majority of watermen do not believe that industry can effectively be kept out. and that 
if leasing is allowed at all. it opens the door for a potential take-over. Local communities oppose 
the leasing o f bottom for oyster farming because they also believe that large numbers o f jobs 
would be lost (MacKenzie, 1989). However, proponents o f leasing see it a different way. Rather 
than limiting one's independence, a leaseholder is better able to control one s survival in the 
industry, harvest when one wants, hold oysters until the market prices go up. and so forth. In 
addition, rather than depending entirely on Mother Nature to take care o f things, one can try to 
create optimal growing conditions by choosing where and when to seed, minimizing siltation. 
and choosing when to harvest.
c. Most watermen erroneously rejected the idea that oysters could be grown on anything 
but natural oyster beds. Thus, any leasing strategy would have to include natural oyster beds, 
thereby restricting where the watermen could harvest. This notion has repeatedly been proven
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
128
wrong all over the United States’ coast. Much o f the successful oyster culture that is being done 
today in Washington and the Gulf states is done on artificial oyster reefs, in areas where oysters 
never existed before. In other words, the watermen rejected the state's definition of barren 
bottom erroneously believing that it would have to include natural bottom to grow any oysters at 
all (Leffler. 1987a). Indeed, recent experimentation with artificial reef materials in the 
Chesapeake shows great promise as a future oyster habitat. A clear advantage is that the 
artificial reefs keep the growing oysters off the silt-laden bottom.
2. How have past and present oyster fishery regulations encouraged or discouraged 
private cultivation o f oysters in Maryland?
The continuing distrust o f the government by the watermen suggests that they were, and 
still are, concerned that privatization would redistribute their perceived natural rights to 
employment and income in the fishery to a wealthy class o f planters. The prevailing attitude 
amongst the watermen is that an open-access type o f  fishery is an entitlement, if not a right 
defined by law.
Maryland is the only major oyster producing state in the United States in which private 
cultivation plays such a  minor role in production. The Maryland legislature has provided few, if 
any, incentives to potential leaseholders to make such a large economic and time investment into 
aquaculture. In addition there is no established means in Maryland for financing or providing 
financial assistance for such potentially risky operations, especially with the hovering specter of 
oyster diseases. Corporations might have the financial stability to undertake oyster farming, as 
they have done in New England, and on the West and G ulf Coasts, but century-old restrictions 
prevent the DNR from leasing grounds to businesses and limit the number o f  acres each 
individual can lease.
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Watermen have continued to bring pressure on their state representatives in the Maryland 
General Assembly to protect them from any legislation that encourages leasing. The tidewater 
counties, those bordering the Bay or its tributaries, have enjoyed excessive representation, for 
their numbers, in the general assembly, with legislators being very sensitive to the watermen's 
demands. Such sensitivity persists today even though the watermen and their sympathizers 
remain a numerical minority but a political majority (Alford, 1973; Kennedy & Breisch, 1983).
In short, the legislature ignored, and still ignores, scientific studies and the recommendations of 
the Oyster Commission, now the Tidewater Administration. The legislature's caving into the 
demands o f the watermen, who have endeared themselves to the public for their traditional way 
of life, has contributed to the decline of the oyster industry in Maryland (Powers, 1970).
Long years o f opposition to oyster fanning has hampered development o f hatcheries and 
seed areas, and seed still remains scarce for both public and private grounds. This shortage has 
proven especially troublesome for oyster farmers since seed oysters raised on public grounds 
cannot be sold to private planters until a determined amount o f bushels o f seed has been moved 
to public beds, to be made available to the public fishery, as part o f the repletion program.
Unlike Virginia, Maryland restricts the size o f leaseholds and only recently permitted the sale o f 
seed from Maryland to growers at a lower cost than the seed previously purchased from Virginia. 
Until this recent change, it was very unprofitable for private growers to attempt to plant and raise 
oysters on leased grounds in Maryland.
The sporadic and underfunded efforts at rehabilitation o f the oyster fishery have been o f 
minimal value because o f the sociopolitical resistance by watermen and legislators. The 
historically smail amount o f leased acreage compared to public acreage in Maryland is ironic 
because, as noted before, Maryland was one of the first states to recognize private cultivation o f 
oysters with the One Acre Act in 1830. To opponents o f oyster farming the poor showing of
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private planting shows how oyster farming in the Chesapeake Bay has failed. To proponents of 
oyster fanning, the poor showing is an indication o f how legislation has successfully hamstrung a 
viable industry in Maryland. One consequence of this conflict is that the start-up costs for a 
would-be oyster fanner today are considerably greater than if an oyster farming industry had 
been cultivating grounds over the last century (Leffler, 1987a). The incredible political influence 
o f the watermen and their sympathizers has prevented any legislation that provides sufficient 
incentives for a major increase in oyster farming.
Though private leasing o f banen ground was provided for in the Haman Act of 1906. this 
law also included many provisions that inhibited private cultivation. Most o f  these restrictive 
provisions are still in place today and the lack of adequate enforcement against poaching 
exacerbates the situation. Perhaps the greatest disincentive to private planting is the clause that 
permits legal challenges to the lease. It in effect makes all leases applied for subject to challenge 
and dismissal, or refusal.
Even though oyster farming is encouraged in Virginia, ever since disease infected the 
oyster population in the 1960s. farming has declined. Few people want to risk investing money 
in oyster farming because o f  the high disease incidence. Instead, Virginia's oyster growers have 
been aggressively pursuing the notion o f introducing the Japanese oyster, which appears to be 
more disease resistant than the Eastern oyster (Abrahms, 1992; LeGrand, 1997). However, 
introduction o f  nonendemic species, anywhere, is fraught with problems o f  its own and that issue 
is still under debate.
Despite over a  100 years o f recommendations by fishery biologists and economists to 
privatize all the oyster grounds, watermen, legislators, and the general public have not accepted 
their advice. Instead, in the past 3 decades, both Maryland and Virginia have developed new 
initiatives to increase oyster production on the public grounds (personal communication, Gary
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Smith, DNR, Oxford, MD, October 29, 1996; personal communication, Louis Wright. DNR. 
Mattapeake. MD, August 27, 1996; personal communication. William Hargis, Virginia Institute 
o f Marine Science, Gloucester Point, VA, March 1995). During the 1970s. Maryland invested 
large sums o f  money in the development o f seed oyster beds and the transplant o f  that seed to 
areas where the seed oysters would grow to market size, all within the boundaries o f  the public 
grounds. This practice continues today at great expense to the Maryland taxpayers, averaging 
greater than $1 million a year. In Virginia in the mid-1980s, seed transplanting between public 
grounds was increased. Changes in the cull size at this time permitted harvest o f  small oysters 
from public grounds in the James River (Applied Marine Science, 1988). These decisions 
reduced seed availability in Virginia and raised the cost o f seed for Virginia’s private planters, in 
the long-run interest o f  promoting public grounds production.
In both Virginia and Maryland, increasingly tighter state budgets have cut the amount of 
money spent on repletion programs on public beds. Most o f the Maryland harvest is coming 
from grounds that have been planted by the state and Maryland’s oyster fishery has become what 
many call a put-and-take industry; the state puts, and the watermen take. Harvests in 1987 from 
the entirely privately controlled oyster fisheries in Oregon and Washington states surpassed the 
total harvest (private and public combined) in the Chesapeake Bay for the first time ever. While 
West Coast harvests continue to exceed the Bay’s harvest, attitudes toward leasing in the Bay are 
not expected to change soon. The Chesapeake Bay has lost its supremacy as the premier oyster 
producing region o f the nation and now, even the survival o f the oyster fishery is at stake.
Policy for management o f the Chesapeake Bay oyster grounds has been determined by 
the Maryland Legislature, which faced two seemingly conflicting goals. One objective was to 
maintain wide access to the Bay’s natural productivity in order to preserve income-earning 
opportunities for residents o f  tidewater communities. The other objective was to increase
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production.
3. How has the economic burden of private cultivation deterred increased cultivation of 
oysters, or are other factors at work?
The combination o f disease and the rising cost o f seed have radically reduced the 
potential profitability o f private leasing, in addition to the already unfavorable regulations and 
lack o f  enforcement against poaching (Bosch & Shabman, 1990a, 1990b). As Maryland looks 
ahead to revitalizing its oyster fishery, the calls for privatization o f the common grounds are 
being made again (Leffler, 1987a). However, the track record of the oyster fishery suggests that 
any change in property rights will not be toward increased privatization. The failure to 
completely privatize the grounds in the past, as New England and the West Coast have done, was 
not because the transactions costs o f  doing so were too great, but rather because of the desire to 
preserve the traditional concept o f the commons and the cultural values that would be lost with 
privatization.
Any changes in the future will likely be toward changing the rules of management and 
harvest for the public grounds. If oyster production is to be increased in the Chesapeake Bay. the 
cooperation and consent o f the watermen are needed for any policy to be successfully 
implemented. For the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery this means designing strategies and 
policies for improving placement o f  shell, increasing seed production, regulating gear on the 
public grounds, establishing quota and season limits, and minimizing damage from disease 
(Bosch & Shabman, 1990a, 1990b; Shabman & Thunberg, 1988). All of these can be done 
within the context o f a mixed fishery (private and public), or a public, limited-access fishery.
The efficiency o f a private property rights structure over property rights o f the commons 
has been the central focus o f  natural resource economics since Gordon's article (1954) on the
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economic theory o f a common property resource. It was later popularized by Hardin (1968) 
when he called property rights o f the commons the tragedy o f the commons. Gordon used a 
fishery as an example o f a common property resource that would be more efficiently managed if 
privatized. In his model, a common property rights structure attracts labor and capital, which 
could earn a greater return in private enterprise elsewhere in the economy and in the dissipation 
o f resource investment costs. Conversely, according to Gordon’s model, when private property 
resource investment costs are maximized, labor and capital are released to earn equal, or greater 
returns in alternative employment. In his analysis, Gordon used only two categories o f  property 
rights: private property and common property. This two-part classification, and the resulting 
conclusion about the efficiency o f  the alternative rights structures over common property has 
been widely adopted in the economics literature (Agnello & Donnelley, 1975. 1984; Bell. 1972; 
Christy, 1964; DeMeza & Gould, 1987; Scott, 1955. 1979).
Over time, the central theme o f this economic literature has become prescriptive. 
Economists advocate the social superiority o f private property rights arrangements and support 
state action to privatize fishery and other natural resources. The Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery 
has frequently been used to illustrate the validity of Gordon’s (1954) model since the oyster 
grounds are divided into public grounds and private grounds, and the fishery lends itself to this 
type o f comparison.
However, more recently, economic assessments o f  common property rights systems are 
being accompanied by new insights that are leading to a reexamination o f conventional economic 
theory and policy prescriptions (Feeney, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990; Pinkerton. 1989: 
Quiggin, 1988; Santopietro & Shabman, 1992b). One o f the reasons for arguing that a type of 
commons management strategy may be more efficient is the notion o f nonmonetary returns 
(Swaney, 1990). In the fisheries literature, there is a growing recognition that specific.
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individual returns are realized from common property ownership. Some of these returns by their 
very nature, exist only when the resource is a commons and would be lost with privatization of 
the resource (Apostle, Kasdan, & Hanson, 1985; Pollnac & Poggie, 1975; Smith. 1981). such as 
the loss o f traditional values derived from a community structure that would be disrupted w ith 
abandonment o f a commons fishery, should be included as a cost o f  privatization.
The oyster fishery o f the Chesapeake Bay provides an excellent situation within which to 
reexamine the conventional fisheries economics theories and policy prescriptions that emphasize 
the economic superiority of private property' rights. This is particularly useful since property 
rights, or use rights, determine the methods and extent of resource exploitation that is permissible 
by those with access.
Although the development o f the private oyster farming industry on a large scale has 
been known for over 100 years throughout the world, seed oysters for planting have been raised 
artificially upon a small scale in Italy for more than 1,000 years by a very simple method. Pliny. 
The Elder. wrote (as cited in Brooks, 1891) that the artificial breeding o f  oysters was first 
undertaken by a Roman knight, Sergius Orata, in the salty waters of Lake Avemus, and that 
enterprise was so successful that Orata became very wealthy (Gaius Plinius Secundus lived 23-79 
c e ). Orata would pile up stones on the bottom o f  the lake, high enough to keep the oysters off of 
the lake's mud bottom. Upon these rocks oysters taken from the sea were placed to provide spat 
for future harvests and the breeding oysters themselves were not harvested. Each pile of rocks 
was surrounded by a circle o f stakes that were connected to each other by a cord. From the cord 
a small bundle o f twigs was suspended so that it hung in the water near the bottom. During 
spawning season, the swimming veligers attached themselves to the twigs and grew very rapidly. 
As the oysters grew to a  suitable size for market, they were removed from the twigs and the 
smaller oysters were left to continue to grow. Variations on Orata's technique, some with more
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or less success, are used today throughout the world.
A new pioneering project, only a few years old, run by the Virginia Institute of Marine 
Science (VIMS) in Gloucester Point, Virginia, is based on the hypothesis that oysters might grow 
better farther up the water column instead of on the sediment-laden bottom (Williams. 1997). It 
was first tested by VIMS over a 10-year period during which the scientists and volunteer 
watermen discovered that if the oysters were grown off the bottom in trays, they would not 
expend as much energy ridding themselves o f  bottom sediments, and they would be in a part of 
the water column that has higher concentrations of phytoplankton and dissolved oxygen. This is 
a modem day version o f the Roman knight Orata's oyster farming technique. If the oysters grew 
faster under these conditions, they might reach the legal harvest size (3 inches) in less than the 2- 
3 years in which Dermo and MSX usually kill them. Now. small-scale Virginia oyster farmers 
can purchase certified disease-free (not necessarily disease resistant, not genetically- 
manipulated) seed oysters from the VIMS hatchery and grow them suspended in trays or mesh 
bags. The rapid growth rate o f the suspended oysters does not appear to have affected their 
flavor (for which Chesapeake Bay oysters are famous) but, it has produced thin shells so 
shuckers and packers need to take extra care with the oysters. It will take a while before this 
project, if it continues to be successful, reaches commercial scale or there are enough oy sters to 
make a noticeable difference in the Bay’s water quality. It does, however, show promise and 
whether it becomes a cost effective endeavor for the growers only time will tell.
For many years fish hatcheries in general have served two purposes, as a  selective 
breeding ground for only those characteristics that are desirable, and as a restocking tool to 
bolster sagging or declining populations of fish. The earliest known, federally built hatchery was 
in Bucksport, Maine, built in 1871 in an effort to replenish declining stocks o f Atlantic salmon 
(Kenworthy, 1996). Though many hatcheries originally were started to provide stocks for
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recreational fishers, they have now, out o f necessity, become scientific laboratories for 
commercial fisheries to deal with the ever increasing specter of disease running through fin and 
shellfish populations. The state funded oyster hatcheries in Maryland have attempted to find a 
cure for MSX and Dermo by not only exploring their mechanism o f  action but trying to breed 
disease resistant oysters. The oyster hatchery program has a long way to go before disease 
resistance can, if ever, be truly established and enough oysters are raised to be o f commercial 
note. The repletion program is in itself, a version o f a restocking program not unlike those 
carried out with finfish, only the oyster stocks are not hatchery reared.
Though the Maryland state budget once relied heavily on the taxes and secondary 
industries (restaurants, shuckers, packers, shippers) that oyster fishing brought to the state, now 
the state pays far more into the fishery than is returned. Even with unlimited funding for 
research, the creation o f a genetically-manipulated miracle oyster that is disease resistant, salinity 
adaptable, pollution tolerant, and fast growing will not solve the problems created by 
mismanagement, misguided actions, and greed i f  fisheries management strategies are not 
changed.
In addition to the tremendous costs incurred by hatchery rearing and restocking 
programs, a growing number o f fisheries biologists and conservationists are lobbying nationwide 
to reduce the country's reliance on state and federally funded programs, saying that they do more 
harm than good, both socially and biologically (Kenworthy, 1996). Excessive reliance on 
hatchery rearing and restocking programs, sometimes referred to by conservationists as 
mitigation narcosis, many researchers have found, often leads to a loss o f genetic diversity and 
the spread o f disease. Ultimately, they say, it can cause an overall reduction in fish populations 
as hatchery-raised stocks initially out-compete wild populations but later succumb to other 
conditions that the hardier wild stocks were better able to adapt to because they have not had a
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coddled upbringing in ideal hatchery conditions. As the evidence piles up. fisheries managers 
are tom between science and politics, most notably the demands o f their fishing constituencies. 
Unfortunately, as state and federal fisheries managers all over the country have found out. once a 
fishery becomes dependent on hatchery rearing and restocking programs, it is difficult to 
terminate them. A major shift is needed from producing fin and shellfish for harvest toward 
protecting fish habitats and declining species.
The historical objectives o f policy makers in Ma’y 'end  ?.-.d V i r g i n i a  have been to both 
maintain wide access to oyster grounds in order to preserve the traditional distribution o f income 
from this source, but also to increase production. The current mix o f private and public, state- 
managed grounds was established around the turn o f the century in order to promote these 
objectives. This mix is the result o f a political consensus that both protected rights of access for 
the watermen by reserving the natural grounds as a commons, and at the same time granted 
exclusive rights to those willing to invest in private cultivation. The initial success o f Virginia’s 
private planters in increasing production led biologists and economists to argue that complete 
privatization in both Maryland and Virginia is the best course o f action for increasing oyster 
harvests from the Bay. Recently, however, disease outbreaks more serious than in the past have 
devastated the Virginia oyster grounds, both private and public. Calls for complete privatization 
as a  management strategy have consequently waned because this recent rise in disease incidence 
has discouraged, and will contnue to impede, any investment in private planting.
Complete or substantial privatization of the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery, at this point, 
would likely favor those with the capital to invest in leasing, cultch, and seeding. The private 
property rights structure o f the successful, commercially viable oyster fisheries o f the West 
Coast, Gulf Coast, and New England have evolved over a great many years in areas where little 
or no oyster fishery existed before, or where the public fishery collapsed early on. They were not
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encumbered by over 100 years o f tradition and fishing on the commons. Community structures 
and values have evolved over many years around the Chesapeake Bay because of the existence o f 
the commons. Drastic legislative changes would be needed to allow for. and provide incentives 
for, leasing including relaxing the ban on corporate leasing and leasing o f natural ground, as well 
as providing protection from poaching and providing adequate seed supplies at an affordable 
price. Even if such legislative changes were made, as long as the specter o f disease looms over 
the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery it is unlikely that many will be willing to invest their money 
and efforts into farming oysters. Overfishing, habitat destruction, and pollution are contributing 
factors in the disease susceptibility o f  the Bay oysters and until those problems are dealt with in a 
comprehensive fishery management plan, it is likely that MSX and Dermo will plague the Bay's 
oyster populations for many years to come.
4. How do nonmonetary, intangible benefits provide watermen with sufficient 
compensation for the monetary loss incurred by working in the oyster fishery?
The value watermen place on their jobs and on their quality of life is not taken into 
account as an opportunity cost if. as NRE economists define it, the more efficient system of 
private property rights is adopted because quality o f  life is a subjective matter. One component 
of this value is the satisfaction the watermen obtain as self-employed fishers. Owning one's own 
boat and gear gives a waterman a sense o f independence not readily available in other areas of 
employment (manufacturing, construction), or in working for an oyster farmer. Working out of 
doors, close to nature, taking risks, and following family and community traditions have all been 
found to be important in providing job satisfaction to the Bay watermen. The value o f 
nonmonetary, intangible benefits, called worker satisfaction bonus (WSB) by Pollnac and Poggie 
(1988), depends upon the preferences and attitudes o f the individual watermen. With other
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sources o f employment potentially providing higher income and job stability, the value o f  the 
WSB is clearly very high for many o f  the watermen, especially the long-time watermen. Despite 
the declining harvest, the WSB apparently sufficiently compensates them for the monetary loss 
incurred by working in the oyster fishery.
A potential opportunity cost that could be displaced from the fishery by privatization 
would be the quality o f life enjoyed by the watermen and their families who live in small, 
distinctive communities along the many inlets and tributaries o f the Chesapeake Bay. The 
fishing communities are characterized by tightly-knit, extended-kinship interactions because of 
the limited in-migration o f new people during the last 2 centuries. The traditional use o f small 
boats and the generally greater abundance o f oysters in shallow coastal waters usually allow 
watermen to work close to home, and at the same time secure a living that supports their families 
and the community structure. Most watermen have lived in their communities for more than 20 
years, and this attachment to the local community is a strong motivation for maintaining access 
to the public grounds for a large number o f people. This commitment is further intensified by the 
fact that there are few alternative employment opportunities in these local, rural communities.
The watermen have historically believed that individuals and corporations wealthier than 
themselves would acquire most o f the property rights if  the commons were abandoned to 
privatization. The current property rights structure, in which only barren grounds are available 
for lease, keeps the private and public fishery distinctly separate, and has for over 100 years. If. 
as the watermen fear, the public grounds were made available for lease, the watermen might be 
left with the alternative o f  either working as wage laborers for the oyster farmers or leaving the 
fishery. Thus, they continue to oppose any moves toward increased or complete privatization o f 
the fishery, where the gains flow elsewhere in the economy (owner o f the lease) rather than back 
to those currently sharing in the commons. More importantly, the watermen continue to oppose
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privatization because o f their interest in maintaining the benefits that the commons support, such 
as WSB and preservation o f  the community structure.
The oyster fishery management system of the Chesapeake Bay has been described by 
economists as legislated inefficiency. The justification for this belief is based on both theory and 
empirical investigation. However, both the theory and the empirical work suffer analytically 
because they are based on the assumption that the public grounds are an open access resource, 
when in fact they are a limited-access resource and are heavily regulated, with restrictions that 
limit both access and use, and they are actively managed by state agencies. The conclusion that 
private oyster grounds are more efficient in the neoclassical sense than the public grounds misses 
the fact that the rights structure is part o f  the political consensus on managing the fishery. The 
oyster grounds are neither fully privatized nor open to all fishers without restriction and more 
than resource investment costs are at stake. The mix o f private and state-managed public oyster 
grounds reflects a public policy of trying to maintain a certain distribution of income from the 
fishery while also increasing harvest levels. Unfortunately, the existing rights system has been 
decidedly ineffective on production. Under the existing common property rights structure and 
continuing decline in the oyster population, financial and even nonmonetary losses are increasing 
for the watermen.
The various measures o f  job satisfaction are complexly related to other sociocultural 
variables such as age, years o f fishing experience, type o f fishing, ethnicity, and home port or 
community. The changes brought about by fisheries management can take many forms ranging 
from minor alterations in the harvesting techniques used to drastic shifts in style, or possible 
displacement o f individuals from the industry due to limited entry plans. These changes, no 
matter how minor, have the potential o f affecting the structure o f a person’s work, an aspect of 
life that has been shown to play an extraordinarily important psychological, social, and economic
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
141
role in the well-being o f the individual in American culture (Gatewood & McCay, 1990).
The fisheries manager’s interest in determining how social and cultural characteristics of 
people relate to their satisfaction with, and performance in, changing occupational roles can be 
useful in developing an understanding o f some o f the potential sociocultural impacts o f  specific 
management strategies as applied to a commercial fishery. Therefore, it is prudent to address the 
structure o f  job satisfaction in the Chesapeake oyster fishery by using existing theory to propose 
practical solutions to the problem of developing fisheries management strategies that minimize 
negative social consequences while conserving oyster stocks and economic viability.
Resource management, in the biological sense, involves the management o f ecosystems 
and natural areas in an effort to maintain biodiversity and to protect species. However, 
incorporation of cultural, social, and historical issues in natural resource management also 
obligates resource managers to reevaluate resources, and accept culture as a viable input within 
the realm o f  interpretation and protection. Resource managers must understand cultural 
differences and dominant patterns o f resource allocation as they affect, and are interpreted by, 
other cultural groups. People’s views and interpretations o f  their surrounding environment are 
affected by cultural norms. There are regional differences interwoven with these cultural 
differences between the fishers o f different types o f  fish, or shellfish. For example, oyster fishers 
in the Gulf Coast fisheries (Galveston Bay) are culturally different from the watermen o f the 
Chesapeake Bay, which are culturally different from the New England oyster fishers (Wang, 
Anderson & Jakes, 1996).
There are two factors that need to be included in fisheries management models that are 
normally missing: (a) fishing is an enjoyable activity with intangible rewards in addition to 
revenues, and (b) one’s perception o f the costs involved in an enjoyable activity tend to 
underestimate real costs. Therefore, the level o f  fishing effort at which the greatest profits are
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obtained is not necessarily the point at which the greatest overall rewards are to be had. The 
inclusion o f a satisfaction bonus (positive nonmonetary rewards derived from the activity of 
fishing) in a fisheries management strategy would likely indicate that a management objective of 
OY would allow somewhat greater fishing effort than one based on MEY. One must caution that 
management for OY may yield slightly lower profits and may exact a greater toll on the oyster 
stocks, thereby compromising the long-term sustainability o f  the fisheries.
Regardless o f whether fisheries managers are using purely economic models or are using 
socioeconomic models, both types o f  models agree that unless the oyster fishery is regulated in 
some manner, if competition for the common-property resource persists without some controls, 
the fishery will be exploited to unsustainable and therefore socially suboptimal levels. Since 
fishing has considerable nonmonetary rewards, fishers do not stop fishing when the purely 
economic models of fisher’s motivations predict they should. In some cases, they even subsidize 
their fishing with other income. For any fisheries management plan to work, fishers’ satisfaction 
bonus must be taken into account, and management targets and tactics adjusted accordingly.
In the Chesapeake Bay fishing communities, fishing is not just a job, it is a lifestyle, a 
history, a culture, passed from one generation to another. Hence, any attempts to initiate change 
that is perceived as a threat to tradition will be met with highly charged emotional debate, 
political jockeying, and resistance tactics. Instead o f action, those who are trying to implement 
change will be met with a barrage o f rhetoric, endless emotional posturing, plays for sympathy, 
questions, and non-verbal behavior that diverts attention away from the real goal o f producing 
needed change.
5. How can a  single property rights management scheme be suitable for all oyster 
fisheries?
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There is evidence to suggest that the tragedy o f the commons is neither universal nor 
inevitable. In small-scale fisheries such as those in Lofoton, Newfoundland, the Mississippi 
River, and Maine, local fishers manage communal fishing grounds, usually without much 
government interference, and they are successful in preventing overfishing. For the most part, 
these arrangements are community-based, spontaneously developed, and informally organized. 
Though they may carry a common thread o f  community-based management, these fisheries are 
very different from each other, in culture and management strategies. The very existence of 
these fisheries challenges the notion that fishers are necessarily locked into a self-destructive 
pattern o f competition that invariably leads to severe depletion o f the resource. Their existence 
illustrates the fact that a fishery o f  the commons can be self-regulated. This community-based 
approach is designed to be responsive to the diversity o f factors that exist among fishers and 
fishing communities, and the long-term survival o f the community and the fishery. To develop 
more place-based, effective fisheries management strategies, it is necessary for fisheries 
managers to change their basic assumptions regarding the environment o f small-scale fishers. 
Managers must understand the diversity in the social and economic structure o f the communities 
in which production and marketing take place, and the extent o f the resource base. In other 
words, fisheries management strategies can be tailored to the community and the fishery, which 
are in fact, intertwined. It combines the goals o f  fisheries management and rural community life 
to find solutions to both specific problems faced by fishers and the underlying causes o f the 
problems.
Though oyster farming has long been successful in the Pacific, Gulf, and New England 
states, cultural and financial barriers impede its introduction and success in the Bay. It is 
important to point out that the oyster fishery o f  adjacent Delaware Bay is a mixed (private and 
public) fishery plagued by the same diseases, weather, and pollution problems as the Chesapeake
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Bay. However, there have been far fewer barriers to leasing than in Maryland, the oyster fishers 
do not rely solely on the Delaware Bay for their livelihood, and there is no equivalent o f  a 
repletion program or any other subsidy. Left mostly to their own devices, the Delaware Bay 
oyster fishers have found other means o f income and, therefore, put less pressure on the oyster 
stocks.
In the context o f formulating regulatory policies for each unique fishery, consideration 
must be given not only to how to achieve conservation and economic goals, but also the specific 
nonmonetary rewards o f fishing as these vary among different fisheries and regions. Because the 
total configuration o f incentives and rewards is fishery- and region-specific, it is both naive and 
misguided to think that there is a single, best way to regulate fishing effort, for there is no 
regulatory strategy that applies equally well to all fisheries in all regions.
Recommendations
Avoiding the Tragedy
All up and down the East Coast, from the Maritime provinces to the Gulf coast, severe 
overfishing is leading to the economic and environmental ruin o f most o f the fisheries. As one 
species is fished out, the fishers concentrate their efforts on other species. In spite o f years of 
governmental restrictions on gear, catch, and seasons, fishers are continuing to exploit the once 
productive resource that their livelihoods depend on.
In his ground-breaking and influential article, Garrett Hardin (1968) explained why a 
natural resource open to all is subject to over exploitation. He used as an example a pasture open 
to all herdsmen for cattle grazing, in other words, a commons. Hardin pointed out that eventually 
the pasture will become overgrazed. The reason is that each herdsman can capture all the 
benefits o f adding more cows, while facing only a  fraction o f costs, such as the harm caused by
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excessive grazing, since all users share the costs regardless o f  their portion o f the impact o f 
overgrazing on the pasture. The tragedy, noted Hardin, is that each individual is locked into a 
system o f  competition for grass, which leads to ruin.
A similar tragedy occurs when a fishing territory is open to all fishers. Each fisher 
captures all the benefits o f harvesting for fish, while facing only a small part o f  the costs, such as 
destruction o f habitat and the reduction o f the fish population for future harvest. Such was the 
case in the Maryland oyster fishery in the late 1800s, which prompted William Brooks (1891) to 
write:
The citizens o f  Maryland do not desire to deprive any one o f the right to earn his living, 
but our own interest requires that oystering upon the public beds shall be prohibited 
unless the oystermen can convince us that they can be intrusted with this right, without 
placing our common property or the property o f  any citizen in peril. The question which 
we should ask them, which they are bound injustice tc ask themselves, is whether they 
are able to give this assurance to the people o f the State. They cannot satisfy the 
community by calling for more laws to keep them within bounds, or by asking for an 
armed police force to prevent them from destroying their own interests.
They must satisfy the people that they themselves have enough public spirit to 
organize themselves for their own government and regulation, and that they have enough 
self-restraint and forethought and intelligent self-interest to provide for the protection 
and improvement o f the property which is entrusted to them. (p. 213)
If  William Brooks could step forward in time, he would find that his words hit the mark 
as accurately today as they did over 100 years ago. Clearly, it is the lack o f being held 
responsible for the success o f the fishery that perpetuates the continued overharvesting and 
destruction o f M aryland’s oyster fishery. In other words, as long as the government takes 
responsibility for the success o f the fishery while the watermen are not held responsible for 
preserving the stocks and habitat, the watermen will continue to exploit the fishery.
Partnerships Instead o f  Us Versus Them
In order to ensure sustainable harvests o f  oysters and avoid the previously discussed
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
146
tragedy of the commons, sound, enforceable management practices are needed. Generally, it has 
been assumed that fisheries management is entirely a government responsibility. Various 
management strategies have been used, including licensing systems, harvest quotas, and other 
control measures (Jentoft, 1989). However, information from both state and federal regulators 
shows that very often these management strategies have met with mixed success. In fact, 
fisheries management has less to do with understanding fish than with understanding and 
working with people (Dyer & McGoodwin, 1994).
Govemment-fisher interaction can take many forms. The degree o f fisher involvement 
and the locus o f decision-making power may differ from one fishery to the next and from one 
state to the next. Correspondingly, the organizational set up may vary. The two extremes are 
government power and fisher power (McCav, 1995). Fisheries management systems generally 
fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Two general alternatives are available for the 
institutional design of user involvement; consultative management and cooperative management. 
The characteristics of both have been discussed and compared (Chapter 2, Literature Review). 
Cooperative management, or co-management is closer to the fisher-power end o f the scale, and 
has some promise in giving people in the fishing industry and in fishery-dependent communities, 
a greater say and responsibility in fisheries management. Cooperative arrangements may be 
delegated from central government to local-level institutions or result from a legal recognition of 
traditional, community-based management (Jentoft & McCay, 1995; McCay & Jentoft, 1996). 
The basic principle of cooperative management is self-governance but within a legal framework 
established by government, and the power is shared between the fishers and government.
The role o f  science in fisheries management is central but problematic for several
reasons;
1. Natural resource management is based on the notion that it should be first and
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foremost informed by science and that this best serves both public and user group interests.
2. Advocates of scientific guardianship in fisheries management do not take into 
consideration that learning is an important by-product o f  participatory democracy (McCay & 
Jentoft, 1996).
3. Neither do they recognize that user participation is a contributor to greater legitimacy 
of the regulatory system, which in turn promotes higher compliance.
By involving fishers more directly in the decision-making process and by bringing the 
management process closer to the fishers who are affected, their willingness to come to 
agreement and comply with the rules and regulations is enhanced.
In some countries, the efficacy o f cooperative management systems as a management 
tool have been successful by delegating management responsibility to fishers’ organizations. In 
these cases, fishers’ organizations take an active part in designing, implementing and enforcing 
fisheries regulations.
In fisheries management, governments usually choose between two general options: 
indirect regulation and direct regulation. Indirect regulations try to control the total harvesting 
effort by regulating the number o f participant fishers, the size o f their boats, and/or the number 
and type o f the fishing gear. Territorial and seasonal regulations, which restrict fishers' access to 
fishing grounds at certain periods o f time also belong to this category. While indirect regulations 
try to control the inputs o f person power and/or capital, direct regulations seek to limit output. 
Fixing a level for a total allowable catch (TAC) is one way. Dividing the TAC into individual 
quotas (per fisher or per boat) is another (Jentoft, 1989). When considering alternative 
management strategies for Mary’land’s oyster fishery, one must weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages to various strategies and the cultural compatibility o f  the strategies to Maryland’s 
tidewater communities.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
148
Experiences with indirect regulations are primarily negative. They scarcely obtain the 
intended results and often produce unintended consequences. For instance, such regulations fail 
to cope with overcapitalization and resource depletion because they stimulate the adoption of 
more efficient technology. They can close the door to new entrants and. as a consequence, they 
establish privileges which make the fishery a rich man's club. Indirect regulations are difficult to 
administer and enforce, and they also create a very inflexible regulatory system. Once 
regulations are adopted, they are hard to change. If the government cannot enforce the 
regulations, then the management strategy has no chance o f success, for without involvement by 
the fishers themselves there is no incentive to voluntarily obey the rules (Waters. 1991). When 
fishers have a substantial involvement in the development of the regulations, it becomes to their 
advantage to enforce them and report those who violate them.
Fishers almost always have an immediate economic interest in finding ways to bypass 
regulations. The result is that the fishers have more incentive than not to circumvent the 
regulations and promote their own individual interests at the expense o f the collective interest.
In addition, enforcement o f regulations is usually poor at best.
Consensus management is possible through implementation o f a participatory decision 
making structure that demonstrates the relative attributes of various management options, or 
choices. Such an approach addresses the need to include social factors, confront uncertainty, and 
allow decisions using the best available data. Complete agreement among competing interests in 
the fishery may not be achieved, but in the process, scenarios can be developed and evaluated so 
that a decision by a mediating authority may be based on an analytical evaluation o f alternatives, 
rather than on strictly political concerns.
The fisheries management problems o f the Maryland oyster fishery center on the risks to 
both fishers’ capital and to social capital. The problem does not lie in the regulations per se.
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Better drafted, more goal-directed, mop.- objective regulations are unlikely by themselves to 
overcome the problem o f not being able to manage fish abundance. Fisheries management has 
had 100 years o f experience in writing unsuccessful regulations as proof o f the failure o f top 
down regulations. The tools o f business can be applied to what is basically a business problem, 
which means handing over to the fishing industry itself the responsibility and cost for managing 
its own risk. “It should not be a government responsibility to pay for the management o f 
profitability o f the fishing industry by managing their risk” (Gauldie, 1995, p. 2060). Every 
business has to overcome the risk inherent in cycles in abundance, and the fishing industry 
should be held responsible for managing its own risks.
The long-established biological emphasis in fisheries management has meant that the 
role that fishers play has largely been ignored. Yet people, both those who fish and those who 
are otherwise involved in the fishery, contribute directly and significantly to the fisheries systems 
themselves. Among old school fisheries managers and fisheries economists, there has been a 
tendency to give a rather static role to people, most notably in the form o f analysis that takes for 
granted the eventual destruction o f any fishery, following the tragedy of the commons theory 
formulated by Hardin (1968). According to Hardin’s model, where access to a fishery is open, it 
is not in the interest o f  any fisher to limit his or her own effort, as this will only enable others to 
harvest more. Thus, to prevent overfishing and depletion, it is argued by fisheries managers who 
subscribe to Hardin’s model, limitations on fishing effort must be imposed by government 
authority.
However, the assumptions inherent in such applications o f Hardin’s model have been 
extensively challenged by more recent research on local-level, common property institutions for 
managing resources (Berkes, 1989). During the past 2 decades, in different parts o f the world, 
the widespread existence o f local-level, common property-type systems which regulate access to.
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and use of. resources have been documented (Cordell, 1989; Ruddle & Johannes, 1990). Most 
types o f locally-controlled coastal resource management systems are o f a traditional, unwritten 
kind, based on local customary law (Ruddle, 1994). Increasingly, the question is asked whether 
such systems, which include unwritten regulations on access to fisheries areas and stocks, and 
the use o f an imaginative range o f technologies based on precise local knowledge of the behavior 
of the food species, are a practical basis for achieving sustainable utilization o f fisheries 
resources.
Introduced resource management initiatives must be closely adapted to local-level needs 
and aspirations. Stakeholders’ participation at all stages o f  formulation and implementation is a 
prerequisite o f local fisheries management. The crucial question for the success o f any fisheries 
management scheme is. What measures are needed to encourage fishers to voluntarily advance 
their collective interests at the expense o f  their private ones? In other words, what would 
motivate fishers to adhere to the regulations? A key word here is legitimacy, meaning to what 
extent do fishers willingly accept the regulations as appropriate and consistent with their values. 
In essence, legitimacy refers to the degree o f acceptance which the regulatory authorities enjoy 
among the community. If fishers find the regulatory scheme legitimate, there is more reason to 
believe that they will follow the rules. The question then becomes, how can legitimacy be 
improved?
Academia and government have long had a  strong alliance in research ventures, 
particularly in the areas o f  the environment and medicine. However, the mistrust between fishers 
and government (us-versus-them mentality) has been a major barrier to an alliance o f  the three. 
Unfortunately, the destructive practices o f  fishers, such as overfishing and habitat destruction, 
are eliminating the very industry that the government and academia are trying to preserve.
Jentoft (1989) suggests that the legitimacy of a regulatory scheme is related to at least
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four general hypotheses:
1. Content o f the regulations: the more the regulations coincide with the way fishers 
themselves define their problems, the greater will be their legitimacy.
2. Distributional effects: the more equitably the regulations are imposed, the more likely 
the legitimacy o f the regulations will be regarded.
3. Making o f the regulations: the more fishers are involved in the decision-making 
process, the more legitimate the regulatory process will be perceived.
4. Implementation o f  the regulations: the more directly involved fishers are in installing 
and enforcing regulations, the more the regulations will be accepted as legitimate.
Thus, there may be at least four ways to improve the legitimacy o f fisheries regulations 
and to increase their prospects o f success. Each requires taking the fishers' point o f view into 
closer consideration. In the first two of Jentoft's hypotheses, the content and quality o f  the 
regulations per se are the focal points. The last two hypotheses concern the organization o f the 
decision-making process.
How can the legitimacy, and hence the expediency, o f fisheries regulations be improved 
by involving fishers' organizations directly in the regulatory making process? Participation 
would in itself tend to advance legitimacy. But in addition, participation should also improve the 
quality o f the regulations. In other words, by organizing the regulatory process (hypotheses 3 
and 4), the content as well as the distributional effects of the regulations (hypotheses 1 and 2) 
should be improved.
Local Control
The existence o f locally organized informal fisheries management systems has been well 
documented by social anthropologists with an interest in fisheries and maritime communities.
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The focus o f the regulations o f the locally managed systems usually take the form o f  territorial 
use rights. Here, fishers from the community share implicit agreements on the conduct of the 
fishery within waters which they consider theirs, and which they actively protect from intruders. 
Sometimes these regulations are established for reasons o f resource protection. Very often their 
main purpose is to create order and avoid gear conflicts or to ensure fair distribution of access 
opportunities to the fishing grounds.
Cooperatives can be positive tools in fisheries management, particularly as they relate to 
small-scale fisheries. Government bureaucracies have a limited capacity to oversee the many 
local and seasonal variations within different regions and sectors o f the fishery. For regulations 
to be efficiently carried out they must be fair. This however, requires a large amount o f detailed 
knowledge o f local circumstances in the fishing industry, the community values, and 
sociopolitical structure.
Variations entailed in the nature o f  the fisheries require flexible management systems. A 
central argument for introducing localized cooperative management is that large government 
bureaucracies are less flexible than local fishers’ organizations working together with local 
government in enforcing management schemes. In other words, local or regional cooperatives 
are generally more able to react to a situation more quickly than state, or certainly national, 
governments. Decisions to change the rules o f a fishery can be reached much more quickly by 
regional cooperatives than by large government.
Delegating responsibility to local cooperatives means that the fishers become active, 
responsible individuals in the decision-making process. By definition, cooperatives rely on 
membership participation, which is reflected in the internal structure o f  the organization. 
Transferring responsibility for management functions from large state or federal government 
bureaucracies to local cooperatives introduces more democracy into the regulatory process and
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would also be a  valuable societal benefit in its own right.
Unfortunately, fisheries management and regulation in Maryland and elsewhere has 
become very process-oriented. Too much attention has been given to the steps a  fisheries 
management strategy must proceed through, rather than to solving management issues. There is 
a need for local flexibility and participation by all affected parties in fisheries management in 
order for any management strategy to be implemented successfully. The affected parties must 
feel that they have a stake in, and are empowered to participate in. the formation o f the fisheries 
management strategy. In addition, if the strategy runs counter to regional values and culture, its 
implementation is doomed for failure.
The Maryland legislature often relies on numbers, regardless o f  how uncertain they are. 
to make decisions. Unfortunately, the draconian numbers game fails to present an accurate 
picture o f the whole oyster industry and often leads resource managers, regulators, and 
politicians to reach inappropriate conclusions. High catch numbers do not necessarily translate 
into high dollars sold. Conversely, a low catch may be sold fora greater amount o f  money. 
Supporting industries such as processing plants, packers, and the restaurant business are 
economically tied to the oyster fishery. Where fisheries economists have failed has been their 
inability to put a value on habitat destruction and its impact on the fishery. Nor have the 
economists been able to adequately factor in the nonmonetary benefits to fishing. Though it is 
admittedly a daunting task with many co-dependancies woven in. the common reaction has been 
to ignore it (Lee, 1980).
Traditionally, economists have been accustomed to considering pollution and 
environmental damages as externalities, where the costs are borne by the entire community rather 
than by the activity itself. Under the current economic structure in the Chesapeake Bay, there are 
few incentives not to overharvest or destroy habitat. On the contrary, unless there is local
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participation by the affected parties to set harvest limits and conserve habitat, then satisfying 
short-term self-interests without paying the consequences for it confers a distinct competitive 
advantage on those who harvest at will with little regard to preserving the habitat and oyster 
population for a sustainable future. To treat environmental impacts as externalities and manage 
from afar can no longer be justified. Though environmental policy and fisheries management is 
of state-wide and Bay-wide interest, action should be local, particularly if people are to feel that 
they have a  stake in the outcome.
What appear to be missing from most, if  not all fisheries management strategies, has 
been an adequate line of communication between fisheries scientists, regulators, and ihe 
regulated community. The apparent barriers to effective communications appear to be due to 
cultural reasons. In Maryland, the harvests are so poor that the watermen cannot even meet the 
catch quotas that the DNR has set. So, ironically, rather than quotas being a restraining factor, 
they actually encourage the watermen to fish as hard as they can to achieve the quotas, further 
diminishing the oyster population. There is a disconnect between fisheries biologists sounding 
the alarm to halt harvesting in some areas and the legislature setting quotas that encourage 
greater harvesting effort.
If  a cooperative venture is initiated between fishers, state managers, and fisheries 
scientists, it is likely that politics will still play a heavy role. Unfortunately, politics is self- 
serving and ideologically based. Traditionally, politics deals with issues and not with 
performance. Maryland politics are based on economic interests and their political integration 
into government policies and regulations, rather than a performance-based approach that looks at 
what works for the greater good, and not special interest groups. Just as companies associated in 
a joint venture must be prepared to abandon old processes quickly, to serve the total venture 
long-term, so must fisheries managers and the legislature, no matter how traditional or great the
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The political influence of fishers in the Chesapeake Bay far outweighs their numbers and 
a disproportionate amount o f government legislation is passed or rejected in favor o f the fishers' 
demands, even if  it flies in the face o f good science and long-term sustainability. In general, 
governments find it very hard to abandon an activity, even if it has totally outlived its usefulness, 
or is even counter-productive. A private business can be liquidated, sold, or dissolved when it 
has outlived its usefulness, but a government activity can live on ad nauseam. In the United 
States, there are now Sunset laws which prescribe that government activities should lapse after a 
given time, unless they are re-enacted. However, legislatures rarely refuse to renew an activity, 
no matter how obsolete or futile it has become. Usually, by that time, it has become a vested 
interest. The repletion program is one example of this, and the continued ban on corporate 
leasing is another.
Localized Cooperative Fisheries Management in Maryland; Can it Work?
If fisheries managers recognize the roles and dynamics o f goals, objectives, and values in 
fisheries management, they can better focus limited organizational resources for more effective 
management o f fishery resources. A need for local cooperative management in the Maryland 
oyster fishery is shown by the noticeable lack o f long-term rational goals and objectives, and the 
lack o f recognition o f the effect of diverse regional value systems on the entire process.
By definition, fisheries cooperative management means that government agencies, 
fisheries biologists/researchers and fishers, through a cooperative organization, share 
responsibility for management functions. The point o f  departure for initiating cooperative 
management agreements as part o f a political process can vary from region to region. In one case 
it can mean that the government formally recognizes regulations which are already being
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enforced in an informal manner by the fishers themselves. In another, the actual regulatory 
power is transferred from the government to local fishers' organizations. This would normally 
be the situation in fisheries where the government already plays a prominent management role, 
such as the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery.
Cooperative management is to be distinguished from consultative arrangements, which 
have been in existence for several years in the United States and Canada. Such arrangements 
usually involve an advisory board, in which representatives o f  the fishing industry are consulted 
by the government before regulations are introduced. Such is the case with the Maryland oyster 
fishery, where committees o f watermen advise the DNR. In contrast, cooperative management 
means that fishers' organizations not only have a say in the decision-making process, but also 
have the authority to make and implement regulatory decisions.
Localized cooperative fisheries management can be distinguished from other common 
property management systems, in that it is a meeting point between overall government concerns 
for efficient resource utilization and protection, and local concerns for equal opportunities, self- 
determination, and self-control. The responsibility for initiating regulations is shared.
Thus, though cooperative management agreements are unlikely to be a panacea for 
solving all the problems o f the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery, when the benefits and costs are 
taken into account, it must be considered a viable option in comparison to other management 
alternatives.
Perhaps the most common argument in favor o f a localized cooperative fisheries 
management approach is that cooperative organizations that include fishers are in a better 
position to make more equitable regulations than governments alone. Not only are fishers" 
organizations better able to determine what the relevant equity considerations are, they are also 
more capable o f responding adequately to the special needs, demands, and interests o f  individual
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fishers or fisher groups. Governments tend to follow principles o f universalism when dealing
with client fishers. This may guarantee neutral, but not necessarily fair, treatment. Fishers'
cooperative organizations on the other hand, can be more personal, which is sometimes needed to
ensure fairness and equal opportunities.
William Brooks's (1891) insight into the management needs o f  the Maryland oyster
fishery o f  the late 1800s is reflected in the recommendations that he made to the legislature that
address today's needs as well as yesterday’s, but were virtually ignored at that time:
If  I tell the oystermen that it is useless for them to look to the Legislature for the 
improvement and development o f the public beds, I only tell them what they already 
know by long experience.
It has been proved conclusively, over and over again, that our public domain 
cannot be protected without the aid o f the oystermen; but if they would co-operate for the 
enlightened administration of their own business, they would need no new restrictive 
laws. They do not even need to send men to the Legislature to look after their interests, 
nor do they need to fee lawyers to make out a case for them. The enlightened sympathy 
o f  our people is worth more to them than any number of men in the General Assembly, 
or than all the advice o f the best lawyers in the State. For support they must rely upon 
public sentiment, and for success they must trust to their own efforts. If our public beds 
are to be saved from ruin, it must be by the efforts o f the oystermen themselves, by 
organization and co-operation for the purpose, (p. 2 2 1 )
The long-term effects o f introducing cooperative management agreements into the 
Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery are difficult to predict, as it is with most institutional reforms.
The short-term effects may be quite different from the long-term effects and there may be 
transitional problems. In other words, the prospect o f success will be contingent upon the way 
cooperative management is introduced, incrementally or as a grand scheme.
The most important contribution that can realistically be hoped for is that cooperative 
management will confer the regulatory process with legitimacy. This will tend to make 
management both more effective and less costly compared with solely state government control. 
Crucial to the success o f a cooperative management strategy is the actual division o f 
responsibility between government and the fishing industry. The context into which cooperative
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management is to be introduced should be taken into account when cooperative management 
schemes are designed. In a cooperative management plan, all affected parties, be they fisheries 
biologists, government regulators, fisheries-related industries, or the fishers themselves, 
participate in the decision-making. Government can have a role in overall planning, scientific 
support, total quota management, in solving distributional conflicts among various cooperative 
organizations, or in providing sufficient legal support for the cooperatives. Apart from that, 
when it comes to fishing practices, access control, and making distributional decisions among 
individual fishers or boats within a community, local fishers' organizations in general, are well 
suited to the task.
A common property resource, such as an oyster fishery, will be used to excess when 
faced with sufficient demand. This will lead to exploitation, resulting in the depletion of the 
stock. By internalizing the cost o f regulation, monetary and human resources can be allocated 
more efficiently, with increased productivity o f the fishing grounds/habitat and lowered costs due 
to economies o f scale (Pompe & Rockwood, 1993).
The inflexibility and ineffectiveness o f  much government policy makes the cooperative 
solution a desirable alternative. Given the current deregulatory mood in the United States among 
policy makers (examples include: banking, airlines, and telecommunications), who have 
recognized the benefits o f the market incentive approach, it would be practical to consider the 
applicability o f cooperative management as an alternative approach to oyster fisheries 
management and fisheries regulation. If the individual waterman is involved in the stewardship 
of his own fishery, it becomes in the individual’s own self-interest to place the collective needs 
first. Government would still hold an important place at the cooperative management table by 
recommending quotas and the length o f the fishing season, since government for the most part, 
retains the scientific expertise. Also, it is this scientific expertise that can monitor the status of
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The ecological and economic benefits from an efficiently run oyster fishery can be 
considerable. With the prospect o f growing resource scarcity in the Chesapeake Bay oyster 
population and substantial social welfare gains to be realized from proper management, the 
viability o f efficient, local cooperatives should be seriously considered.
Implications for Maryland's Future
If fishing communities have the authority to either prevent or restrict entry into fishing 
areas, the potential for controlling fishing is good. This is a particularly viable management 
option where the commercial species of interest is sessile, such as oysters. Highly mobile 
fisheries are not so amenable to this management strategy because territorial segregation is not as 
feasible. However, as has been tried elsewhere, self-managed quotas and gear restrictions can be 
feasible.
The notion of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) as a means o f assigning each fisher a 
share o f the scientifically determined, total allowable catch is not new and there have been 
studies to measure its efficacy. ITQs, which can be traded or sold, give each fisher an economic 
stake in the recovery o f a fishery, because their value increases as fish populations rebound ("A  
Major Step,” 1997). Traditional fisheries management strategies have led to overbuilt fishing 
fleets, harvest limit over-runs and pressure to raise the limits/quotas. A fisher has no incentive to 
leave a finfish or shellfish in the water since someone else may catch it. Allocating ITQs gives 
fishers a stake in maintaining healthy fish stocks. However, fishers fear that ITQs could favor 
large corporations. ITQs can be designed to avoid giving large firms an advantage and they are 
being used successfully in three fisheries in the United States: halibut and sablefish, surfclams 
and ocean quahogs, and wreck fish.
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One variation on the ITQ approach that has been proposed by Leal (1996) is a Limited 
Partnership Fishery. It is a  cooperative management strategy that may be responsive to the needs 
of the Chesapeake Bay oyster fishery, a mixed gear, territorial fishery. Through the issuance of 
shares, comparable to shares in a publicly traded company, the partnership could establish 
perpetual rights to present and future income streams from the fishery. A study by Ralph 
Townsend (1995) provided the first real evidence that corporate management strategies could 
work as collective governance alternatives in fisheries. The oyster fishery could be defined by 
region (or county) and/or gear type, and the watermen would be permitted to purchase shares in 
the fishery. Out o f each waterman’s earnings from his catch would come a designated 
percentage o f money that would go into a trust fund of sorts. The fund could be used as a source 
of annual dividend payouts to all shareholders and as a source o f  revenue for funding 
enforcement o f regulations and quotas.
Once issued, shares could be easily traded among the watermen and could entitle the 
holder to certain harvest rights, or the right to use certain gear. In other words, a minimum 
number of shares would be required to be allowed a certain harvest limit (number of bushels) or 
to use a certain type of gear (such as patent tongs), or both. A management board consisting of 
watermen elected by fellow watermen in the fishery would need to be established. The board 
would set regulations, such as requirements for licensing, the maximum number o f shares 
allowed per waterman, the gear allowed and their spatial separation on the fishing grounds. As 
in the corporate business world, part o f the responsibility o f this board of watermen, appointed 
by their peers, would be to ensure that the income-producing potential of the fishery is sustained 
over the long term. This is a particularly important point because in order for there to be 
sustained income, the oyster population itself and its habitat must also be conserved.
In a Limited Partnership Fishery, shareholders hold rights to a fishery’s income potential
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and thus have a personal stake in maintaining the future value of the fishery through 
conservation. As with any company, share value will rise or fall depending on the earning 
potential o f the fishery, which is directly related to the biological condition of the oyster stocks 
and the efficiencies o f the fishery. If the value o f  the fishery declines, so will share value. On 
the other hand, if fishing effort is temporarily curtailed to help rebuild future fish stocks, share 
values will rise over the long-term.
Recommendations for Future Research
Any changes in the future will likely be the changing of the rules o f management and 
harvesting for the public grounds. If oyster production is to be increased in the Chesapeake Bay. 
the cooperation, consent, and responsibility o f the watermen are needed for any policy to be 
successfully implemented. This raises several questions that merit further investigation.
1. I f  financial support systems, such as the repletion program, are withdrawn, what other 
employment opportunities can be developed that do not disrupt the culture o f the tidewater 
communities?
2. What other programs can be developed, such as the VIMS project that grows oysters 
above the sediment-laden bottoms, that utilize the native Eastern oyster, reduce losses from 
disease, and are cost effective and commercially viable?
3. What are the barriers to trust and cooperation between fisheries scientists/managers 
and watermen, and what is needed to bring down the barriers?
4. How would an understanding of the life histories o f today’s watermen and their 
families, and the impacts o f regulations and the decline of the fishery on their lives, aid in 
formulating comprehensive management strategies?
5. How might economic models be developed that can measure and incorporate
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nonmonetary benefits and the cost o f habitat destruction?
The research questions posed above point in many directions and involve a wide 
spectrum of professional fields. The future o f fisheries management will not and cannot be 
confined to fisheries biology and population counts. It will need to encompass a broad arena of 
disciplines working together toward a common goal.
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